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NAPOLÉON III.

AND ITALY.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY,

BY

ROBERT HOLMES EDLESTON,

F.S.A., F.R.G.S.,

Author of Letters from Rome in 1903.

PART I.

1830 — 1860.

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TO

M. Émile Ollivier,

OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY,

SOMETIME PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,

THIS SMALL WORK IS,

BY PERMISSION,

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.

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PREFACE.

IN the following pages the writer does not profess to do more than offer to English readers, who have not previously given much thought to the subject, a chronological review of the connection of the Emperor Napoléon III with the Italian 'risorgimento.' The Emperor has been criticised and blamed, not always in measured terms, by writers on both sides dealing with the painful, if exciting, period of Revolution in Italy. It is the endeavour of this humble volume to shew that the Emperor of the French pursued a consistent and reasonable policy, although he may have been too Liberal for the Conservatives, and too Conservative for the Radicals.

The writer would desire to express his grateful thanks for advice and assistance, to Monsieur Émile Ollivier (Prime Minister to Napoléon III); to Colonel Sir Alexander Morgan, K.C.B.; to the Reverend J. J. Cumming, M.A.; to Mrs. Dickinson Edleston; to the Rev. Francis Joseph Bacchus, of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri; to Mr. Edward Sheepshanks; and to Monsieur Charles du Moulin-Browne. The writer is also indebted to the kind courtesy of His Eminence Cardinal Merry del Val, Secretary of State to His Holiness; to General Pelloux (Prime Minister to King Humbert); and to Monsignor Brandi, S.J., Editor of the "Civiltà Cattolica," for direction as to Italian works on the period; and, above all, to Monsieur Franceschini Piétri, Private Secretary to Napoléon III, and now of the Household of Her Imperial Majesty, for his great kindness in sparing time to give a correcting glance at some of the proof sheets of this little volume.

Vienna, May 6th, 1908.

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NAPOLEON III. AND ITALY.

CHAPTER I.
BEFORE THE EMPIRE.

IN the courtyard of the half-deserted Palazzo del Senato at Milan stands Barzaghi's colossal equestrian statue in bronze of Napoléon III. It is a fine specimen of the sculptor's art, and was intended to adorn some central Piazza as a monument of the nation's gratitude to the Liberator of Italy. But it has never been dedicated. Why? Did not Louis Napoléon fulfil the hope of his youth, and when at the summit of Imperial power, by the overwhelming success of the French arms at Magenta and Solferino drive the Austrians out of Lombardy and restore the Province to Italian rule? The friends of Liberalism acclaimed that he did. The conqueror, whose desire was to see Italy free from the Alps to the Adriatic, carried all before him in the short, sharp struggle of 1859, and only made peace at Villafranca when it became evident that to go further would set all Europe in a blaze, and end in horrors, compared with which the carnage of Solferino would pale into insignificance. For Napoléon III had none of his uncle's indifference to human life. But his real fault in the eyes of the leaders of the "risorgimento" was something else. An underlying current of infidelity, amounting indeed at times to anti-religious fanaticism, has marred the whole struggle for Italian unity, in itself an honourable and not necessarily anti-religious movement. The cry of the extremists was ever "a Roma," and to lay hands on the Pope was their ultimate aim. But Louis Napoléon, although a Liberal in the position of an autocrat, and strongly imbued with the idea of nationalities, was a Christian and a Catholic, and nothing would induce him to dispossess the Pope. Far from it, for as history shews, for years he supported the Holy Father in Rome by force of arms. And so the cheers

and the bouquets of Genoa and Milan gave place to the silence of disappointment, the statue at Milan remains in an out of the way corner, and he who did more for Italian unity, than all the sentimental interest of England, is almost forgotten in Italy now. Let us consider in some detail the causes which bound Napoléon III to Italy, and his policy towards that country and the Papacy in particular. We have the authority of the Emperor Napoléon I for saying that the Bonaparte family was of Roman origin, and that it existed in Rome in the year 1000. On April 21st, 1821, Napoléon said at St. Helena, and desired his words to be repeated to his mother, that Madame Mère should marry her daughters in Roman families, and on the 24th, less than a fortnight before his death, he declared that Rome and Switzerland were then the only places where his family could settle, and that Lucien should make his sons Cardinals. King Louis, father of Napoléon III, had repaired to Rome at the restoration of Pius VII in 1814, and on May 24th, when the Pontiff, accompanied by the King of Sardinia, was received in triumph by his subjects, after his long captivity by Napoléon, Madame Mère and Cardinal Fesch arrived in Rome. They were welcomed by the Pope as "great exiles," and although the mother of the Emperor shared his exile in Elba, and the triumph during the *cent jours*, she returned to Rome when Napoléon went to St. Helena, and on August 15th took up her residence with her brother, the Cardinal, in the Palazzo Falconieri at the corner of the Corso and the Piazza Venezia. Hither came Elisa, Pauline, Lucien, Louis, and Jérôme, and the Palazzo Bonaparte, as it is still known, was the residence of Madame Mère until her death there on February 2nd, 1836, and remains the property of the family. Lucien had been made Prince of Canino by Pius VII in 1814, Pauline became Princess Borghese, and in 1824 Queen Hortense brought her two sons Napoléon Louis and Charles Louis Napoléon, afterwards Napoléon III, to Rome for the first time. The elder son, married to Charlotte, daughter of King Joseph, settled at Florence, and did not forget filial duty

towards his lonely father. The younger was there with his mother in 1830, meeting the King, his father, by chance near Viterbo, and when Pius VIII died on November 30th, the Queen and Prince Louis were again in Rome. The two brothers were devoted to each other, they felt themselves quite as much Italian as French, and they were filled with the spirit of adventure. The story of their connection with the Carbonari has no foundation. During the interregnum, Prince Louis was quietly conducted over the frontier of the Papal dominions, leaving his mother in Rome. On February 2nd, 1831, Gregory XVI was elected Pope. Three days later, a revolution broke out in Bologna, a Provisional Government was formed, and the red, white and green flag, now so familiar, was hoisted. The Princes were at Florence, where Menotti said to them "Italy has need of you," their father, mother and King Jérôme urging them to return. No steps were taken by the Papal Government against the rising, and indeed at Ravenna the pro-Legate himself created a Provisional Committee, but an Austrian army was advancing. The two Princes were heard of in command of the line of young Italians from Foligno to Città Castellana, who were threatening to march on Rome, and so King Jérôme wrote urging them to desist, eliciting a reply from Napoléon, couched in respectful terms, to the Pope himself, setting forth the aspirations of the youth of the Romagna. It seems practically certain that what the young men had in view was no dethroning of the Sovereign Pontiff, but a reformed and liberal government, anti-Austrian in tone, under the Pope, in fact very much indeed what Pius IX afterwards sought to establish. But the patriotic movement was doomed to an early failure. On February 26th and 27th, the Princes were with the outposts of the insurgents near Spoleto and Città Castellana, but were soon ordered to retire by their own comrades to Ancona and Bologna.* Queen

* The story has been told, on the authority of M. Louis Thouvenel, that Louis Napoléon threw himself on the protection of the Archbishop of Spoleto (afterwards Pius IX), by whom he was smuggled out of the city, for which act the future Pope was ordered to Rome and punished by Gregory XVI.

Hortense hurried to save her sons, but was met at Pesaro by Louis with the news of the death of Napoléon from measles at Forli on March 17th. The next day Forli surrendered to the Austrian army. The Queen and Louis pushed on to Ancona where numbers were hurrying to embark before the Austrians arrived, but here Louis was seized with measles. On the 26th, Ancona capitulated, and the next day the Austrians entered, but Queen Hortense succeeded in making everyone believe that her son had sailed for Corfu, and actually nursed him in the same house where the Austrian commander, Baron Geppert, lodged. Their rooms were indeed so close that the patient was afraid to cough. On Easter Day, Hortense, having seen the General, obtained permission to leave, and with Louis Napoléon disguised as a servant on the box of her carriage, drove to Loreto for Mass in the famous Casa Santa. Having passed Foligno and Perugia, when once in Tuscany, they used an English passport the Queen had for Italy, France, and England, and travelled as an English lady and her son, though he was the only member of the party who could speak a word of our language. They passed through a part of the Duchy of Modena where reaction was strong, and at Massa even saw the troops turned out to receive the Duke, who had left his capital while the "revolutionists" were being condemned. Louis Napoléon must have thought sadly of the fate of the generous and patriotic Menotti, who, although by no means violent towards the Duke, was executed with the rest. Safe through the territory of this dreaded sovereign, they reached Genoa, and, forwarded by the English consul, went on to Nice and by Antibes, the then frontier, to Paris, where the Prince and his mother were for a time secretly befriended by the King. The patriotic movement was over, reaction triumphed all along the line, backed by the Austrian legions, and Louis Napoléon's first attempt towards nationalising Italy was not encouraging. There seems little doubt that the enthusiasm of some French deputies and journals gave false hopes to the Italian Liberals, although it is known that Louis Philippe himself favoured reforms in the Papal States. We must now pass on to

the year of revolutions, noting events in the interim affecting the career of Louis Napoléon. In 1836, as we have said, Madame Mère died at the age of 86. In this year a project to marry the Prince to his cousin, Princess Mathilde—to this day a leader in Parisian society*—came to nothing, the Strasbourg attempt was made, and the Prince exiled to the United States. The following year Louis Napoléon returned to Europe on account of his mother's illness. The accession of our own Queen Victoria took place while he was on his passage from New York to Liverpool. Arriving at Arenenburg on August 4th, he was with Queen Hortense until her death on October 5th, 1837. In 1840 came the attempt at Boulogne, arranged from London, and the Prince's condemnation to imprisonment for life. On May 25th, 1846, he escaped from Ham, disguised as a workman, all attempts to obtain permission from Louis Philippe for him to visit his sick and lonely father in Italy having failed. King Louis, however, died at Livorno on July 25th, 1846, without seeing his much loved son, as the necessary passports from England were persistently refused. We have to thank the Emperor Napoléon III that this vexatious system, so often the cause of serious inconvenience to private travellers, has long since become obsolete in Western Europe. The year 1846 was a memorable one in Rome. On June 1st, Gregory XVI (Mauro Capellari) died, in the 81st year of his age and 16th of his reign. Born 18th September, 1765, he had been created Cardinal by Leo XII 21st March, 1825, and was elected to the Papacy 2nd February, 1831. On the 16th June, after two days' conclave, at which 54 Cardinals were present, Giovanni Mastai-Feretti was elected Pope, an Austrian veto arriving too late to take effect. Born 13th May, 1792, Cardinal Mastai-Feretti was only 54 years of age when he assumed the tiara with the title of Pius IX. He had been a member of the sacred college a little more than five years, and he was believed to hold views pronouncedly liberal, at all events in comparison with the policy of his immediate predecessor. The coronation took place in

* H. I. H. died in Paris, 2nd January, 1904.

San Pietro on June 21st. On July 1st, the new Pontiff—to the delight of his subjects—appeared on foot in the streets of Rome, and on July 25th—the day of King Louis' death at Livorno—appeared the famous Papal amnesty, which set free 2,000 prisoners. The popularity of the new Pontiff grew by leaps and bounds, prominent Liberals publicly acknowledged his leadership; the walls of Rome were placarded with "Viva il Papa," and on September 8th, no less than 100,000 persons assisted at his Court. At this time the Pope decided to construct a railway from Rome to Naples. On November 7th, the Holy Father solemnly took possession of his Cathedral of the Lateran. Thus much for 1846, but before we pass on to review the revolutionary events of 1848, which paved the way of course for the advent of Louis Napoléon to the position of a Continental ruler, it may be well to consider the map of Italy at that date. We have grown so accustomed to a kingdom of Italy embracing the whole peninsula that it is almost an effort to realise the condition of things as they were from the fall of Napoléon to the readjustment initiated by his nephew. The Congress of Vienna in 1814, which was attended in person by the King of Wurtemberg, the King of Denmark, the Emperor Francis, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor Alexander, found Italy practically in two halves. The central portion was incorporated in the French Empire, and the north, with Milan as its capital, formed a Kingdom of Italy, but with the same sovereign, Napoléon, as the King. This Kingdom also included Dalmatia. The deliberations at Vienna, interrupted in a most dramatic manner by the triumphant return of the Emperor to Paris—he escaped from Elba on February 26th, 1815—when the ill-assorted allies were squabbling over the spoils of his overthrow, bore fruit subsequently as follows:—Piedmont, Savoy, and Nice were restored to Victor Emmanuel I, King of Sardinia, with the addition of Genoa; Ferdinand III, Grand Duke of Tuscany, returned to his dominions, to which Piombino (taken from Napoléon's brother-in-law, Felix Bacciochi) was added; the Duchy of Modena was handed over to the Archduke

Francis; that of Parma to the Archduchess Marie Louise, Empress of the French; the Duke of Parma being compensated with Lucca (taken from Napoléon's sister Elisa Bacciochi); the Pope regained Rome, the Romagna, Ancona, etc.; and Austria took back Lombardy and Venetia. We have omitted the Naples kingdom in this category, partly because it was not directly under the rule of Napoléon, and King Joachim (Murat) was not dispossessed until after a war with Austria in 1815. It was, as a result of this war, that Ferdinand IV, King of Naples and Sicily, who had been restricted for some years, like the King of Sardinia, to the island portion of his dominions, returned to Naples, when he immediately changed his style and title to that of Ferdinand I, King of the two Sicilies. In the course of this short war, Murat carried the attack into the Marches, the Pope retiring to Florence, and it was to the English fleet that Naples eventually capitulated on May 11th. The Pope, who was at Livorno at the end of March under British protection (as was the Queen of Etruria at Genoa), returned to Rome at the end of May. From this time until 1848, the *status quo* under the treaties of 1815 may be said to have been maintained. There were of course minor revolutions, such as that of 1821 in Piedmont which led to the abdication of Victor Emmanuel I—his ultimate successor, Charles Albert, leading the insurgents—and the events of 1831, in which Louis Napoléon played a part as before-mentioned, soon crushed by Austrian legions. There were, of course, changes in the personnel of the rulers. In 1831, Carlo Felice—the last Prince of the elder branch of the House of Savoy—was succeeded at Turin by Charles Albert. Francis I succeeded Ferdinand I at Naples in 1825, during the Austrian occupation, and was in turn succeeded by Ferdinand II in 1830. In Tuscany, Leopold II succeeded his father in 1824, while the Papacy, as we have seen, suffered several changes. The year 1848 shook absolutism to the core. The French King fled, the Austrian Emperor abdicated, the King of Prussia only just kept his place, and in Italy everything was turned upside down. The Pope, the Kings of Naples and Sardinia,

and the Grand Duke of Tuscany all promised constitutions, but it was little use. Events moved so rapidly that we must take them in strict chronological order. On the 6th of January, Count Camillo Cavour demanded from Charles Albert the concession of a Constitution, and on February 7th, the King yielded. In February, following upon a reverse sustained by the Royal troops in dealing with the rising in Sicily, King Ferdinand granted the constitution of 1812 which had been guaranteed by England at the time, but conveniently allowed to drop. The insurrection broke out at Palermo on January 12th, the King's birthday, the people shouting—"Liberty, Sicily, and Pius IX." At the same time the troops were withdrawn from the island and an amnesty granted, the Governments of Austria, Russia and Prussia protesting against King Ferdinand's liberal programme. Naples also obtained a constitution from the same sovereign, and the King of Sardinia, the Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany promised the like to their subjects. On March 18th, the celebrated "cinque giornate" insurrection broke out at Milan, on the last day of which the King of Sardinia entered the town to aid the insurgents against the Austrians. Venice also revolted against Austria and established a Republic under Daniele Manin, which only yielded to Marshal Radetzky in August after five months' siege. By May 15th, Ferdinand II had successfully put an end to the Naples Rebellion. The better deeds of this much maligned sovereign have been forgotten owing to the habit some people have of treating seriously the fiery invective of Mr. W. E. Gladstone. It was far otherwise elsewhere. King Charles Albert was prosecuting a vigorous national campaign against the foreigner, although the Lombards hardly showed themselves worthy of the assistance of the valorous Piedmontese.

Radetzky's legions did indeed win the day on May 29th, at Cortova, but the following day the Piedmontese defeated the Austrian Commander at Goito, and Peschiera was surrendered by General Rath to the Piedmontese after six weeks' siege. On July 25th, however, Radetzky scored a victory at Custozza, after several days' fighting, and Charles Albert retreated

towards Cremona, the Austrians now attacking Peschiera. The King of Sardinia's appeal to the French Republic for 60,000 men was refused, for Louis Napoléon was not as yet in a position to aid him, and Radetzky gaining a big victory at Milan on August 6th, the King wisely consented to an armistice three days later. The smaller insurrections in the Emilia were soon crushed by Austria, although Charles II, Duke of Parma (who had succeeded the Empress Marie Louise the year before, and forthwith given up Lucca to Tuscany) had to abdicate in favour of his son. Charles III, who succeeded, was murdered in 1854, as we shall see later, while his father lived in exile until 1883. The Pope and the Duke of Modena were speedily made secure in the Romagna and the Duchy, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany was able to hold his own until the following year. But the troubles of 1848 were not over in Italy. In May, serious disturbances arose in Rome. The people, egged on by the liberal leaders, clamoured for war with Austria. Austrian troops had actually invaded the Legations. Mamiani, at this time, resigned the Premiership. Pius IX, for a time, yielded to the popular cry. The Pope, firmly resolved to repel the Austrian invader, declared war, with Rossi as Premier, despatching 17,000 men under General Durando to the front, bearing colours blessed in Rome. The Austrian Ambassador left Rome, and the most extreme Radicals cheered the Pope to the echo.

But the soul of the priest recoiled from the idea of causing bloodshed, and he held back his troops with the result that his own throne was speedily endangered from the baffled nationalists. On November 15th, Count Rossi, the Pope's lay Prime Minister, was murdered on the steps of the Chamber of Deputies.* The mob shortly afterwards attacked the Quirinal. The Swiss guard defended the Palace, but the Pope was forced to appear, and Mgr. Palma was killed. Pius IX summoned Minghetti, and, after some delay, Mamiani was appointed Foreign Minister in the Galetti-Sterbini Ministry, but the Pope became terrorised, and, on November 24th, escaped from the Quirinal to Gaeta.

* Palazzo della Cancellaria.

The revulsion of feeling was complete. Little more than a year before Mazzini had written the following remarkable letter to the then popular Pontiff:—"Unify Italy, your country, and to this end you have no need to do more than to bless those who work for you in your name. We will make a nation to rise up around you, whose free and popular development you will preside over during your life-time. We will found a unique government in the midst of Europe, which shall destroy the absurd divorce between spiritual and temporal power, and in which you will be chosen to represent the principle to which the men called to represent the nation will make the application." A dream perhaps, but surely no ignoble one. One is tempted to wonder how soon the obstinate Republican, the justifier of assassination, forgot t. To return to our chronicle. In the Naples kingdom, the newly-constituted Parliament met in May, many of the deputies arriving with armed bands from Calabria, and refusing to take the oath to the Constitution. Barricades were erected, and hundreds of revolutionaries were taken red-handed, but the King speedily released them. The King's first attempt at liberalism was certainly not encouraging, and, this much-abused monarch, Ferdinand II—who had almost put an end to capital punishment in his dominions—was driven to give up the attempted reform. The country was very far from ready for the privilege. After a dissolution and new elections, resulting in another unruly Parliament, and more than one prorogation, the King finally resolved to listen to the 2,293 petitions addressed to him against the Constitution, and his Ministers agreeing, suspended the Constitution altogether early in 1849. In Rome, the Parliament began at once to negotiate for the return of the Pope. On December 3rd, a deputation, to which the Municipality added the Syndic, Prince Corsini, and two ecclesiastics, was ordered to request the sovereign to return to his dominions. The Pope declined. On January 1st, 1849, Prince Louis Napoléon, since December President of the French Republic, expressed to the Papal Nuncio at the customary New Year's reception, his wish to

see Pius IX speedily restored to his dominions. It was not long before the Prince became the instrument of his restoration. On February 8th, the Constituent Assembly in Rome, by 136 out of 144 votes, proclaimed the deposition of the Pope and by a majority of 120 the establishment of a Republic. A few days later, an Austrian army entered Ferrara, and Field Marshal Haynau demanded the reinstatement of the Papal troops. It was about this time that Lord Palmerston made one of his ill-judged speeches in the House of Commons, on the Italian Question, attacking King Ferdinand of Naples without moderation. Palmerston was always ready to do this, although the moment the Emperor Louis Napoléon raised the hopes of Italians, he joined his voice with the rest of English statesmen in deprecating any interference with the treaties of 1815.

In February, a Republic was proclaimed in Tuscany and the Grand Duke retired from Florence to San Stefano, where two English ships were told to await his orders. On March 21st, Radetzky began hostilities in the North again, and marched towards Turin. Two days later, he inflicted a crushing defeat on the pious and patriotic Charles Albert at Novara. The King immediately abdicated in favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel II. In France, the defeat of the Piedmontese was viewed with anything but satisfaction, and the Chamber voted a loan to prevent any intervention of Austria in Rome. The armistice between Austria and Sardinia only lasted a few days, and, on March 31st, Marshal Haynau captured Brescia. On April 5th, the Genoese Republic capitulated to the Piedmontese General, La Marmora, acting in the name of Victor Emmanuel II. Meanwhile, the Republic set up in April at Florence, had made itself so thoroughly hated that, in a couple of months, the Grand Ducal rule was quietly re-established. It was now the turn of France to interfere in Rome, and thus fulfil the hope expressed by the President to the Papal Nuncio in Paris, on *le jour de l'an*. A powerful expedition, under General Oudinot, landed at Cività Vecchia, on the 25th April, and on the 28th started for Rome. On the

30th, they attacked the city but were repulsed by the Republicans. Then ensued a long pause, during which M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, to whom the very ambiguous task can hardly have been congenial, was instructed to confer with the leaders of the Roman Republic. In this way matters dragged on until Oudinot was able to take less tentative action, and, on June 1st, the General disavowed the Lesseps conference, and said his orders were to take Rome, but he would not begin for a few days out of regard for the French in the city. On June 3rd the French began the attack. They occupied the Villa Corsini, dominating the Porta San Pancrazio, took the Villa Pamphili Doria, and bombarded the Porta del Popolo. But it was a varying fight for some time. The defending force of 20,000, under General Rosselli, fought desperately, and Garibaldi, who had arrived in Rome at the end of April with 12,000 legionaries, was in the thick of it. They even retook the Villa Corsini, but, by sunset, the French had all points outside the Porta San Pancrazio except the Villa Vascello, and had got Monte Mario. On June 12th, Oudinot invited a capitulation, and the following day opened fire on the ramparts of Rome with vigour.

On the 27th and 29th there was fighting within the city, and Garibaldi, who was fighting with the rest, advised the Government to surrender. On June 30th the Assembly agreed, Mazzini dissenting, and the city surrendered. On July 3rd the French made their official entry, and re-established the authority of the Pope, Garibaldi departing unmolested. On July 31st, three Cardinals arrived "*au nom du Pape*," and inaugurated reaction, although the Prince President, Louis Napoléon, in a letter to Lieutenant Edgar Ney, orderly officer to the expedition, strongly advised a liberal Papal government, which letter was published in the non-official columns of the "Moniteur." In this letter the Prince reiterated the liberal, but thoroughly loyal ideas he had struggled for in 1831.* It

* "The French Republic did not send an army to Rome to stifle Italian liberty there, but on the contrary, to regulate it by preserving it against its own excesses, and to give it a solid foundation by replacing on the pontifical throne the Prince who was the first to

was not until August 28th, that the Austrians met with success at Venice. The entire praise or blame (according to the taste of the writer) for the armed intervention of France cannot justly be awarded to Louis Napoléon. The 325 deputies, who voted for the expedition, were probably influenced both by eagerness to demonstrate France's right to preserve order in Italy, and also by a desire to rally to the support of the sovereign Pontiff. For the Second Republic was not the outcome of an anti-religious movement. Whatever its faults, it had none of the fanaticism of the First Republic, or indeed of the Third, as we know it now.

The patriot poet, Lamartine, had nothing in common with Robespierre, neither was he in any way reflected in 1870 in the vulgar "Tribune of the People," the "raving lunatic" of Monsieur Thiers—Léon Gambetta. In comparing the shortcomings of the Second Republic with those of the Third, one might well apply the very just remark of a well-known adversary of the Empire,* when he wrote as follows:—"The famous corruption of the Empire, how innocent it would seem, if put side by side with the depravity unredeemed by good-humour, which has succeeded it!" Pius IX remained for some time longer under the protection of the King of Naples at Gaeta, and did not return to Rome until April 12th, 1850. Thus the French Republic, with Louis Napoléon as President, re-established the Papal Government at Rome. On December 2nd, 1851, came the *coup d'état*, and, in the following year, the Prince President made his triumphal tour through the Departments. Of his return to Paris in October, Walewski wrote to Lord Malmesbury:—"*Il y aura une chorus unanime de 'Vive l'Empereur et vive Napoléon III.'*" And this must bring our rough survey of events in Italy as they affected the career of Louis Napoléon "*avant l'Empire*" to a close, for the Prince, confirmed on the morrow of the *coup d'etat* by a majority of 6,798,479 as the sole responsible head of the

place himself boldly at the head of all useful reforms . . . I sum up thus the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Pope:—General amnesty, secularization of the administration, the Code Napoléon and liberal government."

* M. Henri Fouquier.

French Republic, was a year later, by a still greater preponderance of 7,570,980 votes, summoned by the nation to ascend an Imperial throne.

CHAPTER II.

SARDINIA IN THE COUNCILS OF EUROPE.

"The Emperor's policy consisted in founding a solid association of Europe, in resting his system on the foundation of complete nationalities, and the satisfaction of common interests." So wrote Napoléon III of his uncle in "Les Idées Napoléoniennes,"* and in the same work he quotes the following sentences of his great predecessor as spoken at St. Helena. "One of my greatest thoughts has been the combination, the concentration, of the same geographical peoples, that have been dissolved, disintegrated, by revolution and policy. I would have wished to make each one of these peoples a single and organic national body. The first sovereign who shall honestly embrace the cause of the peoples in the next general fight will find himself at the head of all Europe, and will be able to try anything he pleases." Here we have the key to the foreign policy of the Emperor Napoléon III, embraced by him with all earnestness and sincerity, and destined to meet with no inconsiderable success. It is quite extraordinary how this policy has been misunderstood and misrepresented. It was, of course, most obnoxious to extremists, absolutist or clerical, but, as a matter of fact, all the governments of Europe hated it. It has been described as tortuous, devious and double-faced, dishonest, utterly unscrupulous, or a pure hallucination. This last phrase is used by General du Barail—neither a supporter or opponent of the Empire—in a remarkable passage which is worth quoting. "*La politique intérieure de Napoléon III a donné a ce pays-ci quelques années de grande prosperité économique, et lui a permis, en somme, d'épargner de quoi payer les erreurs d'une politique étrangère de pure hallucination.*"† And again, "*de la campagne d'Italie est sortie l'Europe moderne dont le poids nous écrase.*" "*Il*

* t. ii, p. 419.
† *Mes Souvenirs*, t. iii., p. 322.

*se lança dans l'aventure Italienne prodiguant avec la complicité et l'applaudissement des revolutionnaires des deux mondes, l'or et le sang francais, pour payer une de ses erreurs de jeunesse, le rêve d'une Italie unifiée."** It is curious to turn from this criticism of the Emperor's policy from a loyal soldier of the Empire, to the almost friendly summary of the same policy by M. Gabriel Hanotaux, the predecessor of M. Delcassé, as "indispensable" Minister of Foreign Affairs, and an advanced Republican. M. Hanotaux, in his "Contemporary France,"† says:—"It may be said of the Emperor Napoléon III that he placarded his foreign policy on the walls in anticipation." "Abroad, his action was simplicity itself, like the thought of the peoples to whom he appealed." "The force of this propagandist policy in Europe was such that Napoléon III was, for the moment, the arbitrator among the Powers because he had always the peoples on his side. If he had always been victorious, he would have carried away the liberals of all countries, even those of France." "Napoléon in insurrection against Europe, thought he could find a point of support in the English alliance. England, always concerned with her commercial interests, grew with the aid of the nephew of the Emperor whom she had conquered. At the outset, she accompanied him in all his adventures, free to quit him when he was once deeply engaged. She knew how to stop him at the decisive moment and to snatch the fruits of victory from him when the time came. It was thus in the Crimea,‡ in China, in Italy, in Mexico. And at last, when the Franco-German war put the fate of Europe in suspense, she failed him once again. As for the other great Powers, they all had their grievances against the impetuosity of Napoléon and of France. The grievance of Russia was Poland; of Austria, Italy"; and so on. How they took their revenge we shall see later. For our present purpose it is necessary to take up our chronicle of Franco-Italian events at the inauguration of the Second Empire. For the first two years, the Emperor was naturally too concerned with home affairs to turn his attention to Italy.

* *Mes Souvenirs*, t. iii., p. 320.
† Vol. i, pp. 8 et seq.
‡ We take a somewhat different view in England.

How long indeed the Italian question, as regards the great Powers, might have slumbered it is impossible to say, had it not been for the irrepressible Cavour, but probably until some revolutionary act forced it upon public attention. But Cavour wished for no such development as this. His object was so to insinuate Sardinia into the Councils of Europe that the Powers, or at least one of them, should have to take him seriously. And thus it was that a brave Sardinian contingent was found fighting side by side with England and France, in the defence of the Turk against the tyrant Russia, and Sardinian Plenipotentiaries were summoned to the Congress of Paris.

It was in the October of 1852 that Cavour first became the Prime Minister of Victor Emmanuel II, on the resignation of Massimo d'Azeglio after a quarrel with the French Minister at Turin, M. Bateauval. It was only a brief tenure, for d'Azeglio soon resumed office. Field Marshal Radetzky was then Governor of Lombardy and Venetia for the Emperor Francis Joseph, with two Lieutenant-Governors under him, having his residence at Verona. On December 4th, 1852, after some slight hesitation, the English Court officially recognised the French Empire. In the spring of the following year, a rising was attempted in Milan, as a protest against the sequestration of the property of some political exiles. The Piedmontese Government protested to Austria that this was a violation of the arrangement in the peace of 1850. The English Government supported the Sardinian view, the Prince Consort especially condemning the Austrian policy. On March 7th, the Austrian Government issued a threatening note to Sardinia. On the 20th, the Emperor of the French spoke his mind on the subject in an interview with Lord Malmesbury in Paris. The Emperor said that Italy gave him great anxiety, especially the Austrian insolence to Sardinia. The Emperor Francis Joseph was, he observed, a very energetic and clever man, and would make a figure in the future. He disapproved of Count Buol's policy, and agreed that the Austrian Emperor was ambitious. In the summer of

1853, the English and Sardinian Courts were brought into closer relations by the visit of the distinguished young Duke of Genoa (the father of Queen Margherita) to England.

At this time Cavour was by no means a popular hero at Turin. He was naturally extremely unpopular with the clerical party, and liberals did not care for him. His house was attacked by the mob, and King Victor Emmanuel, never very guarded in his language, called the Minister "*la Bestia nera.*" In the October of this year, there was nearly a serious rupture between France and Naples, owing to King Ferdinand having placed two French officers, sent by the Emperor Napoléon to a review as a compliment, in quarantine, because one of these officers was the reputed author of an anti-royalist pamphlet. For a short time the French Minister was recalled from Naples. On March 29th, 1854, the Duke of Parma (Charles III) was assassinated in the street, and his widow, Marie Louise of Bourbon (sister of the Comte de Chambord) became Regent for the young Duke Robert, the present dispossessed Sovereign of that State. On April 10th, a Convention was signed between England and France, preliminary to the Crimean war. In September, the Prince Consort paid a visit to the Emperor Napoléon at the camp of Boulogne, which visit was the occasion of much important political conversation. The Prince, who thought the Emperor "decidedly benevolent and anxious for the good of his people," has recorded in a memorandum some of the Emperor's views on the Italian question. The Emperor told the Prince that he would like to see Lombardy free from the maladministration of Austria. The Prince said Austria would never consent to this, though he wished it, for her own sake. "She would never give up the line of the Mincio." The Emperor replied that he "would be glad if even the Milanese only could be freed." The Prince reminded the Emperor that Austria herself had, in 1848, offered to give up Lombardy in whatever form England pleased, provided she would obtain peace for her in return. Lord Palmerston had however refused to entertain anything of the kind, insisting upon Austria giving up the

whole of her Italian kingdom. The Emperor said he had never heard of this, and "called it a capital blunder of policy." On April 16th, 1855, the Emperor Napoléon and the Empress Eugénie arrived in England on their memorable state visit to Queen Victoria and Prince Albert, which lasted until the 21st. The Crimean war was then at its height, and the Emperor was bent on going out himself, from which project it took all the persuasions of Queen and Ministers at Windsor to restrain him. The French Emperor was in a manner represented at the front by his first cousin, Prince Napoléon, as Queen Victoria was by the Duke of Cambridge. The Emperor had barely returned to France, from the cheers of the English people to the consequently increased enthusiasm of his own, when an attempt was made on his life. On the 29th of April, the Sovereign was shot at twice in the Champs Elysées by Giacomo Pianori, but rode on at a walking pace unmoved, saluting the crowds. Revenge for the occupation of Rome was said to be the motive of this crime. The visit to England was an unqualified success, and established mutual relations of confidence between Queen Victoria and Napoléon III, which were of the utmost value to the cause of liberalism and progress. The Queen described her Imperial guest as "not profuse in phrases, and very steady of purpose." This very steadiness of purpose, which the Emperor exhibited in regard to the affairs of Italy, was unfortunately destined to try severely the *entente cordiale* between England and France. The English Ministries of both parties, notwithstanding Palmerston's occasional ebullitions, were resolutely opposed, supported and often guided by the Court, to any interference with the treaties of 1815.

Meanwhile, things were not proceeding too smoothly at Turin. King Victor Emmanuel lost his brother, the Duke of Genoa, in February; and, within a few weeks of each other, the two Queens—his mother and his wife—died. He then found himself engaged in anti-clerical legislation. The "Rattazziana" laws on religious corporations, readjusting clerical incomes, passed the Chamber, Cavour on

the right centre supporting Rattazzi, the leader of the moderate left. The King, now without the counsels of the pious and amiable Queens, was induced to give the Royal assent, with the result that the Pope, on July 27th, published major excommunication in Consistory against all concerned. Victor Emmanuel was, however, winning over some Republicans to his side. Manin, the ex-President of the Venetian Republic, then living at Paris in poverty, wrote—after the Piedmontese participation in the Crimean war:—"I, a Republican, plead the banner of unification." Cavour called him for his pains "a very good man, but mad about Italian unification." On May 8th, Walewski, the French Ambassador in London, was appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was succeeded at the Court of St. James' by Persigny. On November 29th, King Victor Emmanuel, with Cavour and d'Azeglio, arrived in Paris; and, after a visit of a few days to the Court of the Tuileries, proceeded to London on a visit to Queen Victoria. Somewhat grotesquely, several religious societies in England betook themselves to Buckingham Palace to present addresses to the Sardinian Monarch, his well-known habits being apparently amply atoned for in their eyes by the fact that he had displeased the Pope. On April 20th, 1856, Cavour and d'Azeglio, who had attended the Congress of Paris, were in London, and called on Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office. On October 23rd, Lord Malmesbury, who was dining with Cavour in Turin, records the fact that the Duc de Gramont was out of favour there, whilst the English Minister, Mr. Hodson—who openly sided with the revolutionary party—was very much the reverse. So little did the Piedmontese yet realise which country would help them, and which would throw obstacles in their way. In November, the English and French Governments protested against King Ferdinand's methods to the extent of withdrawing their Ministers from Naples, and ordering the combined fleets to bluster in the bay, much in the same way as such demonstrations are sometimes applied now-a-days to "bluff" the Sultan, or administer a wholesome check at the

Piræus. On August 6th, 1857, the Emperor and Empress of the French arrived at Osborne on a visit to the Queen, Walewski and Persigny accompanying their sovereign.* The landing took place at the Osborne private pier between 9-0 and 10-0 a.m., and the Isle of Wight was almost girded with police and detectives during the Imperial visit. Several conferences took place between Palmerston, Clarendon, Walewski and Persigny, the Emperor and the Prince Consort had long and serious talks, and on the 10th the Imperial guests departed.†

It was hoped, at all events by the Emperor, that the personal interchange of views on the European situation might remove the slight uneasiness felt at the English Court as to the possible re-opening of the Italian question. At the beginning of 1858, an event occurred which profoundly affected the whole situation. On January 14th, a desperate attempt was made by Felix Orsini and three other Italians to assassinate the Emperor in Paris by means of hand-grenades. It is not too much to say that, while in France itself this dastardly act merely caused a temporary return to iron rule, abroad, its effect was far-reaching in the extreme. It brought about the fall of the Liberal Ministry in England, with the consequent return of the Conservatives to power, and caused many harmless and amiable—and even some learned—persons in this country to fear an immediate French invasion. It originated the Volunteers and last, but not least, it hastened the fulfilment of the Emperor's Italian policy. At first, naturally enough, the King of Sardinia feared that the attempt, on the part of Italians, to assassinate the one ruler in Europe

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* In accepting the invitation on May 30th, the Emperor wrote:—"*Persigny m'a écrit que votre Majesté daignait nous inviter à aller passer quelques jours à Osborne* in private; *Rien ne saurait nous être plus agréable, car il nous semble qu'il y a déjà bien longtemps que nous ne nous sommes vus.*"

† In a letter of thanks on August 15th the Emperor wrote:—"*Je crois que, lorsqu'on a passé quelques jours dans votre intimité, on en revient meilleur, de même, lorsqu'on a su apprécier les connaissances variées et le jugement élevé du Prince, on revient d'auprès de lui plus instruit et plus apte à faire le bien.*" Commenting on this letter to the Queen on August 20th, Lord Clarendon truly observed: "*the Emperor is France*, and France moreover in her best form."

with Italian sympathies, might ruin their cause for ever with that Monarch, but it was far otherwise. It quickened the Emperor's hitherto almost secret sympathies with the aims of those who sought to destroy their best friend, and caused him to work more steadfastly than ever—not necessarily from fear for his own personal safety as has not unnaturally been suggested—to bring about the re-opening of the Italian question. This is not the place to describe in detail the Orsini conspiracy, and its attempted fulfilment. We shall see later how it affected the career of an English Radical Minister. Suffice it to say that the Emperor and Empress had a most narrow escape, both being hit by projectiles from the bomb which exploded close to the Imperial carriage as it stopped at the door of the Opéra, and that 10 persons were killed and 156 wounded. The Emperor, in a letter to the Queen, deeply deplored the number of persons hurt. The late Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha (Ernest II) has given in his memoirs a thrilling account of the scene at the entrance to the Opéra, where he was awaiting the arrival of the Sovereign. Orsini wrote from his prison the following remarkable appeal to the Emperor:—"Let your Majesty remember that the Italians, of whom my father was one, shed with joy their blood for Napoléon the Great, and that they remained faithful to him to the last. Bear in mind that the tranquillity of Europe and of your Majesty will be a chimæra so long as Italy is not independent. Set my country free, and the blessings of twenty-five millions of men will follow you through succeeding generations."* It is almost impossible not to wish, with at least one distinguished and sincere admirer of the Emperor Napoléon III, that the Sovereign could have seen his way to exercising the prerogative of mercy in the case of Orsini. It is more than probable that he might have done so, but for the violent public execration of the attempt and all connected with it, which immediately arose in France. When it became known, very soon, that the plot was hatched in London, public indignation arose to an

* This letter, and a later one, condemning assassination, were sent by the Emperor to Cavour for publication in Italy.

alarming extent, and the Emperor was entreated to allow his armies to hunt out the nest of traitors and assassins across the Channel. It needed all the firmness of so immoveable a man as the Emperor Louis Napoléon to avoid most dangerous international results. To return for a moment to Orsini. The report that the Emperor visited him in prison and personally gave him assurances of his intention to liberate Italy is untrue, but it was characteristic of one of the most fair-minded and generous-hearted of men to allow some intimation of his intentions towards Italy to reach the wretched but patriotic criminal, in his condemned cell.* The effects of the Orsini attempt on the life of the Emperor of the French were, as we have seen, felt profoundly in England. Although the Emperor restrained the ardour of the Colonels who hastened to the Tuileries with loyal but fiery addresses, his Government naturally entered into communications with the English Cabinet on the subject, and with considerable insistence. The result was, that on February 9th Lord Palmerston introduced what was known as the Refugee Bill in the House of Commons. What the Prime Minister's own views on the subject were it would not be easy to say, for, while he sympathised with Italian revolutionaries, he was an admirer of the Emperor Napoléon. Disraeli, in opposition, supported the Bill, placing principle above party, while Lord John Russell opposed his own chief. The first reading was carried on February 10th, by 299 to 99, but the Government were defeated on the second reading on the 20th, by 234 to 215, and Lord Palmerston resigned. Two days later Lord Derby accepted office, giving the Foreign Office, vacated by Clarendon, to Lord Malmesbury for the second time. In this government it is interesting to remember that the Dowager Duchess of Devonshire† was Mistress of the Robes. The new Conservative government tried to proceed with the Refugee Bill, but, as soon as March 2nd, found it quite impossible, owing to the strange conduct of Lord John

* In his second letter, Orsini wrote:—"*Les sentiments de sympathie de V.M. pour l' Italie ne sont pas pour moi un mince réconfort au moment de mourir.*"

† Then Duchess of Manchester.

Russell and Mr. W. E. Gladstone, backed by 140 Radicals. Even so early as 1858, the strong contrast between Disraeli and Gladstone, when it came to a matter of principle, shewed itself to the discredit of the latter. While the question of the anarchists sheltered in London was still the subject of delicate *pourparlers* between the French and English Governments, the troubles of Italy forced themselves again upon the world by the affair of the "Cagliari." This ship, manned by Carbonari, was stopped by the Neapolitan Government when on the way to stir up a Revolution in Calabria, and the crew unfortunately included two English engineers, named Park and Watt. These men of course found themselves in prison, the former at Palermo, and the latter at Naples, and the affair afforded a left-handed pretext for a Radical attack on the Government. On the very day of this attack in the Commons —March 12th — Persigny presented to Lord Malmesbury Count Walewski's reply to the English Government's case on the Refugee question, which reply was most conciliatory. Great credit is due to Lord Malmesbury and Count Walewski for the amiable solution of this delicate and, at one time, very threatening question. Both statesmen were seriously hampered by their fellow-countrymen in finding a way out of the difficulty, and both displayed remarkable tact and moderation.* This result reached, Persigny, who was always of the party in France to distrust the Conservative Government and intrigue for the return of Palmerston to power, resigned his Embassy. The Emperor accepted it with regret, and nominated Marshal Pélissier as his successor. The Crimean hero arrived in London on April 15th, his appointment being welcomed as a compliment by the English people. So the storm cloud between England and France passed away. To return to the "Cagliari" affair. There was little doubt that the Sardinian Government were privy to the designs of the ship, in the hope of provoking a war. The English Govern-

* Orsini and Pieri were executed on March 13th. Rudio has recently (1908) made some remarkable disclosures. The ex-conspirator states that Mazzini prompted the attempted assassination from London, and that Crispi was present on the night of the attempt.

ment, of course, made representations to the Neapolitan Government on the capture of the English engineers. The latter at first refused to give satisfaction, but before long consented to release Watt, keeping Park for trial at Palermo without delay. In April, Lord Malmesbury had an interview with d'Azeglio in London. The Sardinian Minister was somewhat *difficile*, but the Foreign Secretary maintained a firm attitude, discouraging any disturbance of the peace from the direction of Turin. On the 29th of this month, Lord Malmesbury spoke at length on the *affaire* in the House of Lords. "It had arisen," he said, "from a determination on the part of the Sardinian Government and their supporters in this country to provoke an Italian war." Her Majesty's Cabinet were determined to thwart the Sardinian Government. The seizure of English engineers was doubtless illegal, that of the ship doubtful, English legal opinion being divided on the subject. This explanation was well received in the House. On May 16th, the Cabinet of Turin expressed compliance with Lord Malmesbury's ideas; and on June 11th, the King of Naples offered £3,000 compensation for the British engineers, and gave up the "Cagliari" and her crew to England. In July, the Emperor Napoléon and Count Cavour had a private meeting at Plombières. When this became known it set the Cabinets of Europe thinking, and gave colour to the rumour that the Emperor of the French was not averse to intervening in Italy. It soon became whispered that Cavour had obtained a promise of assistance from the French Emperor against Austria, on the understanding that Nice and Savoy were ceded by Sardinia to France.

The actual compact of Plombières, which was to have such far-reaching results, we shall see later, as it was revealed subsequently by the Emperor to Lord Malmesbury. Before Plombières the French Emperor had had an epoch-making interview with the Czar at Stuttgart—a sort of repetition of Tilsit—when the Russian monarch told his brother Emperor that he could do as he liked in Italy. This "benevolence" on the part of the Autocrat of all the Russias was probably the

most important determining factor in the definite shaping of the French Emperor's policy in the succeeding spring. Had the Czar been averse to the raising of the Italian question, it must inevitably have been postponed, just as had Prussia remained quiescent during the war, Venetia might have been freed with Lombardy. Austria was believed, at this time, to be not unwilling to fight and crush Sardinia afresh, and had been strengthening her position in Italy for years in the belief that France and Russia were both weakened by the Crimean war. On August 5th, Queen Victoria and Prince Albert, with Lord Malmesbury, arrived at Cherbourg to visit the Emperor and Empress of the French, with a special view of discussing common action as regards Naples, from which Court the Ministers of both countries had been withdrawn for some time.

There had been much idle talk about the King of Naples' treatment of political prisoners. The late Liberal Ministry had had some years' angry correspondence with Naples on the subject of Poerio. Many extravagant statements were made, notably by Gladstone, which would not bear examination. The Naples Government offered to Lord Clarendon to send the prisoners to South America, provide for them temporarily, and exile them, but Palmerston refused the offer. However, when Lord Malmesbury was in Berlin with the Queen in August, 1858, the subject was re-opened. Malmesbury asked the Neapolitan Minister one day at Potsdam for the release of Poerio. This was promised by Massone on condition that Poerio sailed for America. Massone afterwards asked to see the English Minister, and intimated that his Government trusted to renew official relations. England could not act without France, however, and Bernstorff told Malmesbury that the King of Naples would not re-open negotiations and would have no interference. He would send Ministers to Paris and London, but he was glad to have no English and French Ministers at his Court. Lord Malmesbury was inclined to let things remain as they were, but Massone kept to his promise as to the release of prisoners on the terms

originally offered to the Liberal Government. Poerio was therefore set free; but this "type of the Italian Conspirator," as even Crispi called him, found it consistent with his sense of honour to bribe with others the Captain of the ship which was taking him to America, and he came to London instead. On December 9th, the Queen wrote to Lord Malmesbury that she was "much alarmed by what Lord Cowley writes from Paris as to the Emperor Napoléon's supposed intentions to bring on a war in Italy. Whatever can be done to turn the Emperor's mind from such a project," the Queen said, "ought to be done." It "must in all probability lead to a war with Germany." A quasi-official denial was obtained from Paris to quiet this uneasiness, but it was becoming evident that the Emperor's Italian sympathies were taking fresh impetus. As to Austria, her view of the situation was given unequivocally enough at the end of the year when Count Buol, in a despatch to Hübner in Paris, said, "the Italian question could not be re-opened," "no exchange, no cession, no negotiation." Count Apponyi read the despatch, from which the above words are quoted, to Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office, on December 13th, so that the English Government were aware, at the close of the year 1858, of the existence of serious divergence of view between Paris and Vienna on the persistently recurring and troublesome question of the independence of Italy.

CHAPTER III.

THE WAR OF 1859.

"But now, Napoléon, now
That, leaving far behind the purple throng
Of vulgar monarchs, thou
Tread'st higher in thy deed,
Than stair of throne can lead,
To help in the hour of wrong
The broken hearts of nations to be strong—
Now, lifted as thou art
To the level of pure song,
We stand to meet thee on these Alpine snows!—
. . . . . .
Sublime Deliverer!—after many days
Found worthy of the deed thou art come to do."

MRS. BROWNING.

On January 1st, 1859, the Emperor Napoléon, at the customary diplomatic reception at the Tuileries, spoke those memorable words to Baron Hübner, the Austrian Ambassador. Their utterance disquieted the Powers of Europe, causing a general uneasiness which the Imperial Government and the Emperor himself promptly did their best to allay. I quote the exact text of this sentence as it is given by Grant Duff, who had it from Baron Hübner himself. "I hope you will tell the Emperor that, although the relations between our Ministers are not as satisfactory as I could desire, my feelings towards him are most cordial."

The words were spoken in a conciliatory manner, and there is no doubt that the Emperor had carefully weighed their probable effect, and having sounded the warning note, he was ready at once to divest it of immediate significance. If the speech might not exactly be regarded as a feeling of the pulse of Europe, it was characteristic of the Sovereign's habit of quietly pursuing a settled purpose with unalterable determination, while allowing the medium of official diplomacy to pursue a "correct" attitude, discounting all menaces to the peace of Europe on the side of France, with the almost unvarying result of placing the opponents of his policy in the wrong. The situation, at the beginning of 1859, was further enlivened by the spirited speech of King Victor Emmanuel at the open-

ing of the Sardinian Parliament at Turin, on January 10th, at the close of which he said:—"This situation is not free from perils, since, while respecting the treaties, we are not insensible to the cries of anguish arising from all parts of Italy. Made strong by union, confiding in the goodness of our cause, we await with prudence and resolution the decrees of Divine Providence."

Attention was soon afterwards directed to the probability of France making common cause with Sardinia, by the celebration of the marriage of Prince Napoléon and Princess Clothilde on January 30th at Turin. During the first few weeks of 1859 great uneasiness prevailed, not least at the English Court where Queen Victoria was firmly resolved to spare no effort for the preservation of peace. In his customary new year's letter to the Queen, the Emperor had made no allusion to peace or war. But the Prince Consort, in this as in other matters one of the most accurate of observers, had "not a moment's doubt that the Emperor Napoléon contemplates war, and that it would be against Austria in Italy." There was constant and anxious communication between Lord Malmesbury and Lord Cowley. On the 7th of January the Ambassador wrote that Walewski had assured him the previous day that the "sense of His Majesty's words had been greatly exaggerated." The Emperor "merely expressed regret at the present state of the relations between Austria and France." On the same day on which Lord Cowley wrote, the "*Moniteur*" published the following official communication:—"Jan. 6th. Public opinion has been agitated for some days by alarming reports to which it is the duty of the Government to put an end, by declaring that nothing in our diplomatic relations authorizes the fears to which these reports tend to give birth." On January 7th, also Lord Malmesbury wrote to Lord Cowley on the attitude England would assume in the event of war. The British Government would observe neutrality at all events and as long as possible. If Austria and France together were willing to improve the Legations, England would give them moral

support, even considering the reconstitution of Central Italy, if the people could be improved without weakening the spiritual authority of the Pope. But beyond this, she would not consent to any alterations in the territorial arrangements of 1815. On the 11th, Lord Malmesbury instructed Lord Cowley that the British Government would leave "all the consequences of European war on the Emperor if he begins or allows Sardinia to begin," and the next day the English Foreign Minister spoke of the "folly" of Austria and said that the King of Sardinia's speech could "only mean war." English public opinion was strongly against the aggressor, whoever it should be, and the idea of war had not yet become at all popular in Paris. The time was not ripe for French intervention in Italy. A fresh development was needed. On the 15th of January, Lord Malmesbury wrote to Lord Cowley that he had seen Lafitte, the banker, about Cavour's projected loan. Cavour worked the Orsini gang by saying, "don't be such fools as to kill the only man who can help Italy, but frighten him into it." Lafitte spoke of him as "a desperate adventurer." It was fortunate for the Queen and those who were working for peace that Lord Malmesbury was at the Foreign Office, and not Lord Palmerston. Both were, it is true, extremely friendly with the French Emperor, but, whereas Lord Malmesbury never allowed personal friendship to divert him from the path of a strictly "correct" attitude, Lord Palmerston was so carried away by his radical views on the Italian question that he encouraged or abused the Emperor according to the swing of the pendulum. In November, 1858, Lord Palmerston had discussed with the Emperor Napoléon, at Compiègne, the projected Italian campaign against Austria; and, in July, 1859, he as good as told Persigny that he ought to break the conditions of peace. Enough has been said to shew how seriously the situation on the continent, in January, 1859, was regarded at the English Court. As Sir Theodore Martin says, "the words of the Emperor were sufficient to shake Europe from side to side." "Trade and commerce were instantly affected." In the Roman States and the Duchies the wildest

hopes were excited. Cavour, who had hardly expected the Emperor to move so soon, said, "*Il paraît que l'Empereur veut aller en avant.*" All the Powers were loudly emphatic in their disapproval of any disturbance of the peace. The French Minister at Berlin was told that if Austria were attacked unjustly, Prussia would assist her. The first breaker of the peace would have no more sympathy from Prussia than from England. On the 18th of January, the Emperor Napoléon spoke as follows to Lord Cowley, in Paris:—"What I said to M. de Cavour I repeat now. my sympathies have always been and are still with Italy. I regret that Lombardy should be in the possession of Austria, but I cannot and do not dispute the right of the latter. I respect existing treaties. So long as Austria remains within her own frontiers she is of course mistress to do what she pleases. With regard to Sardinia, if she provokes hostilities unjustly and places herself in the wrong she must expect no support from me." Writing the same day to the King of the Belgians, the Prince Consort made some remarkable comments on the situation. After referring to an unfounded fear of the Emperor Napoléon that he (the Prince) together with his brother, the Duke of Saxe Coburg, and King Leopold were starting a German league against France, the Prince surmises that the Emperor is reckoning upon the moral support of England with her ideas about Italian freedom, and upon the dislike of both Russia and Prussia for Austria. Lord Malmesbury had just told the Prince of the failure of Cavour, "bankrupt and desperate," to raise a loan for Sardinia in London, and the Prince remarks that "the Bourse is an eloquent preacher for peace." The Prince Consort continued, "Louis Napoléon told Lord Clarendon, at Compiègne, that he neither will nor can undertake any reform or change in Rome or with Rome, that even Naples must be left at peace, in order to please the Russians, that only Lombardy, therefore, is left as a field for political action. Much of course depended upon the attitude of Russia, and on the extent of her engagements with France. The Prince Consort was of opinion that Russia had "plotted and

set on foot the whole affair," and the Emperor himself made a remarkable communication to Lord Cowley, in Paris, on this point, as quoted by the Ambassador to Lord Malmesbury on the 20th of January. "England," said the Emperor, "informs me that I ought to keep the peace." "Russia tells me that her desire is peace—that it is the interest of every country that peace should be maintained, but that if, after having well weighed the matter, I find myself obliged to take up arms, she will give me all the assistance in her power, by placing such an army on her frontier as will hold Austria and Prussia in check." Yet the Emperor was still disinclined to move. The army, for one thing, was not ready, and there was no war feeling in the country. Thus a waiting policy was imperative. The Emperor, moreover, was—as we have seen—quite immoveable on one point. France would not be on the side of the aggressor in the coming struggle, and Sardinia must remember this. Things certainly began to look more peaceful, but Queen Victoria was by no means reassured. The English Parliament was opened on February 3rd, by the Queen in person. Her Majesty, in the speech from the throne, said that she continued to receive from all Foreign Powers assurances of their friendly feelings. "To cultivate and confirm these feelings (the Queen continued), to maintain inviolate the faith of public treaties and to contribute, so far as my influence can extend, to the preservation of the general peace, are the objects of my unceasing solicitude." The words just quoted were undoubtedly intended as a warning to the Tuileries; and the Queen, who had just told King Leopold how strong the feeling against the Emperor was in England, now addressed the French Sovereign in one of those friendly letters which were such a feature during the second Empire. The Emperor Napoléon, in his new year's letter to the Queen, had announced in the following terms the approaching family alliance between France and Sardinia:—"*J'ai à annoncer à votre Majesté que bientôt un événement heureux se passera dans ma famille. Le Prince Napoléon va épouser la fille du Roi de Sardaigne. Ce mariage contribuera je n'en doute pas,*

à créer à l'Impératrice une société intime et agréable." The formal demand for the Princess's hand was made on January 23rd, the marriage was celebrated with great pomp at Turin on the 30th, and on the day of the opening of the English Parliament, Prince and Princess Napoléon entered Paris. To this letter, announcing the approaching marriage, the Queen of course replied, and on January 20th the Emperor wrote again. He announced his intention to refer in his speech at the opening of the Corps Législatif to the desire he felt "to live always on the footing of a good and sincere understanding with the Queen and her Government." The letter of the Queen on the morrow of the speech at the opening of the English Parliament was of more than ordinary import. After a reference to the birth of her first grandson—the present Emperor William—the Queen continued, "The marriage of Prince Napoléon has taken place sooner than your Majesty expected when you last wrote, and the prompt return of the young married couple to Paris has no doubt been a great satisfaction to the Empress and yourself. May this realise in every way those gentle affections and that home happiness, which your Majesty, like ourselves, so thoroughly appreciates. What the feelings are by which England is animated in the interest of the maintenance of peace, your Majesty will by this time have seen in the language of all, who, since the opening of Parliament, have given free expression to their opinions on the subject. Their profound anxiety on this point is equal to my own. Rarely has it been given to any man so much as to your Majesty to exercise upon the tranquillity and the happiness of Europe an influence so personal and so potent, and I cannot conceal from myself, how much the great object which we have in view will depend upon the course which you may think yourself called upon to take. Your Majesty has now an opportunity, either by listening to the dictates of humanity and justice, and by shewing to the world your intention to adhere strictly to the faithful observance of treaties, of calming the apprehensions of Europe, and of restoring its confidence in the pacific policy of your Majesty,

or, on the other hand, by lending an ear to those who have an interest in creating confusion, of involving Europe in a war, whose extent and duration it is scarcely possible to foresee, and which, whatever glory it may add to the arms of France, cannot but interfere materially with her internal prosperity and financial credit. I am satisfied your Majesty will not doubt the sincerity of the friendship which alone induces me to write thus unreservedly to your Majesty; and if anything could add to the sorrow with which I should view the renewal of war in Europe, it would be to see your Majesty entering upon a course, with which it would be impossible for England to associate herself. These feelings have always, I know, been shared by your Majesty, and of this your last letter of the 20th gives me a fresh and very satisfactory proof." This very candid—not to say stern—letter of advice, had great weight with the Emperor, and from its receipt we may date a fresh impetus to the pacific note the Emperor had lately sounded. This peaceful impetus found expression at once in the speech from the Throne—as the Queen no doubt hoped would be the result of her letter—and caused much disappointment at Turin.

We must here for a moment return to the English Parliament. In the debate on the address, both sides of the House, not excepting Lord Palmerston, strongly discountenanced war. Lord Granville, who remarked that the Emperor's words on January 1st "might have meant everything or they might have meant nothing at all," recommended in the House of Lords the very policy of peace which his conservative opponents in office were consistently pursuing. This attitude of the English Parliament was not without its effect on the Tuileries. The Emperor probably felt his resolve to preserve peace for the present considerably strengthened. On February 5th, Count Buol sent a circular to the Austrian Ministers at all the German Courts, excepting—surely inadvertently—Prussia, to feel the way towards an Austro-Prussian alliance. Two days later, the French Chambers were opened by the Sovereign in

person * In the eagerly awaited "Discours" from the throne, the Sovereign referred to the "vague anxiety," "the distrust and alarm" which had "possessed themselves of certain minds and shaken public confidence." "L'Empire c'est la Paix," the Emperor repeated, and said that it could not be disturbed except for the defence of great national interests. Although the condition of Italy required foreign troops to keep order, this was not a sufficient motive for believing in war. Peace, he hoped, would not be disturbed. The Emperor concluded, "When sustained by popular sentiment and desire one ascends the steps of a throne, he rises, by the gravest of responsibilities, above that meanest of regions where vulgar interests are at war, and has for his initial motives, as well as for his final judges, God, his conscience and posterity." The Emperor next set himself to the task of replying fully to the letter of Queen Victoria. Writing from the Tuileries on February 14th, the Emperor spoke first of the deep interest felt by the Empress and himself in the birth of the Princess Royal's son—the present Emperor William—and continued: "It is always with gratitude that I receive the counsels which your Majesty is pleased to give me, for I appreciate the noble and friendly sentiments from which they spring, but I would, at the same time, ask permission to tell you frankly what the state of matters is. The story of what has been going on for the last six or eight months is not a little curious.

"In the course of last summer I received from Italy, and particularly from Sardinia, confidential communications, which told me that the disquietude of Italy was such as could not fail ere long to lead to insurrections. These were only prevented from breaking out by the counsels of Piedmont; nevertheless, the Sardinian Government intimated to me that it would be difficult long to maintain this state of things, with-

* A few days before the opening of Parliament, a remarkable pamphlet appeared in Paris with the title "L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie." The pamphlet recommended an Italian Confederation and the expulsion of Austria from Italy, for which foreign help would be necessary and possibly a war undertaken by France to anticipate revolution. This pamphlet was believed, not without reason, to reflect the views of the Emperor h mself.

out holding out to the just complaints which reached it a hope of early redress; that the position was one of so much tension, that Piedmont would not draw back, even if it saw the way to do so, from a war with Austria. I replied that I had always felt warmly for Italy, but that my first duty was to my country and to its interests; that the traditional policy of France had always been opposed to the exclusive influence of Austria in Italy; that, nevertheless, my Government could not encourage an aggressive line of conduct on the part of Piedmont, nor support her in a struggle in which right would not be upon her side, but that, on the other hand, she might rely upon being vigorously backed, either if attacked by Austria, or if she became involved by this Power in a just and lawful war.

"These *pourparlers* came to nothing (*n'eurent pas d'autres suites*); but towards November last, either because the unpopular measures taken by Austria in Italy had roused men's minds, or because indiscreet language had been held at Turin, or, finally, because a certain party had found its interest in disquieting public opinion, certain it is that all at once rumours of war were spread on every side, founded both upon the condition of people's minds in Italy, and upon the state of our relations with Austria. In the hope of calming these apprehensions, I caused it to be announced in the *Moniteur* that there was nothing in our relations with Foreign Powers to justify such fears. Notwithstanding this, as if under the influence of a real panic, everything continued to be construed in a warlike sense. The conciliatory words to M. Hübner, the despatch to Marseilles of six batteries (without men or horses) destined for Algeria, the construction, as an experiment, of ten gunboats, carrying each one gun, the armament of two troopships for the Algerine service, the purchase of some thousands of artillery-horses to bring their number up to the peace footing—finally, the progress made with the reconstruction of our artillery equipment begun two years before—these were what were taken as so many warlike symptoms; and, *although there was in fact nothing more*, the persuasion to the contrary is so general, that it would be difficult for me to

persuade the public in France and abroad, that I am not even now making immense preparations for war. And yet, at this very time, simple prudence seems to me to enjoin that I should do much more; for on the one side I cannot blind myself to the ill-will that surrounds me, and on the other, for the last month I have been urgently appealed to by the King of Sardinia to mass 20,000 men upon the Alps, ready to come to his assistance, in case of his being attacked by the Austrians.

"I am, therefore, in no way responsible either for the apprehensions or for the agitation now on foot, and I can regard them with indifference. But what wounds me deeply as a man and as a Sovereign is to see that a mere rumour of war, vague and undefined, is sufficient to raise doubts of my moderation, and to draw upon me the charge of ambition; and, consequently, that with complications beyond the Alps staring us in the face, people seem to deny to France by anticipation the influence to which she is entitled by her rank among nations, as well as by her history. In presence of an imaginary intervention in the affairs of a country which touches our frontiers, all Germany seems of a mind to enter into a league against France, and to dispute even her most legitimate action. Did Germany intervene in our embroilment with Russia? Or did Europe intervene when Germany upheld the cause of Holstein against Denmark?

"I admit to your Majesty that this attitude of Germany sets me thinking deeply, and that I see in it great danger for the future, for I shall always respect the Treaties. I know that they cannot be changed except by general assent; but respect for treaties does not run counter to my duty, which is to follow always the policy that is most in harmony with the honour and the interests of my country.

Nevertheless, I hope that the alliance with your Majesty will always be maintained. Two great countries may remain friends, although their interest in all questions may not be identical, provided the action of each shall have been settled by a preliminary understanding, in accordance with the dictates of its political interests.

Your Majesty will, I hope, forgive me this long letter. But I felt bound to lay all my thoughts before you, and you will see in it a fresh proof of my desire to find myself in accord with your Majesty, and of the great value I attach to your opinion and advice.

I beg you to recall me to the remembrance of the Prince, and to believe in the sentiments of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am

Your Majesty's good brother and friend,

NAPOLÉON."

Palace of the Tuileries, 14th February, 1859.

Count Walewski, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, found his policy for the moment in the ascendant. He was one of the strongest opponents of the war and had, all along, sent instructions in that sense to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne at Turin. The French Ambassador, receiving very different views direct from his Imperial Master, went to Paris for advice and came back to his post with this conviction on his lips:—"*Non seulement nous prendrons la première occasion à faire la guerre, mais nous chercherons un prétexte.*" Meanwhile, the Emperor's speech at the opening of the Chambers had of course reached Turin, and great was the wrath occasioned in that hotbed of intrigue by its peaceful sentiments. But the Emperor was getting ready for the war which he would not provoke. Instructions were sent by the Imperial Government to the French prefects to prepare the public mind for war. For the moment, however, the horizon was clear, and so Cavour and his Master were furious. The King wrote to the Emperor to the effect that if France now abandoned the cause of Italy it would be worse than Novara. He would resign his crown, like Charles Albert—his father—and let the world know why. Meanwhile, the Prince Regent of Prussia having been approached by the Emperor Napoléon as to his neutrality, in case of war, sought the advice of the Prince Consort. Prince Albert recommended "a state of preparation," with "free discussion in the Press upon the Emperor Napoléon's designs," commenting on the effect pro-

duced by English public opinion, now united in condemnation of war, upon the Emperor of the French. The Prince, however, at the end of his letter expressed grave doubts as to England being able to keep "permanently out of the struggle" in Italy. But, besides the Emperor Napoléon, with his manifest leanings to Italy, and King Victor Emmanuel spoiling for a fight, there was another personal element to be reckoned with by the advocates of peace, and that no inconsiderable one. The Emperor Francis Joseph had just completed ten years on the throne. In the first year of his reign he had set his iron heel on the turbulent Viennese, and had had the militant Hungarians crushed for him by the Czar. His Government, under Schwarzenberg, was sternly, if wisely, reactionary, reviving the traditions of the great Metternich, and he was in no mood to stand impudence from a small state like Sardinia. For the Emperor Francis Joseph in 1859, in the full vigour of youth and military ardour, was a very different factor in the situation from the Francis Joseph of to-day. There was the same rugged determination and devotion to duty, the same self-sacrificing zeal for the welfare of his heterogeneous Empire, but not the ripened wisdom, chastened judgment and the strong moderation of to-day. The young soldier of 1859 was not the man of many and bitter humiliations and the most poignant domestic sorrows, whom we have seen in these later years guiding his peoples to constitutional liberty through many and perilous crises by the beneficent exercise of his personal sway. If the Austrian Emperor was himself in no mood to be trifled with by Sardinia at the beginning of 1859, no less so were his Ministers and his army. Count Buol had been Ambassador at Turin and had doubtless not forgotten the experiences of 1848, when Charles Albert invaded Lombardy with such startling suddenness. The Austrian army, reorganised and confident of success, was led by men as eager, if not more so, than the French for active service, some of whom talked openly of marching to Turin, if not to Paris. In January, Austrian troops were hurried into Lombardy in large numbers and eventually up to the Ticino,

which naturally irritated Sardinia. The Austrians did not intend to be taken by surprise as in 1848, and they were ready to crush Piedmont before France could come to the rescue. Queen Victoria had, as we have seen, spoken very plainly to the Emperor of the French in her desire to prevent hostilities, and she now, therefore, addressed herself with like purpose to the Emperor of Austria. Curiously enough, the first word of this intervention came from Paris, where Walewski—a strong advocate for peace—said that the Emperor would accept the mediation of England. The Emperor Napoléon accordingly put down briefly in writing the heads of a possible arrange ment, and he suggested that Lord Cowley should undertake the mission to Vienna. There was a little delay in order to ascertain the willingness of Austria to receive advances from England, for as the Prince Consort, writing to Lord Malmesbury on February 8th, wisely observed, "the great point for us to keep in mind must be not to assume the position of mediators without being sure that we are accepted as such by both parties." This uncertainty was soon removed, and Lord Cowley started for Vienna, bearing an autograph letter from Queen Victoria to the Emperor Francis Joseph. The Queen said that having anxiously weighed the circumstances by which peace seemed to be threatened, she could find nothing in them which ought not to be surmounted by diplomatic wisdom. "The state of Italy," her Majesty said, "is what really constitutes the danger by which we are threatened; but even this danger would not be such as to imperil the general tranquillity but for the existence of an antagonism excited by the engagements, real or supposed, of Austria and France." It was of course difficult, the Queen added, for a great Power to take an initiative which might seem to imply weakness or concession, and it was as the mutual friend of both Sovereigns, and having no personal interest, that she tendered her good offices. Just at this time Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell resolved to question the Government on its Italian policy, but happily neither of them said anything in the House to weaken the hands of Ministers who were

striving to keep the peace. Mr. Disraeli, replying to Lord Palmerston, announced that he was led to believe from communications he had received that before long the Roman States would be evacuated by both the French and Austrian troops, and that with the concurrence of the Papal Government. It should be remembered that Austria was then occupying Ancona, and France, of course, Rome. Mr. Disraeli asked that no more should be said, and his words on this occasion ought never to be forgotten. "Sir," the Minister said, "the proceedings and debates of this House are nicely scanned in foreign countries, and expressions used in our freedom of discussion are very often subjected to interpretations which the speakers themselves never contemplated. It is impossible to say what might be the effect at this moment of a heated debate or an indiscreet phrase." Lord John Russell alone spoke after this appeal, and it was only to make the cautious and wise observation that for Italy negotiation would be better than war. Prussia was still very fidgety, and kept appealing to England, and especially to the Prince Consort, for advice. The Prince again counselled "a waiting attitude." Lord Cowley found Vienna conciliatory, the Pope did not refuse to entertain the proposals put forth by England, —at the suggestion, be it remembered, of the Emperor of the French—and last, but not least, the French Senate refused a big budget for the war. The prospects of peace being preserved were distinctly encouraging, and the war party at Turin began to be proportionately alarmed. There were well-accredited rumours of fresh threats of assassination for the Emperor Napoléon if he drew back, which threats Cavour was believed to have turned to his purpose already, and it was even reported that one of Count Rossi's murderers had been to Paris on a deputation to the Emperor from Italy. As Lord Acton has said "The crime of Orsini was skilfully turned to account." When appealed to by M. de Villamarina, the Sardinian Ambassador, the Emperor put him off with the remark, "*Ne vous offensez pas—ceci n'aboutira à rien.*" Prince Napoléon, however, shewed so much dissatisfaction at

the peaceful outlook that he was retired from his Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies on March 7th, and M. Rouher appointed in his stead. Two days earlier, the *Moniteur* had published a most reassuring note. "In face of the anxieties, ill-founded as we like to believe," said the official journal, "by which people have been disturbed in Piedmont, the Emperor has promised the King of Sardinia to defend him against any aggressive act on the part of Austria; he has promised nothing more, and people know that he will keep his word. Is there any hint of war in that? Since when has it become contrary to prudence to foresee more or less proximate difficulties and to calculate all their consequences?" "Is it not time to enquire when an end will be put to these vague and absurd rumours, spread from one end of Europe to the other by the Press, and everywhere pointing out the Emperor of the French to public credulity as inciting to war, and throwing upon him the sole responsibility for the disquietudes and the warlike preparations of Europe? . . . . . To study questions is not to create them; nor will turning attention from them be to summarise or to settle them. For that matter, the examination of these questions has passed into the region of diplomacy, and no one is authorised to believe that the result will be unfavourable to the consolidation of the public peace." Lord Cowley returned from Vienna with a very workable basis for negotiation. Austria was not unreasonable in the least. But before he had completed his mission, the idea of negotiation had taken a fresh impetus, and from a somewhat unexpected quarter. The Emperor Alexander made the proposal that there should be a congress of five Powers, excluding Sardinia, to settle the Italian question. This proposal, emanating from the Czar, at once received the warm support of the Emperor Napoléon. Communications had no doubt passed between the two Emperors before Russia came forward with this idea of a Congress. The *Moniteur* announced the new recipe on March 22nd, in the following terms:—"Russia has proposed a Congress with a view of preventing complications which might arise from the condition of Italy, and which would be likely to disturb the

peace of Europe. This Congress, composed of plenipotentiaries from France, Austria, England, Prussia, and Russia, would assemble in a neutral city. The Government of the Emperor has signified its adhesion to the proposition of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The Cabinets of London, Vienna, and Berlin have not yet replied officially." Two days later the *Moniteur* was able to announce the assent of the Cabinets of London and Berlin, and the next day that of Vienna. To this last announcement the official journal added the somewhat puzzling information that Count Cavour had left Turin for Paris by invitation of the Emperor. Cavour, as a matter of fact, had written to Prince Napoléon on the uncomfortably peaceful outlook, and despatched Count Nigra with a letter from Victor Emmanuel to the Emperor complaining of Walewski's language to the French Ambassador at Turin. The Emperor was told that this was calculated to create profound discouragement, or to drive the King to some desperate act. Hence the Emperor's summons to Cavour. The Sardinian Minister arrived in Paris on March 25th, and soon saw Walewski, by whom he was told that the Emperor had said he was determined not to quarrel with Austria or interfere other than peaceably in Italy. Cavour went so far as to allege that he had been urged by the Emperor to take the initiative, and in his angry disappointment declared, after seeing the Minister, that if he were now thrown over after all the national excitement and expenditure, and his own Parliamentary speeches, he would go back that night to Turin and resign. The King, he said, would of course abdicate, and he himself would go to America and publish his documents. His wrath was not very surprising when we remember that he had been scheming ever since the interview of Plombières, "that vast intrigue," as Lord Acton calls it, "of the party of national union in Central Italy by which the popular insurrections were organised which broke out simultaneously with the war, and by which one part of the French designs was effectually baffled." Cavour was nearly leaving Paris without attempting to see the Emperor. He did, however, see the Emperor more than once, and was received, says his biographer, M. de Mazade, "with

the same cordiality and frankness as at Plombières." He learnt in Paris society that the Emperor's task was hedged round by difficulties "which," to quote again from M. de Mazade, "might be unexpectedly brought to an end by Austria, should that country be so kind to him as to commit some fault of impatience or precipitation." Meanwhile Pélissier had made in London, on March 18th, the formal suggestion of a Congress. The Derby Cabinet considered the question the next day, and decided upon four points, as follows:—Evacuation, reform, security for Sardinia, and substitute for treaties of 1847, Sardinia should disarm, Austria publicly declare that she would not attack Sardinia, and join with France in guaranteeing that State. Sardinia was to be left out of the Congress; if not, then Naples, Rome, Tuscany, Modena, and Parma (five more votes) would have had to come in too. This last suggestion was the answer of the Cabinet to the Opposition. The Russians announced about this time that they would prefer a Congress (not conference) to which the Secretaries of State themselves should go. D'Azeglio, on behalf of Sardinia, assented to a suggestion of Lord Malmesbury that envoys from Italian States might be heard, but not sit in the Council. M. Thiers made rather a remarkable comment at this juncture in a letter of the 22nd March, when he said, "This Congress gives to the Italian question a body and a soul, a real political existence, hitherto always disputed, and rightly so, by Austria." However, it all came to nothing, after much labour and agitation. Austria would only take part if no territorial questions were entertained, and the objects were merely the evacuation of Rome, Roman reform, and the assurance of lesser States from attack from within or without—the veriest irony in face of the Sardinian designs. The Emperor did indeed express the opinion through Walewski that the Congress might make peace *minus* Sardinia; but as Austria insisted on Sardinian disarmament, and Cavour would not hear of such a thing, matters were at a deadlock. But there was yet another ray of hope. Austria suggested a general disarmament. Lord Cowley, in an audience with the Emperor Napoléon, strongly urged peace, and they agreed to

include Sardinia and the Italian States in the Congress. Cavour actually agreed to the general disarmament if arranged in Congress, but England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria wanted the disarmament before the Congress, both parties in England still strongly favouring peace. On April 18th Lord Clarendon made a most "correct" speech in the House of Lords, which it is somewhat difficult to reconcile with his attitude at the time of the Congress of Paris three years earlier. At that time Cavour distinctly stated in a letter to Rattazzi that Clarendon was an ardent supporter of his (Cavour's) policy. In fact, Cavour built more hopes on Lord Clarendon than upon any other English Minister. The speech of the late Foreign Secretary in the House of Lords on April 18th was in quite an opposite sense, and unexceptionable in character. "Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and Lombardy may be annexed," he said, "to Piedmont, but I believe that such an arrangement would soon prove more distasteful to the Lombards than even their union with Austria." "Great dissensions would arise. There is between the Lombard and the Piedmontese no affinity, not even that of language." "I believe that the bubble of Italian unity has burst." Lord Clarendon, of whom by the way M. Émile Ollivier retains a very high opinion, was indeed at this time quite in sympathy with Lord Malmesbury's Italian policy, and tried to restrain the ebullitions of Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and Mr. Gladstone. But soon came the startling news that Count Buol had despatched to Turin on April 19th, by Baron Kellersberg, a demand to Sardinia to disarm within three days. If this demand, which was delivered at Turin on the 23rd, were not complied with, an Austrian army would march on Turin. The English Government immediately protested againt an Austrian invasion of Sardinian territory, and Lord Derby, speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet on the 25th, spoke of the latest move of Austria as a criminal step. English public opinion instantly underwent a marked change. As the Prince Consort said, writing on April 27th to the Prince Regent of Prussia, "At one stroke the Emperor Francis Joseph has turned public opinion here against Austria." On the previous day Count

Walewski declared in the Corps Législatif, that if Sardinia were invaded, France would consider it as a declaration of war against herself. It was the first the French Chambers had heard of the situation. Walewski made a statement of the negotiations, and Baroche laid down his two proposals for men and money —500 millions of francs. The Duc de Morny explained that the war would be localised, and was a purely Italian question. The opposition "Cinq" were placed in a difficult position. Jules Favre was in favour of the war, Hénon against it, and Ollivier, as he says himself, was perplexed. His devotion to Italy led him to rejoice at the chance of seeing it free and united, but Piedmontese unity was repugnant to him; a republican confederation was his ideal. The "Cinq" voted neither way. On March 6th, when Lord Cowley was in Vienna, the Russian Government had made it known at Turin that France had assented to the proposal of the Congress. Lord Derby not unnaturally protested that the Russian proposal tended to prevent Lord Cowley's success at Vienna, and the Emperor Alexander complained that the English Premier had spoken against the proposed Congress. In April, the English Government questioned the French Government as to a rumoured treaty with Russia, such being incompatible with the Anglo-French alliance. The *Times*, on the 28th of this month, charged Russia and France with having an offensive and defensive treaty. Prince Gortschakoff declared that no arrangement existed hostile to England, and the Emperor Napoléon told Lord Malmesbury, through Lord Cowley, that all Russia had promised him was a "benevolent neutrality," with the assistance of a force on the Galician frontier. This advance speedily took place. A force of 60,000 men under General Lüdens was ordered to the frontier. It soon became clear that this was the utmost France could expect from the Czar. On the 27th of April, the Austrian troops began to cross the Ticino, and the die was cast. There were now 40,000 French troops in Piedmont, and Marshal Canrobert and General Baraguay d'Hilliers had reached Turin. Yet diplomacy had hardly spoken its last word. On April 28th, Lord A. Loftus wrote from Vienna to Lord

Malmesbury, that Count Buol had spoken to him on the question of the Italian States in the Congress. The Austrian Minister said that Naples, Modena, and the Pope declined to send representatives, and added, significantly, "but I may plainly tell you that we can never consent to sit in a Congress with Sardinia." Austria, having actually invaded Sardinian territory, now accepted the offer of England for arbitration, and France, not unnaturally, refused. The French Government, however, proposed the joint mediation of England, Russia, and Prussia, to which suggestion the English Government replied by asking if Russia were neutral or a party. The article in the *Times* had roused the British Lion. Lord Palmerston, in Opposition, now gave it as his opinion that France was right on all points, the Emperor was "honourable," he was useful to get Austria out of Italy, and Prussia had no right to interfere. Lord Clarendon took exactly the opposite line, and Lord John Russell, in view of his city seat, was very moderate. Austria had now 110,000 men on Sardinian soil, and the French force soon reached 119,000.

On the last day of April, the King of Sardinia issued a proclamation, in which he declared, "The brave soldiers of the Emperor Napoléon, my generous ally, will fight the fight of liberty and justice with my soldiers." The next day Victor Emmanuel left Alessandria to assume command of the army. On the 3rd of May, the Emperor Napoléon told the French Chambers that the Government had warned Austria since the 26th of April, that if Austrian troops crossed the frontier of Piedmont, France would be obliged to consider this invasion of an allied country as a declaration of war. The entry of the Austrian troops into Sardinian territory on the 29th, had constituted Austria in a state of war against France. The Emperor the same day declared in a proclamation to the French people, that the Emperor of Austria having invaded Sardinia had declared war against France. "The Emperor to the French people," the proclamation ran, "Austria, in sending her army upon the territory of the King of Sardinia, our ally, declares war upon us. Thus she violates justice and the treaties, and

threatens our frontiers. All the great Powers have protested against this aggression. Piedmont having accepted conditions which ought to ensure peace, people ask what can be the reason of this sudden invasion:—because Austria has brought things to this extremity, that either she must rule up to the Alps, or Italy be free to the Adriatic, for in that country every nook of land which remains independent is a danger for her power. . . . . " "I wish for no conquest," the manifesto went on to say, "but I do wish to maintain firmly my national and traditional policy. I observe the treaties on condition that they are not violated in my despite. I respect the territory and the rights of neutral Powers; but I boldly avow my sympathy for a people whose history is mingled with our own, and which groans beneath foreign oppression." "The object of this war," he continued, "is to restore Italy to herself, not to change her master." "We are not going to Italy to foment disorder nor to unsettle the power of the Holy Father, whom we have replaced upon his throne, but to withdraw it from that foreign pressure which burdens the entire peninsula, and to assist in basing order there on satisfied legitimate interests."... "I am about to place myself at the head of the army. I leave in France the Empress and my son. Seconded by the experience and intelligence of the last surviving brother of the Emperor, she will be able to prove herself equal to her mission. . . . . " "Providence will bless our efforts, for the cause which relies on justice, humanity, the love of country and of independence, is holy in the sight of God."

This manifesto at once turned the tide of popular opinion in France in favour of the war. Yet the risks were great, and the Emperor was by no means insensible to them. As soon as French troops passed into Piedmont, Prussia ordered mobilisation, the Southern German States became clamorous to fight in support of Austria, while England strengthened her fleet and established volunteers. With the vast German mobilisation, 70,000 Danish troops out, and 100,000 Swiss, Russia with 200,000 men on the Austrian frontier, and England hurrying forward naval preparations, the state of Europe was sufficiently alarming. Belgium was the

only country perfectly quiet. England was, of course, entirely neutral in the contest, Lord Derby being in power. The French Government knew of the disposition of the German States towards Austria, and that Russia, whatever happened, was unwilling to see Austria humbled. The French Ambassador at Berlin was informed that not only would no territorial change by the war be favoured by Russia, but also no heavy sacrifices inflicted upon Austria. The Emperor Napoléon was therefore naturally extremely desirous of localising the war, and Russia in her "benevolence" supported him. The Russo-French "*mot d'ordre*," observed the Prince Consort, a little later, is "*localiser la guerre.*"

It was at this time that Lord Malmesbury addressed a circular to the British Ministers at the German Courts, urging non-intervention in the event of a war between France and Austria. A copy of this circular was sent to Paris, but, as Lord Malmesbury long afterwards discovered, it never reached the Emperor Napoléon. Neither Lord Cowley or Walewski had ever mentioned this document to the Emperor. Walewski possibly suppressed it as tending to remove a serious obstacle to the war he so cordially disliked. Walewski and Malmesbury had just learnt that the whole Prussian army was to be mobilised. The circular issued by Lord Malmesbury redounds so greatly to the credit of the English Ministry, that it shall be quoted at length here.

"Foreign Office, May 2, 1859.

"Sir,—I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government witness, with great anxiety, the disposition shown by the States of Germany to enter at once into a contest with France. Her Majesty's Government cannot perceive that at the present moment Germany has any grounds for declaring war against that Power, and still less would the Confederation, in their opinion, be justified in prematurely adopting any course which would bring on a European war.

"It is desirable, however, that the Governments of Germany should entertain no doubt as to the course which in such a case Her Majesty's Government would pursue, and, therefore,

you will explicitly state to the Government to which you are accredited, that if Germany should at present and without a *casus fœderis* be so ill-advised as to provoke a war with France, and should, without any sufficient cause, make general a war which on every account ought, if possible, to be localised, Her Majesty's Government intend to maintain a strict neutrality, can give to Germany no assistance, nor contribute by the interposition of the naval forces of this country to protect her coast from hostile attack.

"The elections now proceeding afford an undeniable test of public feeling on this point, and it may be said to be the only one in which the English people appear to be at the present moment absorbed. That Germany should arm and prepare for eventualities is natural and right, but in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government no act has as yet been committed by France against Germany, and no treaty obligation subsists which justifies her to provoke an attack on her own territory or an invasion of France.—I am, &c., MALMESBURY."

The Emperor was entirely unaware of this action of the English Government. Lord Malmesbury sent a copy of the circular to the Tuileries after the war, and explained the matter in a conversation with the Empress Eugénie in 1862.

The suppression of this despatch in Paris was especially unfortunate, for the Emperor Napoléon was far from trusting the Conservative Government, even with Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office. Lord Palmerston, in conjunction with Persigny, did not lose the opportunity of encouraging the notion that his party was the most favourable to the policy of the Tuileries, and in this he was cheerfully abetted by Persigny, who found in it the means of attacking Walewski. The *Morning Post* all the time wrote up the policy of the Empire, for Mr. Borthwick was in close touch with the French Court, whilst Palmerston was more than suspected of attacking the foreign policy of the Conservative Government in 1859, after consultation with the Emperor. On the same day Lord Malmesbury wrote an important despatch to Lord Cowley, in

which he urged the Ambassador to see the Emperor before he left for the campaign. Lord Cowley was to get the Emperor's consent to neutralise the Baltic and the Adriatic, in conjunction with England and Russia, the object being to prevent complications with Russia and Turkey which might drag England into the conflict. Lord Malmesbury, in this letter, also urged Lord Cowley to go with the Emperor to the war, in order to proffer him advice at critical moments when there was danger of the conflict spreading. The Duke of Coburg had told Lord Malmesbury that public opinion was strong in Prussia against France, and that Germany would only hold aloof if France did not cross the Ticino. Lord Malmesbury assured the Duke that England would not give "one atom of help" to Germany if she attacked France. On May 19th, Count Vitzthum, the Saxon Minister, told Lord Malmesbury that Germany would rise if Austria were defeated by the allies, and 400,000 men march on Paris. The energetic line taken by the British Cabinet was in fact the greatest safeguard the Emperor Napoléon possessed when he started on this hazardous enterprise.

The French troops had now been pouring into Piedmont for some time, the left wing of the army, composed of the 3rd and 4th corps, by the Mont Cenis, under Canrobert and Niel; the right, composed of the 1st and 2nd corps, by sea to Genoa, under Baraguay d'Hilliers; and others by the Corniche road. At the end of April, the Emperor witnessed the departure of the Guards from Paris. An English lady who was present with her husband, thus describes the moving scene:

"In Paris, on a sunny day in April, 1859, there was much excitement in the Rue de Rivoli, for many regiments were marching to the station of departure, to join the 'Army of Italy';—bands playing, and the men going at the double, four abreast, each one equipped for the campaign, and with his mess provisions, including a very long roll of bread, strapped on his back. Then, to add to the interest, appeared the Emperor Napoléon III, with the Empress, who carried the little Prince Imperial on her arm. They came out upon a balcony of the Tuileries Palace overlooking the street, and only a very little way

above the footpath. The Emperor leaned his arms upon the rail of the balcony, and surveyed the scene, but without betraying any feeling he might have in doing so. With his hat rather over his eyes, on account possibly of the bright sunshine, his expression was inscrutable. The Empress and the Prince Imperial, both without any outdoor clothing, watched the scene closely;—every now and then the little curly-haired child turning to his mother to express his delight, while one could see every expression flit over the face of the beautiful Empress. More than once her eyes filled with tears, and she was seen to wipe them on the sleeve of the Prince's white dress. The three were quite absorbed in the sight, apparently; but when the troops had passed, one of our party led off an English 'Hurrah!' Then, and only then, the Emperor looked up, almost smiled, and raised his hat, looking pleased. Next day the *Times*, reporting the passage of the troops, described the enthusiastic reception of the Imperial family, and spoke of the vigorous cheers of the English onlookers."

On the 10th the Emperor himself left for the front. There was a Court Mass in the morning, said by the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris; and at half-past five in the evening, preceded and followed by *cent gardes*, the Emperor and Empress left the Tuileries in an open carriage for the Gare de Lyon. King Jérôme and Princess Clothilde saw the Emperor and Prince Napoléon off for the war. The Empress went as far as Montereau, to return the same evening as Regent of France. The Emperor sailed from Marseilles in the Imperial yacht, *Reine Hortense*, and twenty-four hours later he landed at Genoa. The Genoese were prepared, by a proclamation from the Syndic, to offer an enthusiastic welcome to the "champion of justice and of civilisation, the avenger of oppressed peoples, the heir of the name and the glory of Napoléon the Great." "Not content with having sent instantly a formidable army into Italy," the Emperor "comes' himself," the proclamation ran, "to take command of it." The populace certainly gave ample expression of the "profound sentiments of admiration and gratitude for the august chief of the great nation which extends a kindred hand to Italy, that she may effectually

assist her to conquer at last the independence she has coveted so long." Amidst the salute of cannon, the roll of drums, the ringing of bells, and the acclamations of troops and people, the Emperor of the French was conducted to the Palazzo Reale in a yawl smothered with flowers, and draped with the flags of France and Sardinia. Installed at the Palazzo Reale in Genova la Superba, Napoléon III immediately issued the following proclamation to the army of Italy:—

"Soldiers! I come to place myself at your head to lead you to the combat. We are about to second the struggle of a people to revindicate its independence, and withdraw it from foreign oppression. It is a sacred cause, which has the sympathies of the civilised world. I do not need to stimulate your ardour; each stage will remind you of a victory. In the Sacred Way of old Rome the marble was crowded with inscriptions recalling to the people its lofty deeds. So to-day, in passing by Mondovi, Marengo, Lodi, Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli, you will be marching in another Sacred Way, amidst its glorious memories.

"Preserve that severe discipline which is the honour of the army. Do not forget that here there are no enemies but those who fight against you. In battle remain compact, and do not abandon your ranks to rush forward. Mistrust too great enthusiasm; it is the only thing I dread. The new weapons of precision are only dangerous from a distance. They do not prevent the bayonet from being, as of old, the terrible weapon of the French infantry.

"Soldiers! let us all do our duty, and put our entire confidence in God. The country expects much from you. Already these words of good omen are heard from one end of France to the other:—'The new army of France will be worthy of her elder sister'!"

In the evening the Emperor was received with frenzy by the crowd in the Carlo Felice Theatre, at the gala performance in his honour. Early the next morning King Victor Emmanuel, whose headquarters were at Occimiano, arrived to greet his august ally, and to place himself under the orders of the French Emperor as supreme commander of the allied armies.

On the following afternoon the Emperor Napoléon left by train for Alessandria, to fix his headquarters. Here, close to the battlefield of Marengo, the nephew of Napoléon I was received with adulation. The following ode, recited twice over in the theatre, is a specimen:—"Hymn to Napoléon III, Sovereign of the greatest of peoples, valorous warrior sent by God, sublime soul, noble heart, generous and pious, O great man, O powerful monarch, we behold thee at last among us. Thanks to thee, the right of peoples to independence is already recognised, and by us the unjust treaties by which men are divided into oppressors and oppressed will be destroyed. Thanks to thee, the sun of liberty will rise on Italy. Here, where the genius who gave his laws to the world, and whose name is the pride and glory of our time, began to shine, within these walls whence the eagle took his radiant flight, France and Italy come to unite with each other in a single thought."

The next day, Sunday, the Emperor went on foot to the Cathedral for mass, accompanied by Vaillant and Canrobert. Before the arrival of the Emperor there had been a dispute between Canrobert and the Sardinians as to the plan of campaign, whilst the Austrians were threatening Turin. The Emperor supported Canrobert; Victor Emmanuel gave way; and Cavour proving obstinate, the King ignored him. The extraordinary inaction of Giulay, in force in Piedmont, could hardly have been foreseen. On May 20th the first encounter took place at Montebello. General Forey, established on the banks of the Po, having learnt that the Austrians had attacked the Piedmontese outposts, ordered an advance, and the allied troops made a most fierce attack, General Forey showing the greatest personal bravery; and by the evening the Austrians were driven from Montebello, and forced even to evacuate Casteggio. At the same time, Garibaldi, with his volunteers, was advancing on Como, which place they took possession of, in the name of Victor Emmanuel, on May 29th.

On the 30th, King Victor Emmanuel crossed the Sesia, ordered by the Emperor to advance to Palestro. Several battles were fought, and on May 31st the allies were masters of the left

bank of the Sesia. The King, with General de la Marmora, was usually in the thick of the fight. Victor Emmanuel, joined by the Emperor from Vercelli, on the field of battle, issued in the evening the following proclamation :—

"Soldiers! to-day a new and striking feat of arms has been signalised by a new victory. The enemy attacked us vigorously at Palestro, bringing powerful forces to act upon our right; the intention was to prevent our soldiers from joining those of Marshal Canrobert. The moment was supreme. Numerically our force was greatly inferior to that of the adversary, but the latter was confronted by the brave troops of the 4th Division, under General Cialdini, and the incomparable 3rd Regiment of Zouaves, which, fighting to-day with the Sardinian army, has powerfully contributed to the victory. . . . . His Majesty the Emperor, on visiting the field of battle, has expressed his most cordial felicitations, and he appreciates the immense advantage of this victory. Soldiers! persevere in your sublime conduct, and I assure you that heaven will crown the work you have so courageously begun."

The Duc de Chartres* took part in these operations as a young officer of Sardinian cavalry, and met the Emperor. The next day King Victor Emmanuel wrote the following letter from Torrione to Colonel de Chabron.

"Colonel, the Emperor, in placing the 3rd Regiment of Zouaves at my orders, has shown me a precious testimony of friendship. It seemed to me that I could not give a better reception to this choice troop, than by affording it an immediate occasion to add a new exploit to those which rendered the name of Zouaves so formidable to the enemy on the battlefields of Africa and the Crimea. The irresistible vehemence with which your regiment marched to the attack yesterday excited my utmost admiration. To fall upon the enemy at the point of the bayonet, to seize a battery in the face of grape-shot, was the affair of a few minutes. You should be proud of commanding such soldiers,

* The younger of the two grandsons of Louis Philippe, presented by their mother, the Duchess of Orleans, to the Chamber on the abdication of the King, in favour of the elder, in 1848. The Duke still lives in Paris.

and they ought to be happy to obey a leader like you. I keenly appreciate the idea of your Zouaves in bringing to my head-quarters the pieces of artillery taken from the Austrians, and I beg you to convey my thanks to them. I shall make haste to despatch this fine trophy to H.M. the Emperor, whom I have already acquainted with the matchless bravery with which your regiment fought yesterday at Palestro, and sustained my extreme right. I shall always be well satisfied to see the 3rd Regiment of Zouaves fighting beside my soldiers, and winning new laurels on the battlefields which still await us. Kindly acquaint your Zouaves, Colonel, with these sentiments.

"VICTOR EMMANUEL."

The allies then advanced towards the Ticino. General MacMahon advanced from Novara, the Emperor's headquarters, to Turbigo, and on June 3rd a sharp encounter took place at Robechetto, from which place the Austrians were soon driven back. The Emperor himself from Turbigo sent reinforcements to MacMahon. The campaign was now pushed with vigour. On the 4th of June was fought and won the great battle of Magenta, where MacMahon received his bâton as a Marshal of France. Canrobert, Niel, Baraguay d'Hilliers, La Motterouge, Espinasse, Camou, Mellinet, Wimpffen and Cler shared in the honours of this great struggle. The Emperor was occupied in hurrying up the reinforcements from the bridge of San Martino, for the King's army was slow in getting across the Ticino. At San Martino the Emperor learnt of the taking of Magenta at nightfall. He enjoyed but a few minutes' rest on a peasant's bed in his uniform, and the following morning Victor Emmanuel presented himself with regrets for his delay. The next day the Emperor made his headquarters at Magenta, met MacMahon, but was shocked to find *en route* amongst the slain the heroic General Espinasse. The victorious general of Magenta was soon dubbed by his sovereign Marshal of France and Duke of Magenta.* In sight of the capital of Lombardy the Emperor

* A *Te Deum* for the victory was sung in Notre Dame on the 7th in the presence of the Empress Regent, King Jérôme, Princess Clothilde, and Princess Mathilde.

waited for the King of Sardinia, and on June 8th the allied sovereigns entered Milan in triumph. They passed under the triumphal arch, allowed to be opened for the first time by the municipality for the liberating sovereigns. After an enthusiastic reception, the Emperor from the Villa Buonaparte dated the following proclamations to the people and to the army:—

"Done at the Imperial headquarters of Milan, June 8, 1859. *Armée d'Italie.*

"Italians! the fortune of war leads me to-day into the capital of Lombardy. I am going to tell you why I am here.

"When Austria unjustly attacked Piedmont, I resolved to support my ally, the King of Sardinia. The honour and the interests of France made this a duty. Your enemies, who are also mine, have sought to diminish the universal sympathy existing in Europe for your cause by seeking to make it believed that I am going to war through motives of personal ambition, or to enlarge the territory of France.

"If there are men who do not understand their epoch, I am not of the number. In the enlightened state of public opinion, one is greater to-day by the moral influence one exerts than by barren conquests, and I proudly seek this moral influence in endeavouring to free one of the most beautiful portions of Europe. Your welcome has already proved that you have understood me.

"I do not come here with a preconceived system for dispossessing sovereigns, nor to impose my will upon you; my army will concern itself with two things only: to combat your enemies and to maintain internal order; it will put no obstacle to the free manifestation of your legitimate desires.

"Providence sometimes favours peoples as well as individuals, by giving them an opportunity to grow greater suddenly, but on condition that they know how to profit by it. Profit then by the chance afforded you. Your desire for independence, so long expressed, so often disappointed, will be realised if you show yourselves worthy of it.

"Unite, then, in a single aim — the liberation of your country. Organise yourselves in military fashion. Hasten to

place yourselves under the standard of King Victor Emmanuel, who has already so nobly pointed out to you the road to honour. Remember that there can be no army without discipline, and animated by the sacred fire of patriotism be nothing to-day but soldiers; to-morrow you will be free citizens of a great country.—NAPOLÉON.

"Soldiers, a month ago, relying on the efforts of diplomacy I was still hoping for peace, when the sudden invasion of Piedmont by Austrian troops summoned us to arms. We were not ready—men, horses, material, provisions, were lacking, and, to assist our allies, we were forced to march in haste and by small instalments beyond the Alps, to meet a redoubtable enemy long in readiness. The danger was great; the energy of the nation and your courage made up for everything. France has found again her ancient virtues, and, united in a single aim as in a single feeling, she has displayed the abundance of her resources and the strength of her patriotism. It is now but ten days since operations began, and Piedmontese territory is already freed from its invaders. The allied army has given four successful battles and gained a decisive victory, which has opened to it the capital of Lombardy. You have disabled more than 35,000 Austrians, taken seventeen cannon, two colours, and 8,000 prisoners; but all is not yet ended; we shall still have combats to maintain, obstacles to overcome. I rely on you, brave soldiers of the army of Italy! From the heights above your fathers look down on you with pride." Victor Emmanuel also issued a proclamation from Milan, in which he said: "The Emperor of the French, our generous ally, worthy of the name and genius of Napoléon, in taking command of the army of that great nation, has resolved to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic."

Let us see for a moment what was happening in the Duchies, where Piedmontese intrigue was busy, behind the back of the Emperor Napoléon. In Tuscany addresses had been distributed amongst the troops and people early in the year, Buoncompagni directing sedition. As to Modena, Mr. Walton, the English Consul at Carrara, wrote on February 12th to Lord

Malmesbury as follows:—"Many respectable people here are in constant correspondence with a committee resident in Turin, in which M. Farini takes an active part, and from what I can ascertain it is to prepare the people in this district to receive the Piedmontese troops, at the same time impressing upon them the necessity of avoiding any political demonstration until the Piedmontese march on the Ticino, as it is then intended to disarm the few troops here, and the Piedmontese will be requested to enter the State under the pretext of keeping order." Accordingly, when the war began, Francis V had to withdraw his few troops from Massa and Carrara, and concentrate his forces in the capital. A provisional Government was then started at Carrara, with Piedmontese troops occupying the country.

In Tuscany, the Grand Duke had two factions with which to contend. One party would support his throne, with a constitution and participation in the war against Austria, while the other was for union with Piedmont.* Buoncompagni, the Piedmontese Envoy, while smuggling arms into the country, asked the Grand Duke in the name of Cavour, for an alliance with Piedmont. Leopold II wished to conciliate popular opinion, and on April 17th he formed a new Ministry under the Marchese di Lajatico.† The Grand Duke was willing to grant a constitution and assent to a Piedmontese alliance,‡ but the new Minister consulted Buoncompagni, and the intriguer told him to demand the abdication of the Sovereign in favour of his son. The Grand Duke very

* One of the chief grievances of Piedmont was the fact of Austria having military conventions with the Duchies. It was unfortunate for the Grand Duke that the Hereditary Prince accompanied the Emperor Francis Joseph to the war.

† Neri Corsini.

‡ M. Ollivier says that the Grand Duke had been asked by both France and Piedmont to join them, they guaranteeing his dominions; and the Tuscan autonomists favoured this, but English and Austrian counsels prevailed, and the Grand Duke would only assent to neutrality. The troops proving doubtful, the Sovereign offered the Constitutionals the Ministry. Refusing to abdicate, he left for Bologna publicly, surrounded by the Diplomatic Corps, and without disrespect. Of this the Emperor Napoléon was informed on landing at Genoa on May 12th.

naturally declined to accede to this impertinent suggestion, but on the 26th of April, the troops, seduced by Buoncompagni, deserted and adopted the tricolour. The next day the Grand Duke informed the Diplomatic Corps that he would leave and throw himself upon the protection of the Powers.

Mr. Scarlett, the British Minister, objected to the course taken by the sovereign, but Buoncompagni had apparently succeeded in frightening the Grand Duke, and that evening he left Florence for Bologna, *en route* for Vienna. Buoncompagni established himself, by a proclamation in the name of Victor Emmanuel, Dictator during the war, and from Florence was able to assist in the revolt of Parma, Modena, and the Romagna. Emissaries were sent to the Emperor of the French at Alessandria, asking for his protection for the revolutionary Government at Florence—ostensibly against the Austrians. In consequence of this, Prince Napoléon was ordered to Tuscany, and landed at Livorno on May 23rd, after issuing a proclamation to the inhabitants of Tuscany.* The presence of the Prince was not unnaturally taken to presage a possible kingdom of Etruria, with him as sovereign. The Prince had, however, strict orders to do nothing against Bologna or any part of the Pontifical territory so long as the Austrians did not violate neutrality, and in case of such violation to explain by a manifesto the entry of the French troops into Pontifical territory.

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* "The Emperor sends me amongst you, at the request of your representatives, to wage war against your enemies, the oppressors of Italy. My mission is exclusively a military one. I have nothing to do with, and shall not busy myself about, your internal organisation. Napoléon III has declared that he has but one ambition, that of bringing about the triumph of the sacred cause of the liberation of a nation, and that he would never be swayed by family interests. He has stated that the sole object of France, satisfied with her might, was to have on her frontiers a people who would be indebted to her for their regeneration. If God protects us, and grants victory, Italy will be free to adopt what government she prefers, and while taking her rank among nations, will strengthen the equilibrium of Europe. Remember that no sacrifice can be too great when independence is to be the reward of your efforts, and show the world by your union, your moderation, and your energy, that you are worthy to be free. The Prince Commanding in Chief the 5th Corps of the Army of Italy, NAPOLÉON (Jérôme)."

Buoncompagni was appointed Piedmontese Commissioner on the 9th of May; but the Emperor Napoléon prevented Victor Emmanuel from accepting the proffered dictatorship, in spite of Cavour's advocacy. All that was allowed was a Piedmontese protectorate during the war, and Buoncompagni on taking possession was instructed to say that this settled nothing against Tuscan autonomy, and that the administration would be kept independent. Of Buoncompagni's deeds at this time, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe said, in the House of Lords, that "he had forfeited his rights as ambassador, and made himself subject to the laws of Tuscany."

The Duke of Modena found himself obliged to act on the defensive in May. Massa and Carrara proclaimed Victor Emmanuel dictator, and were given a Piedmontese Commissioner. Prince Napoléon, who was no friend to any of the Sovereigns suffering from Piedmontese intrigue, soon began to threaten the Austrians in the Legations, backed up by the French fleet in the Adriatic. After Magenta the Austrians abandoned Ancona, and on June 11th they evacuated Bologna.

Prince Napoléon, in his report to the Emperor on July 4th, when summoned to join the main army at Goito, said his purpose had been "*de menacer le flanc gauche de l'armée autrichienne en compromettant ses lignes de retraite, et de hâter son abandon des duchés de Parme et de Modène.*" "*La présence de ce corps* (*Vme*)," the Prince went on to say, "*prêt à déboucher sur l'armée autrichienne, a imprimé sur cette armée une crainte assez vive pour qu'elle se soit hatée dès la bataille de Magenta d'abandonner Ancone, Bologne, et successivement toutes ses positions sur la rive droite du Po.*" It should be remembered that in February, before the war, Pius IX had formally requested both the French and Austrians to withdraw from his territory, as he was capable of governing his own dominions. The Austrians were, as we have seen, driven out of the Romagna by the presence of Prince Napoléon, but there was no one to drive the French out of Rome. Prince Napoléon did not find the Tuscans at all amenable to making sacrifices for the cause. Soon after his arrival, on May 31st, he encouraged the raising

of large levies for the war, but the attempt had to be given up, and the Prince wrote to the Emperor, disgusted with the failure.

Francis V withdrew from his capital after the entry of the French into Milan, and on June 11th left for Mantova, to proceed to the Austrian headquarters. We shall have occasion to refer later to the false charges brought against his rule by Mr. Gladstone. The Duchess of Parma, Regent for her son, Robert II, against whose rule even the worst of vilifiers could find little to say, withdrew with dignity on the 9th of June, and proceeded to Verona, and thence to Switzerland. Some of the Parmese officers were credited with a desire to join in the war against Austria, and Piedmontese intrigue was undermining the Government. The Duchess before leaving Parma declared, by a proclamation, that she would neither break faith with Austria nor oppose a national wish for independence. The Austrians having left Bologna, the Cardinal Legate, without soldiers, found himself at the mercy of the rebels.

A provisional Government was started in Bologna, backed by Buoncompagni from Florence, with the connivance of Prince Napoléon. It must not be supposed that "Plonplon," one of the most awkward adversaries of the Emperor at home, was carrying out in all particulars his Imperial cousin's wishes in Italy. Umbria had next to be revolted. A rising was attempted at Foligno, but the insurgents soon submitted. On the 14th of June, the revolutionary spirits in Perugia, reinforced by Tuscan volunteers, hoisted the tricolour and started a provisional Government. They were not prepared, however, to face the Papal troops without assistance from without, and Buoncompagni would not send any. The Piedmontese Commissioner advised the Perugians to get the help of Cerotti, an old defender of Mazzini's Republic in Rome, who was then in Tuscany. On the same 14th of June the Papal army, commanded by Colonel Schmidt, started from Rome. The Pontifical army comprised about 12,000 men, and the rebels had already 5,000. On the 19th, at night, Schmidt reached Foligno, and at 2-0 the following morning halted ten miles short of Perugia. Here

Colonel Schmidt sent Signor Latanzi, a man well known in Perugia, under a flag of truce, into the town. The rebels were asked, in the name of the Pope, to lay down their arms. The offer was refused, and so Colonel Schmidt had to storm the place. The insurgents, in spite of their strong position and superior numbers, were completely routed, and Colonel Schmidt was made a general by Pius IX.

But Tuscany, ruled by Buoncompagni, the Romagna, with d'Azeglio as Piedmontese Governor, sent by Cavour, and the Duchies of Parma and Modena, were in the hands of the revolution. As regards the Duchess of Parma, it may be well to remember the words of the Marquis of Normanby on July 15th, in the House of Lords. Lord Normanby said:—"He had no objection to postpone the observations which he desired to make upon the conduct of Count Cavour. His despatches contained more of the *suppressio veri* than he (Lord Normanby) ever found in any documents of a similar nature. It would have been highly satisfactory to him to have been able to show how well the Duchess of Parma had acted throughout these transactions, and how completely without justification was the conduct of the Sardinian Government. He recollected the state in which she found the Duchy of Parma, and had had recent knowledge of the state in which she left it, and he must say, looking both to her conduct with reference to her son's interest, and the attention she had paid to the welfare of her people, that there would be no act which would be more deserving of opprobrium than any attempt to dispossess her of the states which she held in the name of her son, and which were settled on him and his heirs." This is the opinion expressed at the time by the English Minister to the Parmese. The utmost that could be urged on the other side was that the dynasty stood in the way of an idea.

On May 22nd, the King of the Two Sicilies and Jerusalem died at the Palace at Caserta, in his 50th year. Ferdinand II was succeeded at Naples by his son Francis II, who was married to a sister of the Empress of Austria. King Ferdinand had been asked by both sides in the war for his co-operation, but insisted on neutrality. The allies certainly had no claim upon him, but

Austria was considerably disappointed, and sent him rather a bitter reply. The King had fears of a Murat restoration if he got mixed up in the war. King Francis continued his father's policy of neutrality. At the outbreak of the war, Marshal Pélissier was recalled from the London Embassy to take up a military command, and after a little delay, during which Lord Malmesbury protested against such an appointment, Persigny was sent to succeed him, the Emperor Napoléon having by this time left for Italy. The Queen received the new Ambassador coldly, and he felt his position a trying one. On May 23rd, the Empress Regent of the French wrote to Queen Victoria, that the Emperor hoped to localise the war. "*Un embrasement général*" would be, the Empress said, an incalculable evil for all the world, and both she and the Emperor relied upon the Queen and the Prince Consort, whose influence was so great in Germany towards peace. "It is not I," the Queen replied, on the 25th, to the Empress Eugénie, "but the Emperor, who is all powerful to that end." If desirous of localising the war, the Queen added, the Emperor should not carry it beyond Sardinian territory after he had completed his task of delivering it from Austrian invasion. Unfortunately for the consistency of English diplomacy, the British Parliament was dissolved this month, and the election foretold a change of Government. Lord Derby resigned on a small adverse vote on June 10th, and the 20th found Lord Palmerston again in office with Lord John Russell, Mr. Gladstone, and the Duke of Argyll. Lord Palmerston was at this time, according to the Prince Consort, "wholly French," "thought everything right which the Emperor did, and that we were all wrong not to go hand in hand with him." The country, however, was against this view, and an early discussion on the Italian question resulted in the addresses affirming strict and impartial neutrality, in spite of Palmerston, Gladstone, and Lord John, although the last-named was not, like his chief, an admirer of the Emperor. With regard to Lord Palmerston's attitude, it was believed that the fall of the Conservative Ministry was arranged by him with the Emperor of the

French to take place at the outbreak of war,* and there is much reason for supposing that the fall of the Ministry would not have happened had all the papers on the Italian question been before the House. Mr. Disraeli refused, however, to be drawn on the subject, even by a private friend, and the matter has never been satisfactorily cleared up. The Opposition might have made the position of the new Government very difficult had they chosen to do so, but Mr. Disraeli held his hand, for Lord Palmerston, it must be remembered, was at this period, when in office, practically a Conservative in home politics, and had besides the faculty of disarming opposition on any side by speaking one way and voting the other.

Milan is not quite forgetful of Napoléon III, although the great statue is half hidden away at the Palazzo del Senato. In front of the Cathedral is the new monument to Victor Emmanuel, representing the King on horseback facing the Duomo, and round the base of the statue are bas-reliefs of the entry in 1859. Victor Emmanuel is represented riding at the head of the victorious army through the streets, and by his side is Napoléon III. The Emperor is acknowledging the greetings of the crowd, which flings wreaths and garlands in the path of the victors.†

To return to the campaign. The Emperor, in the midst of his triumph at Milan, was not inactive;—far from it. The Austrians were reported to be taking up a strong position at Melegnano, about twelve miles distant, from which place they might take the offensive. He rode off at once to see if MacMahon and his troops had started, for he had

* M. Emile Ollivier gives a most interesting account of some remarkable negotiations between the Emperor, Prince Napoléon, and Kossuth, in the course of which the Hungarian patriot made a provisional offer of the crown of St. Stephen to "Plonplon." The offer was declined. Kossuth carried on his intrigues with Bright, Palmerston, &c., and when the Derby Ministry had fallen, he turned up at the camp of the French Emperor at Valeggio, bringing letters from the new Ministers.

† Sir James Hudson alleged that Mazzini had dogged the footsteps of the Emperor Napoléon to Milan, and that 66 Orsini bombs found by the Sardinian police in the possession of one of Mazzini's followers there, was intended for use against the Emperor.

ordered the 1st and 2nd Army Corps to advance to Melegnano. Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers was in supreme command, with Generals Forey, de Ladmirault, and Bazaine leading the 1st Army Corps. These started from San Pier d'Olmo in the early morning of the same day, and marched through Milan. The same evening General Bazaine was ordered to attack the enemy, and on his division fell the brunt of the battle. It was a sharp fight, and the French lost 951 killed and wounded, but by nightfall the victory was complete. The Commander-in-Chief was himself in the thick of the battle in the town, fought during a thunderstorm, and MacMahon arrived in time to pepper the retreating Austrians. The next morning the Emperor of the French arrived at Melegnano to see the field of battle and congratulate Baraguay d'Hilliers. He then returned at once to Milan, for a *Te Deum* in the third largest church in the world. Napoléon III and Victor Emmanuel were given another triumph. Riding together, Emperor and King were assailed with flowers hurled at them with such persistence by the girls of Milan, that their chargers could hardly stand the fire.* Mgr. Cascia, the Coadjutor Archbishop, received the Sovereigns at the door of the Cathedral where Napoléon I had placed the iron crown of Lombardy on his head fifty-four years before. In the evening there was a frenzied scene of welcome to the Sovereigns at the Scala Theatre.

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* "Ay, it is he,
Who rides at the King's right hand!
Leave room to his horse and draw to the side,
Nor press too near in the ecstasy
Of a newly-delivered impassioned land:
He is moved, you see,
He who has done it all.
They call it a cold, stern face;
But this is Italy,
Who rises up to her place!
For this he fought in his youth,
Of this he dreamed in the past.
The lines of the resolute mouth
Tremble a little at last.
Cry, he has done it all!
Emperor
Evermore."—*Mrs. Browning.*

The Austrians continued their retreat while the French and Sardinians rested awhile,—the Piedmontese, the Imperial Guard, and the 3rd Army Corps at Milan; the 1st and 2nd Army Corps at Melegnano. The Austrians not only evacuated Lodi, whence they retreated from Melegnano, but on the 10th of June they evacuated Piacenza, destroying their fortifications, and the next day they burnt the bridge over the Adda and abandoned Pizzighettone. The Emperor Francis Joseph, who had come to Verona to take command of his forces on May 30th,* was collecting all his men on the Mincio. He had withdrawn his troops from Pavia, Cremona, Ancona, Bologna, and Ferrara, and was assuming a most formidable position on his own frontier. The Austrian Emperor took up his quarters at Villafranca, to await, behind the Mincio with an army of 160,000 men, the advance of the allies with a slightly superior force against him. Meanwhile, the Emperor Napoléon had gone to Melegnano on June 10th, whence he proceeded, on the 12th, to Gorgonzola. The allied army crossed the Adda on the 12th, the Imperial guard waiting a day behind at Milan as reserve. By the 18th the army reached Brescia, where the French Emperor had another triumphal reception. On the 21st the advance began again. The allies marched without hindrance towards the Quadrilateral. Peschiera, Mantova, Legnano, and Verona, the four strong cities, were a formidable protection to the army of the Emperor Francis Joseph entrenched behind the Mincio, with neutrality as a safeguard on the north. On June 23rd, the Emperor Napoléon was at Desenzano on the Lake of Garda, and drove to see Victor Emmanuel at Lonato. He knew of the Austrian retreat across the Mincio, and decided to advance to the heights between Lonato and Volta the next day. But the Austrian Emperor had, it seemed, changed his mind, not for the

* With the Kaiser were the Archdukes Leopold and William, and the Hereditary Prince of Tuscany. Prince Nicholas of Nassau had joined the army as a volunteer. On June 18th, the Emperor Francis Joseph assumed, by a proclamation, the immediate command-in-chief, with Hess as chief of the staff. Schlick commanded the right wing of the army, and Wimpffen the left.

first time, and on the evening of June 23rd the Austrians had advanced to take up positions at Lonato, Volta, and Valeggio; so the battle the next day came somewhat as a surprise to the allies. The Austrians here found themselves threatened by Garibaldi and General Cialdini from the Adige Valley, by Prince Napoléon with an Army Corps coming up from Tuscany, and by the French Fleet in the Adriatic, as well as by their old combatants of the main Franco-Sardinian army under the French Emperor in person, so Francis Joseph decided upon taking the offensive. The French were also preparing gunboats at Desenzano for use on the Lake of Garda. Moreover, the Austrian Emperor had received a somewhat discouraging Prussian note. Austria had just lost Prince Metternich. The famous Minister died at Vienna on June 11th, in his eighty-seventh year.

Very early on the morning of the 24th of June the allies began to advance, and soon found themselves in collision with the enemy. Before six o'clock the Emperor was informed of this at Montechiaro, and drove off in hot haste to Castiglione, where he surveyed the situation from the top of the church tower. The Austrians were in strong force at Solferino and Cavriana, where the Emperor Francis Joseph made his headquarters, and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, under Baraguay d'Hilliers and MacMahon, were coming into collision with the enemy in the plains.* Napoléon III galloped off at once towards the fray, ordered Baraguay d'Hilliers to advance on Solferino, and, General Forey's division having taken Mont

* The French official report says:—"*Les Autrichiens doivent quitter, le 24, la ligne Pozzolengo—Solferino—Guidizzolo, pour atteindre les positions de Lonato, Castiglione, Carpenedolo. Les corps Français doivent de leur côté le même jour quitter la ligne Lonato—Castiglione—Carpenedolo, pour celle de Pozzolengo—Solferino—Guidizzolo. De ces deux marches inverses le même jour et sur la même ligne resultera nécessairement un choc général, dans lequel se présenteront dans de meilleures conditions les troupes qui auront l'initiative. Or, les colonnes alliées ayant reçu l'ordre de partir à deux heures du matin, après avoir fait le café, et les corps autrichiens ne prenant un premier repas qu'à huit heures et demi pour partir à neuf heures, les Autrichiens devaient être surpris par les alliées. Ce fut effectivement ce qui arriva.*"

Fénile, took up his position there, watching the furious and evenly-balanced fight. General Forey, leading his troops, seized the tower called the "Spia d'Italia," on the heights near Solferino, and General Bazaine took the cemetery, and Solferino and the adjacent heights were in possession of the 1st Army Corps. The 2nd Corps, under MacMahon, attacked Cavriana, and supported by the voltigeurs of the Guard, and the artillery of Lebœuf, seized the place in the afternoon. The 4th Corps, under Niel, had been steadily advancing all day on the right. Canrobert's Corps, held more in reserve towards Mantova, was called up by the Emperor to support Niel. A fearful storm of thunder, rain and darkness came on, the Austrians were all retreating to the Mincio, and the Emperor refrained from pursuit. The Piedmontese army, under La Marmora, had been doggedly fighting all day a battle of its own at San Martino, near the Lake of Garda. They were the superior in numbers, but recoiled somewhat before Benedek. However, after the storm they renewed the attack, and General Benedek having to retreat with the rest of the Austrian army by the Imperial order, the soldiers of Victor Emmanuel occupied the place. The whole of the French army had been engaged in this deadly conflict, and the losses were appalling. Sixteen hundred dead, 8,500 wounded, and 1,300 missing was the French catalogue, while the Piedmontese lost 700 dead, 3,500 wounded, and 1,200 missing. The Emperor had been in active command all day while the battle hung in the balance, and was constantly in danger. As he sat watching the operations through field-glasses, with his staff behind, Dr. Larrey had his horse shot under him. The Emperor Francis Joseph also kept close to the fighting, and was once, it would seem, in imminent danger, and that quite near to his Imperial foe. The Marquis de Massa, in his *Souvenirs et Impressions*, writes:—"In the midst of a group of officers who were seeking to open a passage for their generals, Francis Joseph himself, who had been among the last to leave the bravely-contested battlefield, was believed to be recognised. At this moment Napoléon III, coming up at a gallop close to the battery to estimate its terrible effects, seeing the terrible

personal risk incurred by his unfortunate adversary, and certain that no offensive return was to be dreaded, ordered the gunners to stop firing. This act of generosity cannot be called in question; I had it from Prince Murat, in whose presence it occurred."

The Emperor of the French took up his quarters at Cavriana, in the building from which the Austrian Emperor had just fled. It would have been natural to have ordered a pursuit of the retreating foe, but Napoléon III hesitated. He had won the day, after many anxious moments; his men were much exhausted, and he shrank from inflicting further suffering on friend or foe. With his head in his hands, and soaked to the skin, the conqueror sat brooding in silence over the horrors of the day in the house whence Francis Joseph I had just fled before the arrival of the victor. Napoléon III, the head of the youngest dynasty in Europe, the Sovereign by popular voice, sat deep in thought in the very room from which he had driven the chief of the oldest reigning house in Europe, the Emperor by divine right. It was long before the silence was broken, but at last the Emperor looked up and said quietly to the expectant staff, "*La journée est terminée.*" From Cavriana he issued the following order of the day:—

"Soldiers! The enemy expected to surprise and fling us back beyond the Chiesa; it is they who have recrossed the Mincio instead. You have worthily sustained the honour of France, and the battle of Solferino equals and even surpasses the memories of Lonato and Castiglione.

"For twelve hours you repelled the desperate efforts of 150,000 men. Neither the numerous cannon of the enemy, nor the formidable positions they occupied over an extent of three leagues, nor the distressing heat, have diminished your ardour. The grateful fatherland thanks you, through my lips, for such perseverance and courage; but it weeps with me over those who are dead on the field of honour. We have taken three colours, thirty cannon, and 6,000 prisoners. The Sardinian army has fought with like bravery against superior forces; it is well worthy to march beside you. Soldiers, so much spilled

blood will not be unavailing for the glory of France and the welfare of peoples.—NAPOLÉON."*

The next day was largely occupied by the allies in attending to the dead and wounded. The Emperor made Niel a Marshal, and the French army moved nearer the Mincio, Victor Emmanuel remaining at San Martino. The Emperor of Austria established himself at Verona.

So ended this desperate struggle, fought under a scorching sun, and at a cost to the victor of 100,000 casualties. "The war will be short," said a French officer to two English companions on the Riviera in the early spring. The words were a surprise to his hearers, who knew nothing of imminent war. Yet the officer, who must have known something of the mind of his Emperor, was right. In a few weeks war broke out, and in a surprisingly short time it was all over. If the war of 1859 surprised the general public, no less so did the conclusion of peace.

* The Empress Regent, the Prince Imperial, Princess Clothilde and Princess Mathilde attended a *Te Deum* at Notre Dame for the victory on July 3rd. This was the Prince Imperial's first appearance on a public occasion.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EMPERORS IN CONFERENCE.

"Then sovereigns, statesmen, north and south,
Rose up in wrath and fear,
And cried, protesting by one mouth,
'What monster have we here?
A great Deed at this hour of day?
A great just Deed—and not for pay?
Absurd,—or insincere.'"

. . . . . .

"But he stood sad before the sun
(The peoples felt their fate).
'The world is many,—I am one;
My great Deed was too great.
God's fruit of justice ripens slow:
Men's souls are narrow; let them grow.
My brothers, we must wait.'"

On the morrow of Solferino, the Emperor reflected on the horrors of the battles won, and on the impracticability of winning any more. In front of him was the Quadrilateral, where his retreating foe had a singularly invulnerable position of defence, and a vast Prussian army he knew to be burning to advance on the Rhine.* Last, but not least, he received final assurance that the "benevolence" of Russia could not be reckoned upon in case of emergency. The Emperor asked Count Schouvaloff if there were any chance of Russia attacking Prussia should Prussia intervene against France, and the answer was clear—"None in the world." Colonel Claremont sent this information to Lord Cowley from Valeggio. Schouvaloff brought an autograph letter from the Czar to the Emperor, urgently counselling peace. Prince Gortschakoff had already written to Kisselew in Paris with information to the effect that the

* The first warning of a serious check had come before Solferino. It was on the 23rd of June that the Emperor received a letter from the Empress Eugénie, pointing out that the Prussian army had concentrated at Coblentz and Cologne, and urging peace and the return of troops to France. The Emperor took Victor Emmanuel aside on horseback, and read the letter aloud. The King listened in silence, and looked dejected, but neither spoke a word.

majority in the Prussian Council, led by the Prince Regent, were for war on the Rhine, and that the Czar hoped the Emperor Napoléon would make peace with Austria. M. Emile Ollivier shows conclusively that of all the reasons inclining the French Emperor to seek a peace, the most urgent, and indeed the determining one, is not to be found in the exhaustion of the French officers from the heat, nor even in the carnage from which Napoléon III so instinctively recoiled, but in this warlike attitude of Prussia. As the German historian, Treitschke, says: "the Prince Regent was ready to take up arms for the treaties of 1815."

Lady Paget, who was then in attendance on Princess Frederick William, the Princess Royal of England, has recently confirmed the imminence of Prussian intervention. Prince Frederick William, afterwards the Emperor Frederick III, told Lady Paget one day that "it was to be officially declared the next day that Prussia would join Austria against France and Italy." There was a military dinner that evening at the Neue Palais, Potsdam, the residence of Prince Frederick William, and all was expectancy, when the Prince Regent, handed a message, rose and said, "Gentlemen, a peace has been signed at Villafranca between the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of the French." This attitude of Prussia was not without effect upon Austria, although not in so obvious a manner.

On June 25th, an extraordinary panic took place in the French camp, and the Emperor was disgusted to see the 'liberated' people hastily putting out Austrian flags, in the belief that the allies were in retreat. Preparations were now pushed forward for the siege of Verona, but Napoléon III was scheming for peace.

Alike as a humanitarian and as a statesman of common prudence, the Emperor of the French saw that it was imperative to make overtures for peace; and first he turned to England. Peace he must have, and he instructed his Ministers in France to ask England to arrange an armistice, on the understanding that Lombardy and the Duchies were to be surrendered forthwith to Sardinia, and Venetia be made an

independent state under Austria. Lord John Russell, however, offered no comment in communicating with the Austrian Ambassador. It must be recorded to his credit that he urged peace on the Government of the Prince Regent. Russia soon signified approval of the terms suggested by the Emperor Napoléon for England's mediation; Prussia hesitated, and Austria declined. The Emperor Francis Joseph preferred falling into the hands of the Emperor of the French to owing an obligation to Prussia.

Prince Hohenlohe, then a Bavarian Minister, and afterwards third German Imperial Chancellor, was in London at this time, and gives in his memoirs some interesting impressions.

Count Apponyi appeared "much disheartened" by Solferino, and "spoke with great bitterness of Prussian policy, which Austria had to thank for this disaster." If Austria were made to sign a dishonourable peace, he thought Napoléon III would turn against Prussia, and Germany and Austria would be powerless to help. The Prince Consort told Prince Hohenlohe that the Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia was the work of Günne and Windischgratz, unknown to Buol. The Prince Consort also spoke of the Emperor Francis Joseph and his policy, and said that the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian had no better results in Italy, "because hindered and distracted by Vienna." The Archduke's rule, as Governor of Lombardy and Venetia, up to the war, was admittedly liberal and conciliatory. The Prince Consort, whose judgment was rarely at fault, showed a certain amount of religious prejudice in discussing Austrian policy. The Prince augured badly, Prince Hohenlohe tells us, of any man educated by Jesuits. "These men and the policy inspired by them are the causes of the present trouble." Prince Hohenlohe suggested that the revolutionaries and the secret societies were the trouble. The Prince Consort said that no secret societies existed without misgovernment, to which Hohenlohe rejoined that there were as many of these in the South American Republics as in Italy.

To return to the peace negotiations. Palmerston, who hated the idea of the war coming to an end, opposed the scheme

submitted by Persigny to Lord John Russell on the 6th of July.* England proving immovable, the Emperor Napoléon resolved to treat directly with the Emperor Francis Joseph, and accordingly, on the 7th of July, he startled all concerned by sending General Fleury to Verona, with proposals for an armistice. The Emperor Francis Joseph assented, after a night's reflection, and the next day an armistice was concluded, with an arrangement for a meeting between the Emperors on the 11th. The day before the Imperial meeting, Persigny asked for assistance from England for the "moral support" of the French demands the next day, on much the same lines as before, including the surrender of Venetia.† Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell would have assented to this, as getting a large slice for Italy, but the Queen demurred, and so the Government declined to support the French demands. England again essayed to put a spoke in the wheel of Italian independence. On the 11th of July took place the memorable meeting of the Emperors Napoléon and Francis Joseph at Villafranca, of which M. Imbert de S. Amand gives a graphic and thrilling description in his "*France and Italy.*"

Two great Emperors, engaged in deadly conflict, each with immense armies, resolving to see one another in the face and put an end to the bloodshed! these two mighty Sovereigns, galloping across country, followed by their staffs, until they met to shake hands, is a theme indeed for description with pictorial effect. Napoléon III and Francis Joseph then rode side by side to a house in the centre of the town. An understanding was soon reached. Austria was to retain Venetia, but it was to become one of the States of an Italian Confederation,

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* Outside the Cabinet, feeling in the British Parliament was strongly anti-French.

† On the 10th of July, Lord John Russell wrote to the Queen that he and Lord Palmerston recommended giving the "moral support" asked for by Persigny. The Queen replied the same day that they "ought not to ask her to give her 'moral support' to one of the belligerents." Two days later the Queen asked the Foreign Secretary a very natural, but for him somewhat awkward question, when she wrote, "Are the wishes of the Lombards, Tuscans, &c., really ascertainable, while their countries are occupied by French and Sardinian armies?"

under the honorary presidency of the Pope. Lombardy was to be ceded to France, to be handed on, of course, to Sardinia; the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena were to be reinstated. It was verbally arranged that no force was to be used in the reinstatement of these Sovereigns. The Emperor Francis Joseph thought force would not be necessary, but he would not sign the preliminaries if it was stated that none was to be used.

These preliminaries were speedily communicated by Lord Cowley to Lord Palmerston. The Emperor Napoléon gave it as his opinion, like the Emperor Francis Joseph, that the Duchies would take back their Sovereigns. Neither would seem to have been aware of the extent to which Piedmontese intrigue had gone. Both Emperors expressed themselves much pleased with the other. The Emperor of the French said to Prince Metternich:—"*J'ai eu bien raison d'avoir redouté l'entrevue avec sa Majesté l'Empereur, votre souverain, car j'étais bien sûr qu'elle me subjuguerait,*" and consequently he granted easier terms. The Emperor of Austria, on his part, was, according to Sir Theodore Martin, greatly impressed by the "tact, the graceful bearing, the clearness of mind, and the considerate delicacy of the French Emperor."* Meanwhile, disaffection had broken out in the Papal States, after the departure of the Austrian troops. In July revolution was rife in the Duchies; Cavour working through his agents for their annexation to Sardinia. To the camp at Montechiaro had come a deputation from Bologna to offer the dictatorship to Victor Emmanuel. The Emperor said to them:—"If the Bolognese had taken up arms against the Austrians it would

* Lord Cowley, in a letter of the 20th to Lord John Russell, gave some particulars of the Imperial meeting. "The two Emperors met in the most cordial manner." The Emperor Francis Joseph took the initiative of offering to cede the conquered territory, but nothing more, for the sake of peace. The Austrian Emperor said he desired to see the dynasty of Napoléon firmly seated on the throne of France, but added, "Believe me, dynasties are not established by having recourse to such bad company as you have chosen; revolutionists overturn, but do not construct." Prince Napoléon told Lord Cowley that the Emperor Francis Joseph had difficulty in persuading his staff to agree to the peace.

have been another case; but you have taken up arms against whom? Against the Pope. I did not come to Italy to deprive the Pope of his possessions." The Emperor would not hear of Victor Emmanuel's dictatorship, or any consideration of the territorial question; all he would sanction was the sending of a commissioner to keep order, exacting at the same time a promise from the Piedmontese authorities not to favour any attempt against the Marches or Umbria There is a curious note in Cavour's letter to La Marmora on July 6th, "I think we have finished agreeing with the Emperor on the Roman question," for Cavour had started the movements he was promising to discourage. Hence, his ungoverned rage on hearing of the arrangements of Villafranca.

Yet to the Romagnese, Victor Emmanuel could reply with admirable caution. "It will not do," said the King, "to let Europe accuse me of acting merely through personal ambition, and of substituting Piedmontese absorption for Austrian oppression. The Holy Father, the venerated leader of the faithful, remains at the head of his people. He is not, like the sovereigns of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, deprived of his temporal authority, which we ought not simply to respect, but to consolidate. Therefore, I would disapprove of any subversive act contrary to equity and injurious to the noble cause we serve. Let us not forget that Pius IX is an Italian Prince." Excellent sentiments, and worthy of a Prince of the house of Savoy, to be unhappily forgotten when *Il Re Galantuomo* had no longer Napoléon III. at his elbow.

We shall see how Cavour, the calculating opportunist, for once, lost his head. When Victor Emmanuel ratified the treaty of Villafranca, he left for Turin and resigned in a fury, throwing up his plethora of offices as President of the Council, Minister of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, and of War. Cavour, in resigning, declared that there was danger now for constitutional liberty and for England in an alliance between three emperors.

Cavour's rage at the abrupt termination of the war was shared by the thoughtless mob at Turin, and the Emperor's portrait was removed from the shop windows.

"Nay, but he, this wonder,
He cannot palter nor prate,
Though many around him and under,
With intellects trained to the curve,
Distrust him in spirit and nerve,
Because his meaning is straight.
Measure him ere he depart
With those who have governed and led:
Larger so much by the heart,
Larger so much by the head.
Emperor
Evermore.

"He holds that consenting or dissident
Nations must move with the time;
Assumes that crime with a precedent
Doubles the guilt of the crime;
Denies that a slaver's bond,
Or a treaty signed by knaves
(*Quorum magna pars* and beyond
Was one of an honest name),
Gives an inexpugnable claim
To abolish men into slaves.
Emperor
Evermore."—*Mrs. Browning.*

The armistice was made known in Paris on the 7th, by the publication in the *Moniteur* of the following message:—"The Emperor to the Empress. An armistice has been concluded between the Emperor of Austria and myself." The next day the official journal announced:—"It is necessary that the public should not misunderstand the extent of the armistice; it is limited merely to a relaxation of hostilities between the belligerent armies, which, though leaving the field open for negotiations, does not enable us, for the present, to foresee how the war may be terminated."

After the conclusion of the armistice the Emperor Napoléon issued, on July 10th, the following order of the day from Valeggio:—

"Soldiers,—A suspension of arms was concluded, July 8th, between the belligerent parties until the 15th of next August. This truce will permit you to rest from your glorious labours and, if needful, to imbibe new strength to renew the work you have so brilliantly inaugurated by your courage and devotion. I

return to Paris, leaving the provisional command of my army to Marshal Vaillant, major-general; but, when the hour of combat sounds, you will see me again among you to share your dangers."

On the day of the imperial meeting, the *Moniteur* said:—

"We hasten to make known the circumstances under which the suspension of arms just concluded between the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria, has taken place. Communications were exchanged between the three great neutral Powers, with the object of agreeing upon the terms on which their mediation should be offered to the belligerents. The first act of this mediation was directed to procure the conclusion of an armistice; but notwithstanding the rapidity of telegraphic communications, this agreement between the cabinets could not be effected in less than the lapse of several days. Meantime, the attack of our fleet upon Venice was about to take place, and a new battle before Verona was imminent. In this position of affairs, the Emperor, faithful to the sentiments of moderation which have ever directed his policy, and anxious, above all, to prevent useless effusion of blood, did not hesitate to ascertain what were the desires of the Emperor Francis Joseph, seeing that, if these desires were conformable with his own, it was a sacred duty of the two Sovereigns to suspend, from that moment, hostilities which might be without result owing to mediation. The Emperor of Austria having shown similar intentions, commissioners named on both sides met for the settlement of the clauses of the armistice, which was definitely concluded on the 8th of July, the duration of which is fixed at five weeks. On Monday, the 11th instant, an interview between the two Emperors will take place at Villafranca."

The next day, the peace resulting from the interview was made known as follows:—

"The Emperor to the Empress, Valeggio, July 12th. A treaty of peace has been signed between the Emperor of Austria and myself. The conditions of peace are the following:—An Italian Confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope. The Emperor of Austria gives up his rights over

Lombardy to the Emperor of the French, who remits them to the King of Sardinia. The Emperor of Austria keeps Venetia, but it is to form part of the Italian Confederation. A general amnesty is to be granted."

The latest turn of events was at once earnestly discussed at the English Court. The Queen said what had happened showed the danger of driving Austria by apparent hostility into the arms of the two other emperors, and that Cavour's chances, plus England, against them would be small, whilst she would be most happy to do anything to improve Italy. The resignation of Cavour, after a stormy scene with his Sovereign, who was both too grateful and too wise to find any fault with the French Emperor, took place on July 14th, and the next day the Emperor of Austria issued a manifesto from Luxemburg Castle on the peace. The Emperor Francis Joseph declared that he "had accepted peace only after being convinced that he could obtain more favourable terms by direct negotiation with the Emperor of the French, than those to which the three neutral Great Powers were likely to give their moral support as a collective project of mediation." Victor Emmanuel issued a proclamation on the 13th to the "people of Lombardy." "Heaven," he said, "has blessed our arms. With the powerful aid of our magnanimous and valiant ally, the Emperor Napoléon, we arrived in a few days, from victory to victory, on the banks of the Mincio. To-day I return among you, to give you the happy intelligence that God has granted your wishes."

On the 11th of July the Emperor of the French wrote to the Kaiser:—"*Ayant fait connaître les premières propositions que j'avais adressées à votre Majesté, non-seulement les Cabinets de Londres et de St. Pétersbourg ont déclaré être prêts à les soutenir très-vivement mais le Gouvernement Prussien a fait dire que, si l'Autriche refusait, elle ne devrait plus compter sur son concours ni matériellement ni moralement.*"

On the 12th of July the Emperor of Austria wrote to the Emperor of the French:—"*Je remercie votre Majesté de la preuve de confiance qu'elle me donne en me faisant part de l'acceptation par les trois Cabinets de ses premières propositions.*"

Some doubt has been expressed as to the reasons which weighed with the Emperor of Austria in inducing him to negotiate directly with the Emperor Napoléon, and in view of the decision of the English Cabinet, how it was that the Emperor Napoléon was able to bring this pressure to bear upon the Emperor of Austria. The explanation is probably to be found in the fact that Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, approving with alacrity of Persigny's suggestions, the French Ambassador telegraphed the assent of the English Government to the Emperor Napoléon before the Queen had overruled the Premier and the Foreign Secretary. Thus it was that the French Emperor was able to give the Emperor Francis Joseph the impression that the neutral Powers would agree to less advantageous terms than he himself. The apparent inconsistencies of the situation have not unnaturally given rise to considerable speculation, not always favourable to the Emperor, whereas, reduced to plain fact, the incident becomes merely one of the not infrequent instances of the enthusiasms of English Liberal Ministers checked at a critical moment by a singularly sagacious Court.

Diplomacy had, of course, to disavow any concurrence with Persigny's suggestions. On the 27th of July, Lord John Russell denied to the Ambassador in Vienna that England had adopted any terms as proper to be submitted to Austria. Prussia made a similar denial, with more reason; while Russia ignored the question. The clash of arms having ceased, diplomacy was now as busy as ever. But the firm hand of Lord Malmesbury was absent from the British Foreign Office, and a Liberal Ministry was in power. It required all the firmness and superior knowledge of the Queen and the Prince Consort to keep them steady. The treaty of Villafranca required the reinstatement of the Dukes, but it also required the Pope to undertake reforms.

I. The two sovereigns will favour the formation of an Italian Confederation.

II. This Confederation will be under the honorary presidency of the Pope.

III. The Emperor of Austria cedes his rights over Lombardy to the Emperor of the French, who, in accordance with the

wishes of the inhabitants, will resign them to the King of Sardinia.

IV. Venetia will form part of the Italian Confederation, remaining, however, under the Crown of the Emperor of Austria.

V. The two sovereigns will make every effort, recourse to arms excepted, to reinstate the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena in their dominions, they giving a constitution and a general amnesty.

VI. The two sovereigns will ask the Holy Father to introduce the necessary reforms in his States, and to separate the Legations administratively from the rest of the States of the Church.

VII. Full and complete amnesty is accorded on both sides to persons compromised by recent events in the territories of the belligerent parties. *Fait à Villafranca le 11 Juillet 1859.*

Such were the stipulations, according to M. Imbert de S. Amand, which the Emperor Napoléon noted down on his return from the interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph, read to Victor Emmanuel and Prince Napoléon, and then despatched by the hand of Prince Napoléon for the Austrian Emperor to sign. The Prince was the bearer of the following letter from Napoléon III to the Kaiser:—"Monsieur mon frère, I have well considered the proposals which your Majesty made to me in this morning's interview, and I have decided to accept them. I send them, written, to your Majesty, as I recollect them. I charge my cousin, Prince Napoléon, to bring you this letter, and this preliminary proposal. He is authorised to discuss the terms with your Majesty, and to bring back the modifications in detail which may result from this discussion, as well as to give your Majesty all the developments and explanations necessary on the stipulated points." Prince Napoléon, who on this occasion seems to have kept his Republican manners and Piedmontese sympathies well in the background, performed his part well.* The Prince was at the same time somewhat

* The Prince, who had just been summoned by the Emperor from Florence in consequence of the withdrawal of all Austrian troops from Central Italy, had suddenly become a strong advocate of peace.

remorseless, not to say threatening, in pushing his case, and tried for more than the generous-hearted Emperor had demanded. After a lengthened interview with the Austrian monarch, he induced the Emperor Francis Joseph to sign the document, with certain modifications, which will be noted on comparing the seven points set out as follows, with the same as originally drawn up by the Emperor of the French.*

I. The two sovereigns will favour the creation of an Italian Confederation.

II. This Confederation will be under the honorary presidency of the Holy Father.

III. The Emperor of Austria cedes his rights over Lombardy to the Emperor of the French, with the exception of the fortresses of Mantova and Peschiera, so that the frontier of the Austrian possessions shall start from the extremity of the fortress of Peschiera and extend in a straight line along the Mincio as far as Le Grazie; from there to Scarzarolo and Suzarra on the Po, whence the existing frontiers will continue to form the boundaries of Austria. The Emperor of the French will remit the ceded territory to the King of Sardinia.

IV. Venetia will form part of the Italian Confederation, remaining however under the Austrian Crown.

V. The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena will return to their States, giving a general amnesty.

VI. The two Emperors will ask the Holy Father to introduce the indispensable reforms in his States.

VII. Full and complete amnesty is accorded on both sides to persons compromised on account of recent events in the territories of the belligerent parties. *Fait à Villafranca le 11 Juillet 1859.*

Prince Napoléon promised the Emperor of Austria that the sheet he signed would be returned the next day, whether with or without the autograph of the Emperor Napoléon.

* The Kaiser struck out "honorary," but the Prince got it put back again. "*Les vœux des populations*" was quite too much for the Kaiser. Treaties, not mob law, decided the fate of provinces, in his view.

On July 12th,* the Emperor resigned the command to Marshal Vaillant, and issued a proclamation as follows:—

"Soldiers!

"The bases of peace are agreed upon with the Emperor of Austria; the chief object of the war has been attained. For the first time Italy is about to become a nation.

"A Confederation of all the States of Italy, under the honorary presidency of the Holy Father, will reunite in a group the members of a single family. Venetia remains, it is true, under the Austrian sceptre; nevertheless it will be an Italian province, and form part of the Confederation.

"The reunion of Lombardy to Piedmont creates for us on this side of the Alps a powerful ally, which will owe us its independence; governments remaining outside of the movement, or reinstated in their possessions, will understand the necessity of salutary reforms.

"A general amnesty will remove the traces of civil discords. Mistress henceforward of her own destiny, Italy will have no one but herself to blame if she does not make uniform progress in order and liberty.

"You will soon return to France; the grateful country will receive with transports the soldiers who have carried so high the glory of our arms at Montebello, Palestro, Turbigo, Magenta, Marignan, and Solferino; who in two months have liberated Piedmont and Lombardy, and who have halted only because the war was about to assume proportions no longer in relation with the interests which France had in this formidable struggle.

"Be proud, then, of your success; proud of the results obtained; proud, above all, of being the beloved children of that France which will always be the great nation so long as she has a heart that can understand great causes, and men like you to defend them."

The same day, the Emperor left Valeggio for Desenzano, and on the 14th, Napoléon III and Victor Emmanuel made a triumphal entry into Milan in an open carriage. The next day

* On the morning of the 12th, Walewski sent the conclusions of the Emperors to London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg.

the Emperor and the King arrived at Turin, and were met at the station by Cavour. The Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne had just telegraphed to Walewski that the people were behaving better, and that the portraits of Orsini substituted for those of the Emperor in the shops had disappeared. In the evening the Emperor received Cavour, and spoke to him frankly and kindly on the situation. To Turin came Bianchi and Montanelli, from Tuscany, anxious to know what this peace meant for them. In their uncertainty they asked Kossuth to lend the Hungarian legion just raised, but he declined, saying that they had no intervention to fear. Kossuth told Montanelli to go to Victor Emmanuel and ask if this was not true. The King felt no difficulty in giving this assurance, and the next day the Tuscans got what they most wanted, a word from the Emperor himself. Coupled with a little wholesome advice, Napoléon III gave Montanelli to understand that there would be no reinstatement of the Grand Duke by Austrian troops, and recommended a plebiscite as to the restoration. The idea of a vote for annexation to Piedmont was scouted by the Emperor. Pepoli, anxious, like the Tuscans, got leave from the Emperor to telegraph to Bologna a similar decision, together with the news that the Emperor had written to the Pope on the subject of reforms.

The Emperor Napoléon left Turin early in the morning of the 16th, accompanied by Victor Emmanuel as far as Susa,* and crossing the Mont Cenis, took train for Paris at St. Jean de Maurienne. At Chambéry it was noted that he received a warm welcome on what was shortly to become French territory. On the 17th, the Sovereign was back at St. Cloud, and two days later had to listen to most laudatory addresses from the Senate, the Corps Législatif, and the Conseil d'État. "In the intoxication of triumph you have shown yourself," ran the address of the Corps Législatif, "to be as generous an enemy as you are a faithful and disinterested ally. Surrounded by victorious and ardent soldiers, you thought of nothing but how to spare their precious blood. You have given true liberty to

* Victor Emmanuel, who had been uneasy about the Emperor at Turin, exclaimed, "*Ah, il est parti,*" with relief, after the farewell.

Italy by freeing it from despotism, and restraining it from revolutionary proceedings. In fine, with that marvellous moderation which characterises you, you have gone as far as the honour of France required, no farther than her interests demanded." M. Baroche, President of the Conseil d'État, exclaimed, "God be thanked for bringing you back safe and sound to this France of which you are the saviour and the hope, to this august wife whose firm courage and lofty intelligence we have tested during your absence, and to this noble child who is already learning to thank Heaven for the triumphs of his father."

The Emperor's reply was a sort of *apologia* for the conclusion of peace, and must be quoted at length. "Gentlemen, in finding myself once more amongst you who have surrounded the Empress and my son with so much devotion during my absence, I feel the necessity of thanking you in the first place, and then of explaining to you the motive of my conduct.

"When, after a two months' glorious campaign, the French and Sardinian armies arrived under the walls of Verona, the struggle was inevitably about to change its nature, as much in a military as in a political aspect. I had no choice but to attack in front an enemy entrenched behind great fortresses, and protected against all flank movements by the neutrality of surrounding territories; and in beginning the long and fruitless war of sieges, I found myself confronted by Europe in arms, and ready either to dispute our success or to aggravate our reverses. Yet the difficulties of the enterprise would not have shaken my resolution or the enthusiasm of my army, if the means had not been disproportionate with the results to be expected. It was necessary to determine on breaking through the obstacles opposed by the neutral territories, and then to accept war on the Rhine as well as on the Adige. It was necessary, above all, to avail one's self frankly of the support of the revolution. It was necessary to shed more precious blood when too much had flowed already. In a word, in order to succeed, it was necessary to risk what it is not permissible to a Sovereign to put at stake for anything but the independence of his country. If I stopped, it was not, therefore,

through weariness or exhaustion, nor through desertion of the noble cause I had desired to serve, but because there was something in my heart which spoke more loudly still—the interest of France. Can you believe that it has cost me nothing to bridle the ardour of soldiers excited by victory and merely asking permission to go on? Can you believe it has cost me nothing to eliminate openly from my programme, in the face of Europe, the territory extending from the Mincio to the Adriatic? Can you believe it has cost me nothing to see noble illusions destroyed, and patriotic hopes dissipated in honest hearts? I made war against the will of Europe in order to aid Italian independence; as soon as the destinies of my own country were endangered, I made peace.

"Can it now be said that our efforts and sacrifices have been totally wasted? No. As I said in taking leave of my soldiers, we have a right to be proud of this brief campaign. In four combats and two battles, a numerous army, second to none in organisation and bravery, has been vanquished. The King of Piedmont, formerly styled the guardian of the Alps, has seen his country freed from invasion, and the frontier of his States extended from the Ticino to the Mincio. The idea of an Italian nationality is admitted by those who are most antagonistic to it. All the Sovereigns of the Peninsula understand at last the imperious necessity of salutary reforms. Thus, after having given a new proof of the military strength of France, the peace I have just concluded will be fruitful in happy results; the future will reveal them more fully day by day, for the welfare of Italy, the influence of France, and the repose of Europe."

"This beautiful language," writes M. Emile Ollivier, "is summed up in two words: 'In the presence of Piedmont insufficient, Italy inert, Germany in arms, the revolution stirring, the execution of my programme was too much for France alone, and so I stopped.' 'Sire, I agree with you,' replies history."

On July 21st, the Diplomatic Corps was received at St. Cloud. Addressing the Emperor, the Papal Nuncio said: "Sire, the Diplomatic Corps experienced the necessity of asking your Majesty to receive its cordial and sincere felicitations on your

happy return and the prompt conclusion of peace." In reply the Emperor observed that "Europe in general was so unjust to me at the beginning of the war, that as soon as the honour and interests of France had been secured, I was glad to be able to conclude peace, and to prove that I had entertained no intention of convulsing Europe, and stirring up a general war. I hope that now all causes of dissension will vanish, and the peace be of long duration. I thank the Diplomatic Corps for its congratulations."

On this same day, Leopold II, Grand Duke of Tuscany, voluntarily abdicated in his exile in favour of his son, the Hereditary Grand Duke Ferdinand. The new Grand Duke speedily issued a proclamation, promising to adopt the tricolour and grant a constitution. Baron Ricasoli had, however, by that time taken upon himself the direction of affairs at Florence, with results to which we shall have occasion to refer later.

On July 8th, the King of Sweden, Oscar I, died at Stockholm, and was succeeded by his son as Charles XV. King Oscar was the son of General Bernadotte, afterwards Charles XIV.

From no quarter did the Emperor receive more encouragement when he concluded peace, than from Russia. Writing on July 14th, the Duc de Montebello, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, told Walewski that he had seen the Czar and Gortschakoff, both of whom expressed their satisfaction and admiration of the policy of the Emperor of the French. "The Emperor has shown himself," in the judgment of the Emperor Alexander and Prince Gortschakoff, "as profound a politician in negotiation as he had proved himself a great captain on fields of battle."

The English Cabinet was by no means pleased with the arrangement of Villafranca. Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell both strongly disapproved of the peace. The Prime Minister protested to Persigny in strong language, saying that Austria ought to be strictly excluded from all right of interference, political or military, beyond her own frontiers. His interference at this juncture was somewhat uncalled for, in view of the fact that he had shown no sort of support to the

French campaign. The Queen, commenting to Lord Palmerston on his letter to Persigny, took a line which was a lesson to the Ministry, both in good manners and consistency.

"The effect of placing Austria in an Italian Confederation will certainly be to legalise that influence for the future, the supposed illegal exercise of which was put forward as one of the reasons for the late war; yet it is one of the conditions of peace bought by much blood and the loss of a rich province by Austria. We did not protest against the war, and Lord Palmerston personally wished France success in it. We can hardly now protest against the peace, and Lord Palmerston will, the Queen is sure, see the disadvantage which would accrue to this country, should he make it appear as if to persecute Austria were a personal object with the first Minister of the Crown.

"The Queen is less disappointed with the peace than Lord Palmerston appears to be."

Lord Palmerston's language to Persigny was hardly appropriate for an English Government largely in sympathy with the cause which France had done so much to advance, while she would give neither men nor money herself for the liberation of Italy. "The Emperor Napoléon," the Queen wrote to Lord John Russell on the 13th of July, "by his military successes and apparent moderation or prudence immediately after them, has created for himself a most formidable position of strength in Europe." The Queen spoke of the Emperor as "having Sardinia, the Pope, and Austria as his debtors." In Germany, indeed, the position of France victorious caused a real feeling of alarm, whilst in England, in spite of the assurances of the French Government, a certain amount of anxiety was felt. Mr. Gladstone's Budget, showing a large deficit on account of increased defences, was readily adopted.

There is a conflict of statement as to King Victor Emmanuel's willingness to agree to the peace. Walewski told Lord Cowley that the King had urged an armistice, and had been more in favour of peace than the Emperor, while the Sardinian Sovereign declared that he knew nothing of the preliminaries until they

were concluded, and only signed to save a rupture. The fact remains that he did sign, even in face of the furious reproaches of Cavour, but that he did so unwillingly, adding a qualifying clause* after his signature. The warlike King probably hated making peace, but it must be remembered that the French were disappointed during the campaign at the apathy shown by the Italians for the cause, just as Charles Albert himself had been in 1848. That the Emperor was wise in concluding peace when he did is beyond doubt, whether Walewski's information was correct or not. M. Emile Ollivier's comment is: "In these conditions"—that is, the attitude of Germany, &c.—"which of the allies was most interested in peace? Piedmont. Therefore . . . Prince Napoléon, devoted to Victor Emmanuel and Italy, advised the end of the war as eagerly as he had the beginning: therefore Victor Emmanuel made no objection, offered no resistance, and thought it useless even to consult Cavour. He was most certainly vexed at this check halfway, but the Emperor was not less so. . . . Was it not better for him to stop, having gained Lombardy, than be thrown back at the bayonet's point, with empty hands, to Turin!"

On hearing of the arrangement of Villafranca, the Prince Consort said, "The Confederation with the Pope at its head sounds like a bad joke." But was it a joke at all, or even an impossible idea? Many reflections suggest otherwise. The German Empire, strong and united in a federation brought about by diplomacy, surely presents to the world a system at once more permanent and more edifying than the struggle to realise the dream of a united Italy founded upon a revolutionary crime. The state of Italy, groaning under the weight of heavy taxation to support unnecessary armaments, does not compare favourably with that of the prosperous confederation on the north, which reckons amongst its subjects a number of her sons. The results of the peace were thus summed up by the Prince Consort. "Prussia," the Prince wrote, "is quite dis-

* "*J'approve en ce qui me concerne.*" The King asked through La Marmora for leave from the Emperor to record this sort of protest against the Confederation and the return of the Archdukes.

credited, Germany endangered, Italy discontented, the French army left in a bloodthirsty condition, the Emperor Napoléon almost compelled to compensate himself by new manœuvres for his moderation, Austria thrown into his arms and made revengeful against Prussia and England, Russia overjoyed, the hands of the Pope and the Ultramontanists strengthened."

Napoléon III had submitted the scheme to the Pope on July 14th in the following letter:—"Très Saint Père, I have just concluded peace with the Emperor of Austria on the following conditions. In this new order of things your Holiness can exercise the greatest influence, and make all causes of trouble cease for the future. If you consent, or rather, *proprio motu*, grant to the Legations and the Marches a separate administration with a lay government appointed by yourself, but surrounded by an elected council, if that province pays the Holy See a fixed tribute, your Holiness will be assured of peace in your states, and will be able to dispense with foreign troops. If this commends itself to your Holiness, I should also wish to propose to all the Catholic sovereigns to join in a contribution to the splendours of the pontifical throne. Finally, I earnestly wish that these unhappy conflicts may cease, for your Holiness should not be ignorant of the fact that as soon as Italian affairs are settled, I shall be obliged to withdraw my troops from Italian territory. I beg your Holiness to listen to the voice of a devoted son of the Church, but one who understands the needs of his time, and who knows that brute force will not suffice to solve questions and smooth over difficulties. All the provinces of the state are not always administered in the same way, when their character and antecedents are different. Thus Scotland and Ireland have separate laws, although members of the same Empire. I see in your Holiness's decision either the germ of a future of peace and tranquillity, or the continuation of a violent and calamitous state of things. The advantage of your own position is that, save for the respectful counsels of the two greatest Catholic states, you submit to pressure from no one; this is not a congress chiefly composed of heretics and schismatics, who come to meddle in the government of the head of our Church. As to the honorary

presidency of the Confederation, I hope your Holiness will not refuse it. It would be even for the glory of religion if you presided over the destinies of Italy, like the Doge of Venice, who seemed by a gesture to raise or calm the waves of the Adriatic. I hope your Holiness will pardon my frankness, and will only see in my humble advice another proof of my love for the welfare of Italy and for the glory of the Holy See. I am, your Holiness's very devoted son, NAPOLÉON."

The reply of Pius IX was the inevitable *non possumus*. The sovereign pontiff had had enough of liberal reform and its results in 1846. "This is beautiful," he remarked, "the Doge raising or calming by a gesture the waves of the Adriatic, but I do not want either this Confederation or this lay government." The Pope would not grant any political reforms. He regretted having done so at the beginning of his reign, but he would grant some further administrative reforms, such as lay governors to the Legations, more local government and admission of laymen, but he would not begin any of this until the revolted states had made their submission. To the Duc de Gramont the Pope said, "By a word the Emperor could calm this agitation. Will he pronounce it? Can he? I know the difficulties of his position; that is why I say, Can he? M. l'Ambassadeur, I make an appeal to your feelings as a Christian and an honest man, and I charge you to ask the Emperor if he consents to say a public word to hinder revolution *chez moi*." M. Ollivier says that the Pope went so far as to complain that the disturbances in Perugia, Ravenna, and Bologna had been directed by persons connected with the Emperor's family, and that the revolution had placed itself openly under the shield of France. The King of Naples informed the Emperor of Austria, before the end of July, that he (King Francis) saw no reason to refuse his adhesion to the Italian Confederation.

The Duchies, however, now dominated by Piedmont, declared that they would not have their sovereigns back, nor would the Romagna resume her allegiance to the Pope, and the Pope was himself not favourable to reforms. The Emperor of the French turned once more in this awkward *impasse* to the

expedient of a Congress, and on July 18th, Persigny was instructed by Walewski to bring the wish of the Emperor to the notice of England. The Emperor, the Minister said, had all along wished the Italian question to be settled by the Great Powers together, and now he looked to see a Congress or a Conference. The Emperor Francis Joseph said he thought no Congress was necessary, but if it were desired by France, he would not oppose it if the Congress undertook "not to pronounce on any of the stipulations which must form part of the Treaty of Zürich." This reply of Austria was communicated on August 4th by Count Walewski to Lord Cowley. On July 18th, Lord Cowley wrote to Lord John Russell that he had asked Walewski if the Emperor were not under an obligation to Austria, who had declined the idea of a Congress and the negotiation for peace, not to press the matter. Walewski replied to this by saying that he, the Emperor, could agree to a Congress, though he might not like to propose it. Lord Cowley then said to Walewski, "But supposing Austria were to refuse to attend a Congress, what will you do?" To which the French Minister replied, "We shall be ready to attend without her." Walewski hoped that Austria would give way, though Cowley reminded him that Austria had declared that she "would not associate herself with a non-Roman Catholic Power in giving advice to the Pope."

The Queen, after reading Lord Cowley's letter, wrote to Lord John Russell on July 20th that "she did not think it furnished material sufficient to justify this country in embarking on the dangerous experiment of a Congress on Italian affairs." "England has been enabled to remain clear of the war, and is still more happily clear of the peace which terminates it." "Two emperors," the Queen remarked, "who were at war with one another, had suddenly concluded a peace." The English Cabinet, the Queen entirely concurring, decided that it was premature to deal with the question until the peace treaty had been drawn up by Austria and France at Zürich. If Austria did not then object, and Russia and Prussia wanted it, the English Government would not oppose a Conference. The Queen and

Prince Albert had not forgotten the fact of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell's views on the terms of peace being known to Austria, for the Austrian Government had already made complaint. In July, Pius IX said to Mr. Odo Russell, "What is to become of us with your uncle and Lord Palmerston at the head of affairs in England?" The Pope further observed—"Your example is dangerous to the Italian minds, your speeches in Parliament excite them, and you fancy, because constitutional liberties suit you, that they must suit all the world." On August 14th, Paris was delighted by the spectacle of the triumphal return of the army of Italy, led by the Emperor.

It was a brilliant and frenzied scene in the Place Vendôme. A contemporary account says: The *centgardes*, the escort, wheel to one side: a few seconds more, and the Emperor appears, a solitary horseman on his charger, saluting the shouting people. They are throwing flowers and garlands in his path, and the vault rings with the noise of many mouths—one voice—"*Vive l'Empereur.*" A shout, so long and loud, that it might waken the sleeper in the Invalides. On he comes, saluting, then rides to beneath the Empress's balcony, and salutes her; then turns to review the army of Italy. At a banquet to the generals, the Emperor said: "As Sovereign and as Commander-in-Chief, I thank you again for your confidence. It is flattering to me, who had never commanded an army, to find so much obedience on the part of men who had great experience in warfare. If success has crowned our efforts, I am happy to attribute the greater part of it to those skilful and devoted generals who rendered my command easy, because animated with the sacred fire, they have incessantly given the example of duty and disregard of death." Of this day of triumph a London journal said: "Flowers rained upon the Boulevards on the heads of the soldiers, and the stern, silent, impenetrable Emperor, on his chestnut war horse, drank in the ovation, and made no sign that it delighted him." The young Grand Duke of Tuscany arrived in Paris on the 16th, and was kindly received by the Emperor.

The Austrian rule, now ended in Lombardy, had been, as we have said, a mild one, with the Archduke Maximilian as Viceroy. As M. d'Ideville says: "To be just, those oppressors were the gentlest of tyrants. Their only crime, and it was one, was to wear the white uniform and to speak German." M. d'Ideville also tells us that he had heard Cavour say that the one he dreaded most during the Austrian occupation was the Archduke Maximilian. "Maximilian," said Cavour, "was young, active, and enterprising; he had devoted himself heart and soul to the difficult task of reconciling the Milanese, and assuredly he would have succeeded." Many partisans of the revolution had been won over by the Archduke, Cavour is reported to have said, and "at no time were those provinces so well administered." Cavour began to be alarmed, but the "kind Government of Vienna intervened," and the Emperor Francis Joseph recalled his brother Maximilian from Milan; "a blunder, an impolitic act, at once most fatal to Austria, most useful to Piedmont."

The scene between Cavour and the King on July 10th at Monzambano, whither the Prime Minister had hurried from Turin, is admitted to have been a most lively one, and although the mad rage attributed to Cavour in the Sovereign's presence can hardly be literal truth, it seems tolerably certain that Cavour advised Victor Emmanuel to abdicate.* The King first asked Count Arese, a personal friend of the French Emperor, to form a Ministry, and on his attempt not succeeding, Rattazzi accepted the task, with the avowed intention of pursuing the policy of Cavour. Rattazzi, however, only held the actual Premiership for a

* M. Ollivier says that Cavour's "exasperation" "turned to delirium," that Victor Emmanuel at last got up and walked away, and that a second 'scene' took place on the 12th, when Cavour wanted the King to go on fighting alone, refused to sign, and resigned. Victor Emmanuel called him "ungrateful" and "insolent," and does not appear to have regretted his disappearance so much as did the Emperor Napoléon. Kossuth, to whom the Emperor expressed, through Jérôme Piétri, his profound regrets, was almost as furious as Cavour. The two raved together. Della Rocca and Corsini defended the Emperor, and even Garibaldi told his volunteers not to forget what they owed to Napoléon III. Neri Corsini died December 1st, 1859.

day, and the 20th of July saw La Marmora Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Rattazzi at the Ministry of Justice.

One of the first things to be done by the Government was, by a curious irony, to instruct the Piedmontese Commissioners to resign their powers into the hands of the several provisional Governments, and thus it was possible for Sardinian representatives to meet those of Austria and France with diplomatic "correctness" on the 8th of August, at Zürich. Consequently, the Marquis d'Azeglio left Bologna, and Pallieri departed from Parma, but Farini declined to leave Modena, proclaimed himself dictator, and soon added Parma to his revolutionary jurisdiction. The Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne learnt from General Dabormida that Piedmont would have nothing to do with the Confederation arranged at Villafranca. Victor Emmanuel did not consider himself pledged to this part of the peace negotiations, and his plenipotentiary at Zürich was forbidden to accept it. Pius IX was, as we have seen, hardly less antagonistic to the proposed Confederation than Victor Emmanuel or the revolutionary leaders themselves. On September 26th Pius IX delivered an allocution formally protesting against the treacherous conduct of Piedmont in the Romagna, and on the 1st of October, Cardinal Antonelli gave the Piedmontese Ambassador, Count della Minerva, his passports. On October 12th, the Ambassador of the intriguing Government left Rome.

After Villafranca the Emperor of the French had said to Victor Emmanuel: "*Nous allons voir maintenant ce que les Italiens sauront faire tous seuls?*" Events were now shaping themselves in that direction. By the end of 1859 the Duchies, Tuscany, and the Romagna were virtually beyond the disposition of diplomacy. General Fanti was appointed to the command of the forces of the league, and under him Garibaldi had the command of the Tuscan division. The Tuscan Assembly in voting on August 16th for union with Piedmont, commended itself "to the generous protection of Napoléon III, the magnanimous defender of Italian independence." The Assemblies convoked at Modena and Bologna, and a plébiscite at Parma, all declared for union with Piedmont. Lord

Palmerston and Lord John Russell, ambitious to assist in the formation of a kingdom of Northern Italy, pointed out to the Emperor of the French that the re-entry of the Dukes was impossible.* Austria was not now inclined to renew the war in Italy, and Prussia was quiescent. The recent mobilisation of the Prussian army had disclosed the fact that her military system was by no means faultless. Russia would probably stand aloof as not interested, and so the English Ministers pointed out to the Emperor of the French that with 60,000 men in Lombardy and 5,000 in Rome, it was in his power to assist or prevent the annexations. As a matter of fact, there were in the autumn some 25,000 men in Central Italy under General Fanti and under Garibaldi supporting the revolutionary governments in Tuscany and the Romagna, and Garibaldi was threatening a further attack on Pontifical territory. The Emperor of the French, on hearing of this danger, made it known that if Garibaldi moved, 30,000 French troops would march to Piacenza. Garibaldi, however, was still restive, and Farini and Fanti both threatened him without avail, so at last Victor Emmanuel summoned him to Turin. After four hours' talk with the King on November 16th, Garibaldi undertook to desist for the present. As he did so, Garibaldi addressed his comrades as follows: "The truce will not last long; old diplomacy seems but little disposed to see things as they are. Diplomacy still looks upon you as the handful of malcontents which she has been accustomed to despise. She does not know that in you there are the elements of a great nation, and that in your free and independent hearts germinate the seeds of a world-wide revolution if our rights shall not be recognised, and people will not let us be masters in our own home." On November 10th, the negotiations at Zürich had at last taken final shape in the form of three treaties. France and Austria bound themselves, by the first of these, to "favour with all

* Lord John Russell, in a speech at Aberdeen on October 2nd, had more or less pledged the Cabinet to support the Italian Revolution. On that day Count Anviti was murdered by the Liberal mob at Parma. Farini and d'Azeglio condemned this crime, but the murderers went unpunished.

their efforts the creation of a confederation between the Italian States, which should be placed under the honorary presidency of the Holy Father, and whose object should be to maintain the independence and inviolability of the confederated States, to assure the development of their moral and material interests, and to guarantee the interior and exterior security of Italy by the existence of a federal army. Venetia, which remains under the Crown of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, will form one of the States of this confederation, and participate in the obligations as well as in the rights resulting from the federal pact, the clauses of which will be determined by an assembly composed of representatives from all the Italian States." "The territorial boundaries of the independent States of Italy which were not parties to the late war, not being liable to change, except with the concurrence of the Powers which presided at their formation, the rights of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and of the Duke of Modena are expressly reserved between the high contracting parties." The second of these treaties, between France and Piedmont, and the third, between all three parties, dealt only with the question of Lombardy and the payment of a war indemnity by Piedmont to France and Austria. Lombardy was now secured to King Victor Emmanuel, while the Duchies and the Romagna had been carrying on governments for nearly six months in his name. If the Emperor Napoléon wished to prevent the dispossession of all the other Italian Sovereigns by Sardinia, for none was he more anxious to intervene than for the Duchess of Parma.* But the Duchess

* Alexander II was inclined the same way. The Duchess wrote to the Czar on behalf of her son. Walewski was informed of this on July 29th, by the Duc de Montebello. Prince Gortschakoff said he had no doubt that the sovereignty of the young Prince would be maintained. Nor did Queen Victoria overlook the particular hardship of this case. Lord John Russell having ventured, in a letter to the Queen on July 13th, to use the words "to be well armed and to be just to all our neighbours," as expressing the right policy for England, the Queen, in her reply, on the following day, agreed with him. "She trusts," the letter ran, "that as the poor Duchess of Parma appears to be overlooked in the Italian peace because nobody thinks it his business to befriend her, we shall, in the above spirit, ask for justice and consideration for her."

of Parma was not an Austrian Archduchess, and so Kaiser Franz Josef would not concern himself for her throne.

On August 8th, the question of the proposed Congress was debated in the House of Commons. A motion against participation in the Congress was withdrawn, after a declaration by Ministers to the effect that no approbation had been given, and that if England did join, the treaties of 1815 would be upheld. This declaration was doubtless of the nature of a concession on the part of the Premier and Foreign Secretary to the views of the Court, and of not a few besides. Meanwhile, the governing powers in Tuscany were pressing for annexation to Sardinia, and English Ministers, in spite of the declaration in Parliament on August 8th, were far from preserving a "correct" attitude.

In July, Lord John Russell had proposed to the Queen that England should submit a scheme to France for the settlement of Italy, implying, without ratifying, the arrangements of Villafranca. The Queen objected, of course; pointing out that England, a neutral power, could not recommend the breaking of the pro-Austrian clauses. Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell were both getting impatient on the Italian question, and had, as usual, to be held in check by the Court. Metternich told Walewski plainly that the Austrian Government would, under no circumstances, recognise the new order of things in the Duchies, and that France ought to take the same line. Yet Lord Palmerston actually urged Walewski, in a semi-private communication, to have the part concerning the Duchies in the Treaty of Villafranca omitted in the Treaty of Zurich,* and made the extraordinary

* The Queen delayed the despatch of the 25th July, said that she would not consent to a neutral suggesting the breaking of pledges at Villafranca in the Treaty of Zurich, and had occasion to rebuke Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell somewhat severely. Complaining that she had repeatedly to alter drafts of despatches, and that they came back to her no better, the Queen at last insisted on a communication to the French Government, to the effect that private communications, like Lord Palmerston's, were not official expressions of Her Majesty's Ministers. At length, on the 10th of February, 1860, the Queen, when enclosing to Lord Palmerston a very improper letter from Lord John Russell to herself, was constrained to say: "The Queen must demand that respect which is due from a Minister to his Sovereign."

assertion that it was to the interest of France to have the Duchies annexed to Sardinia. Walewski spoke to Lord Cowley on the subject of this most "incorrect" suggestion. To do as Palmerston advised would virtually be to resume a state of hostilities, said Walewski, for there would be no cession of Lombardy if peace were not signed. The Emperor was not prepared for such an eventuality. As to the annexation of the Duchies to Sardinia, Walewski very pertinently observed that the establishment of a kingdom with twelve millions of people on the French frontier would be no advantage to France. If this took place, France would have to demand Savoy. Lord Cowley was further informed by Walewski that if Victor Emmanuel consented to annex Tuscany, Austria would not sign the peace or appear at the Congress.* Nevertheless, if Her Majesty's Government were prepared to assist France against Austria, the case would be different, and he did not say that the Emperor would not, in that case, reconsider his decision.

About this time Lord Cowley had a conversation with the Emperor Napoléon on the subject of English distrust of France. The disquietude in England was accentuated by the knowledge that at that time the French navy was the stronger. "I defy anyone listening to the Emperor," wrote Lord Cowley, "when he is speaking of the English alliance, without attaining the conviction that the preservation of it is that which he has most at heart. I feel equally certain that he does not dream of a war with England, and that his *amour propre* is wounded by our own suspicions of his intentions."

On the 3rd of September Tuscany, on the 15th Parma and Modena, and on the 24th of the same month the Romagna, formally offered themselves for annexation to Sardinia. King Victor Emmanuel declined the offer in courteous and sympathetic terms, promising to forward their wishes before the Great Powers. To the Tuscan delegates Victor Emmanuel said: "The Tuscan Assembly will have understood that the accomplishment of your

* Queen Victoria approved of Lord Cowley as first representative of England at the Congress, but entirely refused to have so strong a partisan as Sir James Hudson for the other.

wishes can only take place by negotiations which are about to begin on the affairs of Italy. I will second your desires. Strong in the rights given me by your wishes, I shall support the Tuscan cause before the Powers, and above all with the magnanimous Emperor of the French, who has done so much for the Italian nation." General Dabormida, the Minister of War, must be given some of the credit for this studiously "correct" reply. To the delegates from Parma and Modena, on September 15th, the King spoke in the same sense. In the reply to the Romagnese delegates, at Monza on September 24th, King Victor Emmanuel, in promising to forward their cause with the Powers, said: "Confide in their justice, confide in the generous patriotism of the Emperor, who will complete the great work of reparation which he has so powerfully begun, and which will assure to him the gratitude of Italy." On the 8th, the Queen wrote to Lord John Russell on the danger of such private communications as that of Lord Palmerston to Walewski, as illustrated by the use made at Villafranca of that to Persigny. The Queen proceeded to administer a very proper rebuke to certain of her Ministers, saying that the Government and the nation could not approve of Lord Palmerston's action. Her Majesty sounded a note of warning when she went on to suggest that if England prevented the restoration of the Archdukes the result would be either a kingdom of Etruria for Prince Napoléon, or the annexation of Savoy to France.

An English journal, by no means favourable to the Emperor, was found to say:—

"The people of Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and the Romagna, hold the destinies of Italy in their hands . . . . . It may happen, hereafter, that the aggrandisement of Piedmont will be found so equally distasteful to Austria and to France, that a wise and cautious policy may dictate the middle course—what is supposed finds most favour with the Emperor of the French—the creation of a central Italian kingdom of "Etruria," under the sovereignty of Jérôme Napoléon. . . . . What Bernadotte did in Sweden, Jérôme Napoléon may do in Italy, and will do if he be wise.

. . . . . To accept Jérôme Napoléon may be the best solution of the difficulty."

But the Emperor did not favour the idea.

On the 3rd of September, Walewski telegraphed to Persigny:—"*J'ai oublié de vous écrire hier que l'Empereur a déclaré hautement que la candidature du Prince Napoléon pour les duchés ou la Toscane ne lui convenait pas, et qu'il déclinait toute offre à cet égard.*"

On October 16th, the Emperor of the French received deputations from Parma and Tuscany, at St. Cloud, and spoke to them sympathetically, but without committing himself on the annexation question. To General Dabormida also the Emperor declared himself unable to consent to the annexations for several very potent reasons, and on the 20th, Napoléon III wrote as follows to King Victor Emmanuel:—

"Monsieur mon Frère,

"I write to-day to your Majesty in order to set forth to you the present situation of affairs, to remind you of the past, and to settle with you the course which ought to be followed for the future. The circumstances are grave; it is requisite to lay aside illusions and sterile regrets, and to examine carefully the real state of affairs. Thus, the question is, not now whether I have done well or ill in making peace at Villafranca, but rather to obtain from the treaty results the most favourable for the pacification of Italy and for the repose of Europe. Before entering on the discussion of this question, I am anxious to recall once more to your Majesty the obstacles which rendered every definitive negotiation and every definitive treaty so difficult.

"In point of fact, war has often fewer complications than peace. In the former, two interests only are in presence of each other—the attack and the defence; in the latter, on the contrary, the point is to reconcile a multitude of interests, often of an opposite character. This is what actually occurred at the moment of the peace. It was necessary to conclude a treaty that should secure in the best manner possible the independence of Italy, which should satisfy Piedmont and the wishes of the

population, and yet which should not wound the Catholic sentiment, or the rights of the Sovereigns in whom Europe felt an interest.

"I believed then that, if the Emperor of Austria wished to come to a frank understanding with me, with the view of bringing about this important result, the causes of antagonism which for centuries had divided these two empires would disappear, and that the regeneration of Italy would be effected by common accord, and without further bloodshed.

"I now state what are, in my opinion, the essential conditions of that regeneration:—

"Italy to be composed of several independent states, united by a federal bond.

"Each of these states to adopt a particular representative system and salutary reforms. The Confederation then to ratify the principle of Italian nationality; to have but one flag, but one system of Customs, and one currency. The directing centre to be at Rome, which should be composed of representatives named by the Sovereigns from a list prepared by the Chambers, in order that, in this species of diet, the influence of the reigning families suspected of a leaning towards Austria, should be counter-balanced by the element resulting from election.

"By granting to the Holy Father the honorary Presidency of the Confederation, the religious sentiment of Catholic Europe would be satisfied, the moral influence of the Pope would be increased throughout Italy, and would enable him to make concessions in conformity with the legitimate wishes of the populations. Now, the plan which I had formed at the moment of making peace may still be carried out, if your Majesty will employ your influence in promoting it. Besides, a considerable advance has been already made in that direction.

"The cession of Lombardy, with a limited debt, is an accomplished fact.

"Austria has given up her right to keep garrisons in the strong places of Piacenza, Ferrara, and Commachio.

"The rights of the Sovereigns have, it is true, been reserved, but the independence of Central Italy has also been guaranteed,

inasmuch as all idea of foreign intervention has been formally set aside; and, lastly, Venetia is to become a province purely Italian. It is the real interest of your Majesty, as of the Peninsula, to second me in the development of this plan, in order to obtain from it the best results, for your Majesty cannot forget that I am bound by the treaty; and I cannot, in the Congress which is about to open, withdraw myself from my engagements. The part of France is traced beforehand.

"We demand that Parma and Piacenza shall be united to Piedmont, because this territory is, in a strategical point of view, indispensable to her;

"We demand that the Duchess of Parma shall be called to Modena;

"That Tuscany, augmented, perhaps, by a portion of territory, shall be restored to the Grand Duke Ferdinand;

"That a system of moderate (*sage*) liberty shall be adopted in all the states of Italy;

"That Austria shall frankly disengage herself from an incessant case of embarrassment for the future, and that she shall consent to complete the nationality of Venetia, by creating not only a separate representation and administration, but also an Italian army;

"We demand that the fortresses of Mantova and Peschiera shall be recognised as federal fortresses;

"And, lastly, that a Confederation based on the real wants as well as on the traditions of the Peninsula, to the exclusion of every foreign influence, shall consolidate the fabric of the Independence of Italy.

"I shall neglect nothing for the attainment of this great result. Let your Majesty be convinced, my sentiments will not vary, and, so far as the interests of France are not opposed to it, I shall always be happy to serve the cause for which we have combated together. Napoléon.

"Palace of St. Cloud,
October 20th, 1859."

The new King of Naples, Francis II, had been asked by Victor Emmanuel to conclude an offensive and defensive

alliance with Piedmont, and after the victory of Magenta an offer was made to him of a share in the Pope's territory. The Marches and Umbria were to be added to the Kingdom of the two Sicilies in the event of his siding with Piedmont, and this with the support of Prussia and Russia. King Francis very properly refused to have any art or part in the treacherous designs of the Piedmontese Government. Towards the end of October, Lord John Russell told the Queen that he and Lord Palmerston were in favour of acceding to the proposal of a Congress. The Queen thereupon wrote to the Foreign Secretary on October 28th, as follows:—

"When the Queen last saw Lord John, both he and Lord Palmerston were adverse to going to Congress. This change of opinion seems to indicate how evenly balanced are the arguments on both sides. The Queen hopes that they will be well weighed and discussed (in the Cabinet) to-day, and she will withhold her judgment until she is informed of the result of the deliberation. It strikes her that much must depend upon what the other Powers intend to do. If they were all to join, and England stood aloof, the effect would be very detrimental to us; and again, if our refusal, although all others were ready to join, prevented its assembling, we should incur a heavy responsibility towards Europe, and Italy in particular.

"This is why from the beginning the Queen was so anxious that we should make as few declarations as possible until the peace should have been signed at Zürich, and should abstain from publicly prejudging the questions, which would then have to be considered on much safer data, and with a certain amount of experience.

"The danger of our going into Conference lies chiefly in the probability of our being intended by France to do that which she herself dreads to advocate, and to become the persecutors of Austria. The Confederation scheme is one which will prove so impracticable, and which Sardinia will at once put an end to by refusing to join the Confederation, that it would be very unwise for us to make the destruction of that scheme our special object, rendering *us* responsible for its failure. We can clearly

not sanction or assist in a forcible reinstatement of the deposed Dukes, yet if all other Powers should recognise in principle that they have a right to be reinstated, our alone denying them this right would place us on very awkward ground.

"Again, it appears more than probable that the Dukes of Tuscany and Parma may be abandoned, although their government was a mild one, and had not been complained of before the war, whilst there will be great efforts made to replace the Pope in the Romagna, the misgovernment of which was the chief grievance, and the upholding of it the chief accusation against Austria. We can clearly be no parties to this.

"Before everything else, however, it will be necessary thoroughly to consider what we have declared, in order to preserve perfect consistency in our conduct, without which it must become liable to much misrepresentation."

On the 16th of November, the Prince Consort, writing to Baron Stockmar, said, "The Emperor is in a regular fix, and he of Austria perhaps on the eve of a general revolution. His plan of government has utterly broken down. It has resulted in political, military, and financial bankruptcy; but with misfortune wisdom has not come."

The Prince Consort was extremely pessimistic as regards Austria. Doubtless his judgment of the Emperor Francis Joseph would long since have been reversed. "What the Congress is to accomplish I cannot divine. The Italians seem to have made up their minds not to take back their own rulers. We can lend no assistance to reinstate them by force. France is pledged not to do so, and Austria not to allow its being done."

It was at this time that King Leopold, who had been living in constant dread of the Emperor Napoléon, had an interview with that monarch, with results gratifying to both Sovereigns. Replying to the King of the Belgians' letter on the interview, Queen Victoria said, "I was sure you would be pleased with the Emperor Napoléon. No one has the power which he has of pleasing and fascinating others."

Meanwhile the French Government had continued to press England to support the Congress. The English Cabinet decided

to go to the Congress, on condition that no force was used against the inhabitants of the revolted Provinces, and of this decision the French Government were at once informed. The Emperor of the French probably hoped sympathy with the Italian "*risorgimento*" would, in the Congress, help him out of what the Prince Consort so truly called "a regular fix."

Lord Cowley wrote to Lord John Russell on November 17th, from Compiègne, after seeing the Emperor on the subject. The British Ambassador found the Emperor still in a dilemma. The Emperor said that he had thought the people of Central Italy would not object to the restoration of their Sovereigns, with reforms, so he had entered into engagements with Austria from which he could not recede. Had he known that the people would be so little disposed to take back their Sovereigns, he would have continued the war rather than have made peace as he did. Lord Cowley did not think that the Emperor had personally any objection to the annexation of the Duchies to Sardinia, though his Government were dead against it. Lord Cowley thought that the Emperor's real difficulty was with the Romagna. He did not take part against the Pope, but felt the inconsistency of listening to the people of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and turning a deaf ear to the Romagnese. This was Lord Cowley's impression. The Ambassador also told Lord John Russell that Prince Napoléon had suggested to him a scheme for Central Italy. This was that Parma and Modena should be given to Sardinia, and Tuscany made into a kingdom, with the Romagna added later. Tuscany, the Prince was convinced, would not consent to annexation with Sardinia. Queen Victoria immediately protested against this scheme, fearing England might be dragged into war. Insisting on a determined neutrality in the "Italian intrigues, revolutions, and wars," the Queen very pertinently observed in a letter to Lord John Russell on December 7th, that "the party placed in absolute power by a revolution and a foreign invasion, is not necessarily the expression of the real wishes of a people."

On November 7th, the national assemblies of the Romagna, Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, elected Prince Eugene of Savoy

Carignano, cousin of Victor Emmanuel, Regent in Central Italy for the "*re eletto.*" On learning of this, the Emperor telegraphed to Victor Emmanuel:—"*Mon opinion est que votre Majesté doit refuser la régence; le Congrés va être convoqué, et seul il peut resoudre les difficultés présentes. Si vous permettez au Prince de Carignan d'accepter, le Congrés n'aura pas lien, et le tort étant de votre côté, je ne pourrai pas vous sauver. Montrez de l'énergie, prouvez que la paix que vous signez est sérieuse; sans cela vous perdrez l'Italie.*" Ricasoli and Cavour were not agreed as to the next step. Cavour wished the Prince to delegate Buoncompagni to go as Regent, and Ricasoli refused this. Peruzzi went behind his chief at Florence, and carried out at Turin the suggestion of Cavour. The Emperor objected to this scheme, and Ricasoli only consented to receive Buoncompagni as a *governatore chi non governa.*

Florence had begun to suffer considerably from the loss of a Sovereign. No longer a capital, and the embassies all gone, gloom and depression were general. M. Peruzzi, the Tuscan envoy, had a violent controversy with Lord Normanby on the character of the Grand Duke. Peruzzi alleged that Leopold II was ready to bombard his capital when he left. In refuting this slander, Lord Normanby spoke of the circumstances leading to the departure of the Grand Duke as showing an amount of duplicity and corruption almost unequalled in even revolutionary annals.

The characteristic attitude of the two countries—England and France—in regard to war, showed itself unmistakably during the Italian upheaval. England always hangs back as long as possible from active hostilities, almost to the point of refusing to prepare for war. France makes preparations for war, strikes eagerly for glory and success, and frequently achieves both. England, once goaded into action, settles down to the task with calm determination, and the more the job toughens, the more the country's resolve to see it through toughens too, with the almost unvarying result of ultimate and complete victory. France, when obstacles appear in her path of glory, hastily makes peace. So it was in the Crimea, and so it was in China, when

English and French troops stood side by side. The contrast bore itself out in the Italian business. England strained every nerve to keep the peace, and prevent any interference with the treaties of 1815. France plunged into the fray, and abrogated 1815 as regards Lombardy, but when serious difficulties presented themselves, made peace at once. England was disappointed at the peace, as leaving the job only half done, and Austria still with too much say in Italy, and would have favoured change at Rome and Naples. France made a covenant with the Emperor of Austria, and refused to disturb the Pope or the King of Naples. The rare exceptions to this characteristic attitude of the two countries have been provided when Radical politicians have overborne the natural sentiment of the country. The Radical Opposition in France in 1870 were directly responsible for the unpreparedness which caused the *débâcle* before Prussia, as also for the insane prolongation of the war; and Mr. Gladstone was to blame for the abandonment of Gordon and the retreat from the Transvaal.

CHAPTER V.

"LE PAPE ET LE CONGRES."

"It is so reasonable that it must do the Emperor the greatest harm."

"A signal monument of hypocrisy, an ignoble tissue of contradictions."

"This pamphlet is hell."

Here are three opinions on the famous pamphlet entitled "*Le Pape et le Congres.*" The first is that of the Prince Consort, written to Baron Stockmar on December 29th, 1859; the second that of Pius IX in his New Year's Allocution of 1860; and the third that of Mgr. Dupanloup, the well-known Bishop of Orleans. The pamphlet appeared on December 22nd, under the authorship of M. de la Guéronnière, but was immediately attributed to the Emperor Napoléon. The Emperor, questioned upon the subject, said, "I agree with all that it says. I did not write it." The pamphlet said that the Romagna had been lost to the Holy See for good, that the Pope might be deprived of all his territories except Rome, and be maintained for the future in Rome by a guarantee of the Great Powers, by a revenue provided by the Catholic States, "as a tribute of respect and admiration for the Head of the Church." In a letter of the 31st December the Emperor Napoléon recommended Pius IX to relinquish those provinces "which for the last fifty years have created such embarrassment to his Government," and call upon the Powers to guarantee what was left.

The pamphlet made a great stir in France, and threatened to disturb seriously the cordial relations existing between Church and State. Count Walewski, who had been Foreign Minister since May 8, 1855, made an attempt to persuade the Emperor to disavow the pamphlet, and on the 4th of January his resignation was accepted. The Duc de Gramont, French Minister at Rome, took the same view as Walewski. M. Louis Thouvenel, Ambassador at Constantinople, was appointed to succeed Walewski on January 5th. The new Minister was known to be

more favourably inclined to Cavour and less zealous for the temporal power than his predecessor. The Emperor of the French found himself in no enviable position on New Year's Day, 1860.

It is curious to note, in view of the present anti-religious government of France, the furious hostility aroused by the Emperor's suggestion that the Pope should give up his troublesome provinces. Bishop Pie, of Poitiers, replied to the pamphlet from the pulpit, and other bishops delivered charges antagonistic to the Empire. Mgr. Dupanloup published a book in support of the Pontifical sovereignty, in which he was able to quote even Victor Cousin* in support of his attack on the Italian policy of the Empire. Père Lacordaire,† who was in favour of the war,‡ now condemned the policy, and Thiers and the protestant Guizot joined in the cry raised by republicans as well as clericals against the Liberal turn given to the Government. On the other side was to be found of course Prince Napoléon, for the moment not hostile to the Emperor. Although the Church and the Empire were still at one except on the Italian business, the situation appeared so serious that the Imperial

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* "If it [spiritualistic philosophy] is not blinded by the most stupid pride, it must know that outside of the schools, in mankind at large, spiritualism is represented by Christianity, that Christianity is excellently represented by the Catholic Church, that the Holy Father thus becomes the representative of the whole moral and intellectual order."

† In a pamphlet entitled "Concerning the liberty of the Church and of Italy," the eloquent Dominican, Liberal and Academician, said: "Italians, your cause is fine, but you do not know how to honour it, and you serve it worse still. What have you done for an empty system of absolute unity, which does not in the least concern your nationality or your liberty? You have raised between you and two hundred millions of Catholics a barrier which increases daily. You have arrayed against your legitimate hopes something more than men—Christianity itself—that is to say, the greatest of the works of God upon earth. Make no mistake about it; it is God who has made Rome for His Church. Therefore you have arrayed against you an eternal decree of God. Doubtless you will find it out some day."

‡ Bishop Cœur, of Troyes, had declared that the Emperor Napoléon was fulfilling a Divine Mission in the war, realising a work of which Henry IV and Louis XIV had only a vague presentiment!

Government issued three circulars in February. The first of these was addressed on February 8th to the diplomatic agents abroad, and declared that the character of the Holy See was not affected by a modification of territory. The second, issued on February 15th, instructed the Prefects to "prevent the distribution of unauthorised pamphlets, and look after sermons." The third was addressed by the Minister of Public Worship, on February 17th, to the Archbishops and Bishops of France, and advised the episcopate to calm the agitation, recalling the services of the Empire to religion and the Papacy. It was none too soon, for most, even of the officials, were against the Italian policy and supporters of the Pope's view.

On January 8th the Pope sent his reply to the Emperor of the French, and the *non possumus* of Pius IX was published in an Encyclical on the 19th:—"We declared to the Emperor that we could not yield up that which was not ours, and that we understood that the victory which he wished us to grant to the rebels of the Æmilia would be a spur to the native and foreign disturbers of the other provinces to make the like attempt, when they saw the success obtained by the rebels. And among other things, we declared to the said Emperor that we could not abdicate the said provinces of our Pontifical Dominion in the Æmilia without violating the solemn oaths by which we are bound, without giving rise to complaints and disturbances in our other provinces, without doing a wrong to all Catholics, and, in fine, without weakening the rights, not only of those Italian Sovereigns who have been unjustly deprived of their dominions, but of all the Sovereigns of all Christendom, who could not see with indifference certain most pernicious principles introduced. Nor did we omit to remark that His Majesty was not ignorant by what men, and with what money and protection, the recent outbreaks at Bologna, at Ravenna, and other cities had been excited and accomplished. With the help of God, and according to the duties of our most weighty office, we shall fearlessly make every attempt, and shall leave nothing untried, to defend strenuously the cause of truth and justice, to guard with constancy, and to keep whole and inviolate, the temporal

sovereignty of the Roman Church, its temporal possessions and its rights, which belong to the whole Catholic world; and finally, to watch over the just cause of other Sovereigns, trusting in the Divine help of Him who said, 'In the world ye shall have tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world,' and 'Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness sake.' We are prepared to follow the illustrious footsteps of our predecessors, to rival their example, and to suffer the most rude and cruel trials, and even to lay down our life rather than in any way desert the cause of justice and of the Church of God.'"

The *Univers* published the Pope's letter, and on January 29th this journal, already warned, was suppressed by order of M. Billault, Minister of the Interior. "The Emperor," wrote Sir C. Greville on January 22nd, "must have extreme confidence in his personal prestige to defy both the Clerical and Protectionist parties at the same time: it will be interesting to see whether events will justify this audacity." On January 21st the La Marmora-Rattazzi Ministry resigned, and Cavour returned to office as Premier and Minister of Marine. The new Minister of War was General Fanti, commander of the troops supporting the Provisional Governments of Tuscany and the Romagna. At the beginning of the year 1860 the revolted states, or rather the provisional or revolutionary governments now in possession of them, found themselves almost in a position to decide their own future. L. C. Farini was acting as Dictator of Modena and Parma, Cipriani of the Romagna, and Ricasoli at Florence.

No attempt was made to carry out the Treaty of Zürich, by which France and Austria were supposed to promote the restoration of the Italian Sovereigns. Walewski, indeed, did in all good faith prepare for the Congress to meet at the beginning of the year to settle things in conformity with Zürich. For the Congress was to settle the affairs of Italy. And the Congress did not meet. Cardinal Antonelli was preparing to start to represent the Pope at Paris when the pamphlet "*Le Pape et le Congres*" appeared, with the result we have already noted on the relations

between the French Government and the Papacy. The Pope refused to be represented, and the Congress was quietly allowed to drop.*

To return for a moment to the *Jour de l'an.* At the Tuileries, the Emperor, replying to the address of the Corps Diplomatique in the person of the Papal Nuncio, said: "I am happy to remember that since my accession to power I have always professed the most profound respect for all recognised rights, and it will be the constant aim of my efforts to re-establish universal confidence and peace, so far as it depends on me." At the Vatican, the Pope, replying to the respects of General de Goyon on behalf of the French army of occupation, said: "Prostrate at the feet of that God who was, and is, and will be for eternity, we pray Him in humility of heart to send down His graces and illuminations upon the august head of that army and nation, so that, thus enlightened, he may walk with safety in his difficult path, and continue to recognise the falsity of certain principles which have lately made their appearance in a little work that one might call 'a signal monument of hypocrisy, an ignoble tissue of contradictions.' We hope—nay, we are persuaded—that with the aid of these illuminations he will condemn the principles contained in this pamphlet; we are the more fully persuaded of this because he has from time to time sent us several documents which are still in our possession, and which are a real condemnation of those principles. It is with this conviction that we implore God to pour out His benedictions upon the Emperor, his august companion, the Prince Imperial, and all France." Writing of this reception by the Sovereign Pontiff, the Duc de Gramont, the French Ambassador to the Vatican, told Walewski that the Pope "gave way to his feelings" in his reply in a manner "almost painful."

The Emperor Napoléon, in his letter of December 31st to the Holy Father, said: "Facts have an inexorable logic, and

*The Pope having refused to be represented at the Congress unless the integrity of the Church territory was accepted as a first principle, Cardinal Antonelli would not take part unless the pamphlet were disavowed. Austria refused too, on like grounds.

despite my devotion to the Holy See, I could not avoid a certain amount of connection with the results of the national movement caused in Italy by the struggle against Austria. If your Holiness would have consented to an administrative separation of these provinces, and to the appointment of a lay governor, they would have again come under your authority. Unhappily, this has not happened, and I find myself powerless to hinder the establishment of the new régime. My efforts have been confined to hindering the breaking out of insurrection, and the resignation of Garibaldi has kept the Marches from certain invasion. What, then, is to be done? For this uncertainty cannot last always. After a serious consideration of the difficulties and dangers which the present combinations present, I say it with sincere regret that however painful the solution may be, what seems to me most in conformity with the true interests of the Holy See would be the sacrifice of the revolted provinces. If for the repose of Europe, the Holy Father should relinquish those provinces which for the last fifty years have created such embarrassment for his government, and if in exchange he should ask the Powers to guarantee him the possession of the rest, I have no doubt that order would be restored. Then the Holy Father would ensure peace to grateful Italy, and to the Holy See the tranquil possession of the States of the Church. I love to believe that your Holiness will not misunderstand the sentiments by which I am animated, that you will comprehend the difficulty of my situation, that you will put a kindly interpretation on the frankness of my language, remembering all I have done for the Catholic religion and its august head."

It was a mournful piece of advice which the Emperor felt himself constrained to offer to Pius IX, and could meet with but one reply, "*Non possumus.*" That the Pope should give up the Romagna to the Revolution, and through the Revolution to Piedmont, was no part of the policy of Napoléon III. It was not for this that he had "fought in his youth," it was not of this that he had "dreamed in the past." The liberation of the country from Austrian domination, and the establishment

of constitutional governments in the various Italian states, was the programme of Napoléon III. Successful revolution, and then the subjugation of the whole country to Piedmont, was the programme of Cavour and his fellow-workers, and the intriguers carried the day. So it was that the Emperor of the French *faute de mieux*, came to propose to Pius IX the surrender of the Romagna. It is impossible not to wish that some compromise could have been reached, such as, for instance, the suzerain sovereignty of the Pope, with some lay Prince as his lieutenant in temporals. For that the provinces had been a trouble to the Pope is beyond doubt. It would have been a picturesque healing of the sore could Victor Emmanuel himself have been crowned as vassal sovereign of the Romagna by the Pope in St. Peter's. But the line taken by the Piedmontese government made any such peaceable solution of the problem impossible, and the subsequent tactics of the ministers of Victor Emmanuel more than justified the *non possumus* of Pius IX as a matter of ordinary policy.

The reply of the Pope to Napoléon III was somewhat severe towards one who had to make the best of a bad business, and had with candour explained his own difficult position. For although Napoléon III by his advance against the Austrians had unwittingly set the match to a carefully and secretly-laid train of revolution in Northern Italy, the situation was not of his making, and he, in common with the Pope, had now to watch almost helplessly the formation of a strong kingdom on his frontiers, and to witness a unification constituted, as M. Billault said—and said in official form—*malgré ses conseils*. But the most unfortunate part of the whole business for the Government of the Emperor, at the beginning of the year 1860, was the religious agitation in France, to which we have already alluded, on the question of the Pope losing some of his provinces. Catholic France was in revolt against the Italian policy. The Emperor could not allow the question to be reopened, for the tranquillity of Europe now depended upon it, and thus ensued the painful necessity of curbing Catholic writers and speakers in France.

On February 6th, Victor Emmanuel wrote to the Pope on the subject of his invasion of the States of the Church. The King suggested to the Pope that "if, taking into consideration the necessities of the age, the growing strength of the principle of nationalities, the irresistible vehemence by which peoples are impelled to unite and organise themselves in conformity to the rules adopted by all civilised countries, His Holiness thought he might have to claim his frank and loyal assistance, there would be a means of establishing, not merely in the Romagna, but in the Marches and in Umbria, a state of things which, while preserving its supreme power to the Church, and to the Pope a glorious rôle at the head of the Italian nation, would make the people of these provinces share in the benefits which a strong and truly national monarchy would secure to the greater part of Central Italy." "I hope," the King concluded, "that your Holiness will deign to take into consideration these reflections, dictated by a heart sincere and wholly devoted to his person, and with his customary kindness will grant us his sacred benediction."

This intimation of his intention to assume, for so it was, at least the lieutenancy in temporals of the Papal provinces, was prefaced by the following description of his own religious character: "A devoted son of the Church, descended from a very pious race, as your Holiness very well knows, I have always cherished sentiments of sincere attachment, veneration, and respect toward the Church and its august head. It never has been, nor is it now, my intention to fail in my duties as a Catholic Prince, or to diminish, so far as it depends on me, the rights and the authority which the Holy See exercises on earth in virtue of the mandate of heaven."

Pius IX replied, on February 14th, to his self-styled "devoted son": "Sire, the idea which your Majesty intended to convey to me is not a wise idea, and one which is certainly unworthy of a Catholic King and a King of the House of Savoy. . . . . I am deeply grieved, not for myself, but for the unhappy condition of your Majesty's soul, which is under the stroke of censures, and especially for those which will strike it

when you have accomplished the sacrilegious act which you and yours intend to accomplish. I pray the Lord from the bottom of my heart that He will enlighten and give you the grace to know and lament the scandals which have occurred, and the frightful evils which, with your co-operation, have stricken poor Italy." That Victor Emmanuel felt keenly this dignified rebuke can hardly be doubted. If Napoléon III was in an awkward situation as regards Italian developments in 1860, Victor Emmanuel II was far more so. "*Il Re Galantuomo*," in spite of the licence of his private life, was a man of honour, and he was a Christian. He feared no man, it is true, but he did fear the censure of his Church, and he was now to have it forced upon him, and to be reminded of the truth up to his dying day, that it is impossible to serve two masters, to be at once the instrument of a criminal revolution and live at peace with his conscience and his Church.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ANNEXATIONS.

"You'll take back your Grand Duke?
I made the treaty upon it.
Just venture a quiet rebuke;
Dall' Ongaro write him a sonnet;
Ricasoli gently explain
Some need of the constitution:
He'll swear to it over again,
Providing an 'easy solution.'
You'll call back the Grand Duke.

. . . . . .

"Pray take back your Grand Duke.
—I, too, have suffered persuasion.
All Europe, raven and rook,
Screeched at me armed for your nation.
Your cause in my heart struck spurs;
I swept such warnings aside for you;
My very child's eyes and Hers,
Grew like my brother's who died for you.
You'll call back the Grand Duke?"—*Mrs. Browning.**

"L'Empereur a entrepris la guerre pour l'affranchissement de l'Italie non pour son unité; cette unité s'est constituée malgré ses conseils. Il eût préféré une confédération sous la presidence honoraire du Pape, maintenant, l'unité était un fait accompli, il ne la troublera pas et ne permettre pas qu'on la trouble, mais il ne lui sacrifiera pas la papauté." The words are those of M. Billault, Minister of State, pronounced in the French Senate after the war. They indicate the policy of Napoléon III at this critical period,—a policy obviously not of first intention, but a policy reasonable and consistent, having regard to the gravity of the situation. Once more; as M. Jean Guétary truly observes: "En faisant la campagne d'Italie, Napoléon III n'avait poursuivi ni l'unité de l'Italie, ni surtout l'affaiblissement de la papauté. Si les intrigues de Cavour et des révolutionnaires italiens détournèrent la politique de l'Empereur de son but, il serait inique de l'en rendre responsable." †

* "Una voce augusta."

† "*Un Grand Méconnu*," p. 145.

Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, then out of office, had feared a difference with the Papacy, and opposed the war. From this statesman the Emperor had indeed received a warning of the coming revolution. According to M. Guétary, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said to his Sovereign: "Avec l'état des esprits en Italie et la direction que leur ont imprimée les sociétés secrètes, princes et pape, tout sera ébranlé. Vous exécuterez vos desseins militaires. L'Angleterre vous laissera faire, à cause de ses idées religieuses, que vous allez seconder, malgré vous; la Russie ne bougera pas, par représailles contre l'Autriche, sa rivale en Orient, et la Prusse restera l'arme au bras, par jalousie de la maison de Hâbsbourg, sa rivale en Allemagne. Donc, au point de vue militaire, je ne doute pas de votre succès, mais une fois la lutte des armes terminée, commencera la lutte redoutable des idées. Vous aurez produit un ébranlement politique et accéléré un mouvement moral dont vous ne serez plus le maître. Avec l'état des esprits en Italie et la direction que leur ont imprimée les sociétés secrètes, princes et pape, tout sera ébranlé; les tendances à l'indépendance et à l'unification seront nécessairement fortifiées par l'affaiblissement de l'Autriche, les imaginations exaltées ne laisseront à ce moment aucune chance de succès aux plans les plus sages, aux combinaisons les plus pratiques, et vous aurez dètruit vous même, sans le vouloir, la base des combinaisons qui vous mettent les armes à la main. A la place des fondements solides sur lesquels vous espérez asseoir les nouvelles institutions de l'Italie, vous trouverez un sol miné, ébranlé, émietté, sans consistance, et tout ce que vous aurez édifié sur lui s'écroulera avec fracas, à l'heure même où lui manquera l'appui du prestige de votre présence et des baïonnettes de vos régiments."*

The forecast of M. Drouyn de Lhuys proved only too sadly true. The Emperor doubtless felt the force of the arguments, but the soul of loyal gratitude himself, he could not bring himself to foresee the extraordinary ungratefulness of which he was to be the victim. In reviewing the history of the annexations, and the attitude of the Emperor thereto, it should not

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* "*Un Grand Méconnu*, pp. 145-6."

be forgotten that Napoléon III made a real attempt to bring the revolutionaries of Florence to reason. Prince Joseph Poniatowsky was despatched by the French Emperor in the summer of 1859 to Florence, to feel the way towards a Grand Ducal restoration, in accordance with the arrangement between the two Emperors; and Prince Napoléon's ill-timed utterance in the opposite sense, when he arrived in May, had been promptly and officially disavowed. Both Walewski and the French Minister to Tuscany, the Marquis de Ferrière-le-Vayer, were strongly in favour of the restoration, but Ricasoli's intrigues had gone too far. After Buoncompagni's recall, he installed himself as Prime Minister, and effectually baffled both the partisans of Tuscan autonomy and the friends of the house of Lorraine. At Turin, the Emperor urged the restorations through Reiset.

At the beginning of the year the revolted States, now formed into a sort of union, and protected by Piedmontese arms, were at the disposal of King Victor Emmanuel. The Emperor Napoléon, with his engagements to the Emperor of Austria, could not, of course, counsel their union with Piedmont, nor could he withdraw his troops, for England had made it quite clear to Austria that she would not favour the return of the Archdukes. As to Austria, Lord Augustus Loftus wrote to Lord John Russell on January 2nd, "I think I may say with full confidence, this Government has no intention of marching men across their frontier, even though Sardinia were to march into Central Italy. Austria cannot engage in any external contest, for she would bring down upon herself a national bankruptcy, which would be followed by an internal revolution." A little later, Lord John Russell was informed by Lord Cowley, that the Austrian Ambassador in Paris had "told the Emperor that it is doubly unfair to press hardly upon Austria, for that she cannot have recourse to arms even if she desired it." Further, on the 24th of January, he received by telegraph from Vienna an official statement made by Count Rechberg* to the British Ambassador, to the effect

* Count Buol had been superseded on May 18th after a difference with Schwartzenberg on the question of overtures to the Czar from the Emperor Francis Joseph. Metternich supported Buol, and the Kaiser gave up the idea.

"that Austria might confidentially declare that she had no intention of interfering in Italian affairs."

As Mr. Disraeli said on January 24th, "Italy is at the present moment in a state far beyond the management of courts, cabinets, and congresses."

Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, it soon transpired, had at the beginning of the year favoured the idea of a triple alliance, offensive and defensive, between France, Italy, and England, the rest of the Cabinet dissenting. Warning articles appeared on the subject in the *Times*, summed up in the view that England wished well for Italy, but "we do not go to war for an idea." In January, Count Persigny suggested to Lord John Russell that Austria and France should both formally agree not to interfere in Italy "unless called upon to do so by Europe at some future time in case of anarchy." Lord John Russell wrote to tell the Queen of this on January 9th, and remarked that it "might form the basis of an agreement between France and England." The Queen, replying the same day, took up the Foreign Secretary rather sharply. "If France and Austria," said Her Majesty, "will both abstain from interfering in the affairs of Italy, it will be much the wisest course; but the Queen cannot see why this should require an agreement to be entered upon between France and *us*, who ought not to interfere at all.

"It is worth remembering, with regard to the two above-mentioned Powers, that while Austria is an Italian Power in virtue of Venetia, and France is not, Austria has no troops in any part of Italy but her own, whilst France still occupies Rome and a portion of Lombardy. French interference there is the only one existing." The Queen very rightly maintained that if Austria and France were asked to abstain from interference, Sardinia should be so too.

Lord John Russell did actually propose in a despatch of January 15th, that France and Austria should pledge themselves not to interfere for the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy, unless called upon to do so by the unanimous consent of the five Great Powers of Europe. The Emperor, speaking to

Lord Cowley on the 18th, doubted whether this course was for him consistent with loyalty to Austria. Austria's reply to the English proposal amounted to a refusal to tie her hands. Lord John Russell's memorandum contained three other points, namely: the withdrawal, when convenient, of the French from Rome and Lombardy; non-intervention in Venetia by the Powers; and an invitation from England and France to Sardinia not to send troops into Central Italy until a vote had been taken in those States. M. Thouvenel replied on the 30th through Persigny, assenting to the second point only on condition that the new organisation of Italy was guaranteed by the Powers.

The English Parliament met on January 24th, and was opened by the Queen in person. In the debate on the Address, Mr. Disraeli drew the Government on the rumoured offensive and defensive alliance with France. Lord Palmerston, fortunately for himself, was able to declare that none existed. The Prime Minister had reason to be grateful to the refractoriness of his Cabinet a little earlier, for that alone saved him. At the time of the rumoured alliance between England and France, Prussia offered to come to an understanding with England on the Italian question, but Lord John Russell refused, and somewhat curtly.

We must return for a moment to the annexations accepted by Victor Emmanuel. In July, after the peace, Arese wrote to the Emperor that "people have made an evident return to the reality of the situation, and comprehended all that you have done and all that you may still do for this unhappy Italy." In August, Arese saw Napoléon III at Saint Sauveur, and pointed out that the annexations in Central Italy were inevitable. Then came Metternich, insisting on the observance of the compact at Villafranca, and so on September 5th the Emperor wrote to Arese, "I think that if Tuscany recalled the Grand Duke, we might reunite Parma and Piacenza to Piedmont, place the Duchess of Parma at Modena, and obtain for the Venetians an Italian administration, an Italian army, and a provincial council." Thus did the Emperor strive to find a *modus vivendi* to obtain the utmost freedom for Italy with the least

disturbance of peace and departure from honourable undertaking, but it was of little use, the Piedmontese Government was slowly selling itself to the revolution, and with extremists on both sides it was impossible to treat. On October 3rd the Emperor wrote to Arese, complaining of the "lack of firmness" in the Piedmontese Government, and again the next day, when he said, "It grieves me to see the heedlessness of the Sardinian Government, because it must necessarily lead to a coolness between us." A few days later, on October 11th, the Emperor took occasion to explain his views on the question of the papal throne in reply to an address from Cardinal Donnet at Bordeaux. The Cardinal repeated the Emperor's own words: "'The temporal sovereignty of the venerable head of the Church is as much bound up with the splendour of Catholicism, as with the liberty and independence of Italy," and entreated the Sovereign to ensure the triumph of the Pope. "This triumph would put an end to the anxieties of the Catholic world, who would salute him with transport." The Emperor replied: "I thank you for recalling my words, for I have the firm hope that a new era of glory for the Church will arise as soon as the whole world shares my conviction that the temporal power of the Holy Father is not opposed to the independence of Italy." After referring to the probable departure of the French troops from Rome before very long, the Emperor continued: "It is necessary to seek truth with calmness, and to entreat Providence to enlighten peoples and kings concerning the wise exercise of their rights as well as the extent of their duties, and not to make an appeal to ardent passions."

On September 7th, an article on the Italian question appeared in the *Moniteur*, inspired by the Emperor. This article upheld the idea of the confederation, in which the Emperor of Austria would be merely Grand Duke of Venetia, and blamed those who were hindering the work. The treaty of Villafranca should be executed.

Early in the new year the idea gained currency that there was to be a cession of territory from Sardinia to France. On January 31st, M. Thouvenel expressed through Moustier, the

French Ambassador in Vienna, the "sincere and profound regret" of the Imperial Government at being prevented from fulfilling its engagements. The only way, he thought, to cut the knot was to accept the fourth point of the English proposals, namely the undertaking from Sardinia to cease sending troops into Central Italy. Austria, however, demurred to the English proposals, and so M. Thouvenel suggested another solution in the three following points: The annexation of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to Sardinia; the temporal administration of the Romagna under the form of a vicariate exercised by the King of Sardinia in the name of the Holy See; the re-establishment of Tuscany in its political and territorial independence. Thus did the Government of the Emperor once again attempt to find a *modus vivendi* to reconcile historic rights with "the inexorable logic of facts." It was an all but impossible task. The Emperor brought no inconsiderable pressure to bear upon the Sardinian Government when he intimated that in the event of a refusal of the French proposals he would withdraw the army, and leave Victor Emmanuel to himself; yet Cavour had the temerity to refuse. This was early in March. As for the Pope, the answer was explicit enough. On February 29th, Cardinal Antonelli wrote to the Nuncio in Paris as follows: "The Holy Father cannot consent to an abdication of any sort, and he never can. He cannot, because his States are not his personal property, but belong to the Church; he cannot, because he has bound himself by solemn oaths, he has promised God to transmit them intact to his successors; he cannot, on account of the scandal which it would entail to the detriment of the actually dispossessed Italian princes, and even to the detriment of all Christian princes." The Cardinal Minister went on to say that "if it had been possible for us to delude ourselves as to the possibility of pacifying certain Italian states by reforms and concessions, it was impossible now that parties have openly declared, as in the memoir of the so-called Government of Bologna, that no reforms would satisfy short of the utter destruction of the temporal power." The noble cause of Italian independence was being

guided by extremists, revolutionary and anti-Christian, and the policy of Cavour, while he essayed to cripple them, became perforce more and more swayed by their principles, until the Government of King Victor Emmanuel found itself in a position hopelessly at variance with the law of nations, and therefore beyond the possibility of a compromise with Powers so conservative as Austria and the Vatican. The same policy which made the return of the dispossessed Sovereigns impossible completely put an end to the enfranchisement of Venetia. The well-meant endeavours of M. Thouvenel proved as useless as the stipulations of Villafranca and of Zürich. The Turin Cabinet would hear of nothing short of the complete annexation of Tuscany; the Pope indignantly rejected the idea of a vicariate of the King of Sardinia; and Austria, while approving the rights of the princes, would employ no force to sustain them. Then it was that M. Thouvenel, foiled in his laudable efforts for the settlement of Italian affairs, set himself to the task of satisfying French interests by the annexation of Nice and Savoy.

On February 3rd, Sir James Hudson wrote from Turin that he had seen Cavour, who expressed astonishment at the report about the annexation of Savoy. Before the war many in Savoy had wished to join France, now they were against it. Sardinia had never the remotest intention of surrendering, selling, or exchanging Savoy. This last statement was rather a bold one for Cavour to make in view of his previous discussions with the French Emperor, and his official action almost immediately afterwards. On February 24th, the French Government informed the Turin Cabinet that if Sardinia incorporated part of Central Italy, Savoy would be a necessity for France. On March 2nd Cavour was constrained to say: "We feel too deeply what Italy owes to the Emperor not to consider most earnestly a demand which is founded on the principle of respect for the wishes of the people. At the moment when we are insisting on the right of the inhabitants of Central Italy to decide on their own fate, we cannot refuse to the subjects of the King beyond the Alps the right of freely expressing their will."

But the Emperor must speak for himself. On March 1st the Emperor Napoléon opened the French Chambers in person, and in the speech from the throne thus referred to the Italian question: "Italy is on the point of setting up boldly for herself." "The predominant idea of the Treaty of Villafranca was to obtain the almost complete independence of Venetia at the price of the restoration of the Archdukes. This arrangement having failed, in spite of most urgent entreaties on my part, I have expressed my regrets for it to Vienna, as well as in Turin..... As I guaranteed Italy free from foreign intervention, I had the right to fix the limits of this guarantee; and, therefore, I have not hesitated to inform the King of Sardinia that, while leaving him full liberty of action, I could not follow him in a policy prejudiced in the eyes of Europe by its apparent tendency to absorb all the Italian States, and threatened by new complications. I have advised him to respond favourably to those provinces which offer themselves to him, but to maintain the autonomy of Tuscany, and respect the rights of the Holy See. Although this arrangement does not satisfy everybody, yet it has the advantage of reserving principles and calming apprehensions, while it makes Piedmont a kingdom of more than nine millions of souls." "In view of this transformation of Northern Italy, which gives to a powerful State all the passages of the Alps, it was my duty, for the safety of our frontiers, to claim the French slopes of the mountains." "I cannot pass over in silence the emotion of a portion of the Catholic world; it has suddenly yielded to such inconsiderate impressions; it has plunged into such passionate alarms; the past, which should be a guaranty of the future, has been so disregarded, the services rendered so forgotten, that only a very profound conviction, a most absolute confidence in public judgment, could have enabled me, amidst the agitations wilfully excited, to maintain the calmness which alone establishes us in what is true. The facts, however, speak loudly for themselves. For the last eleven years I alone have maintained in Rome the power of the Holy Father, without ceasing for a day to revere in him the sacred character of the chief of our religion. On

the other hand, the populations of the Romagna, suddenly left to themselves, followed a natural impulse and sought to make common cause with us in the war. Ought I to forget them in peace, and deliver them anew, for an unlimited period, to the chances of a foreign occupation? My first attempt was to reconcile them with their sovereign, and being unsuccessful in that, I have at least tried to safeguard the principle of the Pope's temporal power in the revolted provinces."

A significant article in the *Morning Post* on January 8th, announcing the ministerial change in France, spoke of Walewski inclining towards the reactionary party, and said that under Thouvenel there would be no more of those hesitations which had characterised the interval since Villafranca. The article proceeded: "There will be no intervention and no opposition to Italy's taking the rank which belongs to her amongst the nations of Europe, and which will satisfy at the same time the wishes of the Emperor Napoléon and the desires of the English nation." Yet M. Thouvenel was no partisan of the Sardinian designs as they had come to be; he expressed the mind of the Emperor Napoléon, and was no encourager of revolution like Russell and Palmerston. On March 3rd, the French Minister wrote to the Duc de Gramont in Rome: "If the Pope and the King of Naples understood their own interests, they would see that on one capital point those interests are identical with ours. Italian unity displeases us as much as it displeases them." Gramont had felt the situation keenly. On January 31st he wrote to Thouvenel that he had always loyally supported the Emperor's policy, and had declared that Napoléon III would never be a despoiler or aggressor of the Pope. If now the Emperor gave way to the English representations, how could he (Gramont) continue to represent H.I.M. in Rome?

It is not improbable that the Emperor thought the English Government would cut the knot of the difficulty by their open sympathy with the Italian cause, this helping rather than hindering the annexation of Savoy. In February, Lord Cowley had some important interviews with the Emperor. On the 9th,

the Emperor complained that he should be so much misunderstood, and that no one gave him credit for his intentions. The next day, Lord Cowley extracted from the Emperor the truth about the treaty, or *pacte de famille*, alleged to have been signed before the marriage of Prince Napoléon. There was no treaty; Cavour was unwilling to have one; but it was agreed that when war came, and if the result of the war gave Sardinia ten or twelve millions of souls, France would claim Savoy. Lord Cowley's opinion was that Cavour had let the Emperor think he might have Savoy, and even M. de Mazade cannot explain satisfactorily Cavour's denial. On January 21st, Queen Victoria had written thus to Lord John Russell on the Italian question: "The Emperor shows unwillingness to evacuate Rome and Lombardy, disinclination to admit of the annexation of the Duchies to Sardinia, a feeling that he could not assent to it without appearing dishonourable in the eyes of Austria, and a determination to obtain possession of Savoy."

Cavour, now completely recovered from his chagrin, had his hands full with the question of the compensation to the Emperor of the French. The compact of Plombières has been most differently stated, especially regarding the Emperor Napoléon's plans for the aggrandisement of France as the price of his assistance to Piedmont. It was not possible for the Emperor to foresee at the time of the Plombières interview the forthcoming internal developments in Italy. The Emperor's intention was to free the country from Austrian domination, not to give the signal for a general revolution, and make the King of Piedmont the master of the whole peninsula. There were, of course, various possible and even probable solutions of the Italian problem. One was that of a confederation of the States under the presidency of the Pope, as was actually agreed upon at Villafranca. This plan could have no objections to the Emperor of the French, for the Austrians having been seriously weakened, France would become the powerful neighbour, if not actual arbiter of Italian destinies. And this plan involved no sanctioning of revolution, no interference indeed with the treaties of 1815, beyond the expulsion of Austria. Secondly, in order of

least interference with law and order, there was the possibility of the formation of a kingdom of Central Italy, with the Austrian sovereigns of Tuscany and Modena ejected, if it so happened, and the Duchess of Parma installed as Sovereign of the three States. The Emperor Napoléon was believed to have rather a predilection for this idea. Should the Duchess of Parma have proved unwilling or impossible, an alternative Sovereign was ready to hand in the person of Prince Napoléon. Had the Prince played his cards better at Florence, this idea might easily have been brought within the region of practical politics. The establishment of a Central Italian kingdom could not be in any way obnoxious to the Emperor Napoléon, with or without his cousin as Sovereign, for France would still be the powerful neighbour, and Victor Emmanuel could not very well object, especially if his daughter was seated on the sister throne. This second plan was, however, beset with the difficulty of the annexation of the revolted Romagna.

We now come to the third solution of the problem, the absorption of Northern and most of Central Italy in the kingdom of Sardinia. It was this, of course, which actually took place. Cavour had been intriguing for it all along, and the realisation of this scheme could not but be distasteful to the Emperor Napoléon. Not only did this consummation give immense impetus to the revolution, but it brought into being a powerful independent kingdom on the frontiers of France, and by its effect on the Papacy seriously embarrassed the French Government with religion in France. Yet the Emperor could hardly do otherwise than acquiesce. He could find no support anywhere for a restoration by force of arms of the *status quo*. Austria could not intervene, Prussia would not, Russia had no concern so long as Naples was not involved, and England, under a Liberal Government, openly reversed the policy of the late Ministry, and welcomed the revolution.

These are some of the considerations, coupled with the fact that Cavour withdrew from the promised monetary aid for the war, which forced themselves upon the attention of the French Emperor, when he propounded the idea of a congress, and led

him to insist upon the cession of Nice and Savoy. It was a bitter pill for the leaders of the "*risorgimento*," but Cavour swallowed it with seeming complacency.* Cavour had promised the Emperor at Plombières that the Italians would pay the cost of the war if the French succeeded in helping them to drive the Austrians from Italy. The Austrians, driven from Lombardy by the victorious campaign, were, however, by the peace of Villafranca, left in possession of Venetia, so Cavour withdrew from his bargain. Then it was that the Emperor suggested that in return for the heavy expenditure of men and money borne by France in the interests of Piedmont, the provinces of Nice and Savoy should be ceded by Piedmont to France. The subsequent annexations in Central Italy made it imperative to insist on the cession, so a conference was held at Turin in March, Talleyrand and Benedetti representing France, and Cavour and Farini, Sardinia. The annexation was agreed to by Cavour on the understanding that a plebiscite should be taken. As this method had just been employed by him in the Duchies and the Romagna to get them annexed to Sardinia, it was impossible for the Sardinian Premier to object to the like test being employed against him in Nice and Savoy. The treaty between France and Sardinia was signed at Turin on March 24th, and the Emperor the same day expressed to M. Thouvenel his satisfaction at the result of the negotiations.

There had been the usual interchange of courteous letters between the Queen and the Emperor at the new year. The Queen said that "the year about to close has been full of storm and trial, and has brought suffering to many a heart. I pray God that in this we are about to enter we may see the work of pacification accomplished, with all its benefits for the repose and progress of the world." The Emperor responded, "I hope that the year now beginning will be marked by none of those sudden turns of fortune which have marked the year 1859, and what I desire above all is, that in the interests of the progress and peace of the world, it may draw closer our

* M. Ollivier says that Cavour recognised that he and his King were pledged to cede both Nice and Savoy.

alliance, which has always been fertile in happy results." The rumour of the intended cession of Nice and Savoy caused considerable indignation in England. Queen Victoria, writing on February 5th to Lord John Russell, said, "Sardinia enlarges its borders at the expense of Austria and the House of Lorraine, and it is France that must be compensated! We have been completely duped." Lord Grey, in the House of Lords, said, "the annexation would be so prejudicial to the peace of Europe, that the Government ought to do all in its power to prevent it," and referring to the secret treaty, called it "a great crime against the civilised world." Lord Shaftesbury went so far as to say that "the traffic in the rights of man which is about to be practised in Savoy, deserves to be repressed as severely as the traffic in human flesh." Lord John Russell was very irate, and communicated with Berlin and St. Petersburg, in the hope of getting allies to protest against the transaction.* But European diplomacy was not stirred. Austria and Russia indeed both threw cold water on the enthusiasms of the English Liberal Ministry.

At Vienna, M. de Rechberg, questioned by Lord Augustus Loftus as to his views on the annexation of Nice and Savoy, replied: "The same view that we took of the Piedmontese annexations in Central Italy"; and in an official despatch the Austrian Minister pointed out very pertinently that in the case of Nice and Savoy there would be consent on the part of the

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* Matters became somewhat serious when Lord Cowley wrote to Lord John Russell, with regret, on March 7th, of an occurrence at the Tuileries on the previous day. During a concert at the Palace the Emperor told Lord Cowley that "it was really too bad. He had done all in his power to maintain a good understanding with England, but the conduct of England made it impossible." An argument ensued between the Emperor and Lord Cowley on the annexation of Savoy, and then, turning to Kisselew, the Russian Ambassador, the Sovereign said, "The conduct of England is inexplicable. I have done all in my power to keep on the best terms with her, but I am at my wits' end." Lord Cowley was very angry, but the Emperor, with his characteristic fairmindedness and candour, soon calmed the ruffled Ambassador. To Lord Cowley's complaint about Savoy, the Emperor replied, "It is not likely I should act against the advice of Europe."

ejected Sovereign, which in Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna there was not. Prince Gortschakoff told the French ambassador at St. Petersburg—the Duc de Montebello—that "England was trying to organise a crusade against France on the subject of Savoy and Nice." The Prince also said that he had seen the Czar on the point, and that Russia would make no opposition, even if standing alone in Europe. Napoléon III had dared the Italian campaign in view of the "benevolent neutrality" of the Emperor of Russia, and it was by the connivance of the same potentate that he was able to annex Nice and Savoy without trouble, in spite of the opposition of England. At the same time no small credit was due to M. Thouvenel for carrying into effect his Imperial master's wishes in so difficult an enterprise with such remarkable swiftness, and Napoleon III was not ungrateful.

The result of the plebiscites on both sides was of course a foregone conclusion, although Garibaldi started an opposition in Nice, his native city, until Cavour ordered him off with the inducement of revolutionary work in the south. On April 2nd the Sardinian Parliament was opened by King Victor Emmanuel at Turin. In his opening speech the King said: "Italy is no longer the Italy of the Romans, or the Italy of the Middle Ages; nor ought she any longer to be a field open to foreign greed, but to be the Italy of the Italians. . . . Out of gratitude to France, for the sake of Italy, to cement the union of the two nations whose origin, principles and destinies are alike, a sacrifice was necessary; and I have made the one which was nearest my heart. Reserving the vote of the people and the consent of Parliament, and with due regard to the rights secured to Switzerland by international laws, I have signed a contract for the annexation of Savoy and the county of Nice to France." The ratification of the treaty was carried by an overwhelming majority. It could hardly have been otherwise, when Cavour had already taken the step he so strongly advocated.

"The true ground is," said Cavour, on April 12th, "that the treaty is an integral part of our policy, the logical and inevitable consequence of a past policy, and an absolute necessity for the

carrying on of that policy in the future. . . . . If we should change alliances, if we should become guilty of that black ingratitude towards France, we would commit not merely the most shameful, but the most imprudent act in our power."

On the 29th the Pope pronounced excommunication against all who had taken part in the annexation of the Papal territory. King Victor Emmanuel, in the speech at the opening of Parliament already referred to, used these words in reference to this painful subject: "True to the creed of my fathers, and like them constant in my homage to the supreme head of the Church, whenever it happens that the ecclesiastical authority employs spiritual means in support of temporal interests, I shall find in my steadfast conscience and in the very traditions of my ancestors, the power to maintain civil liberty in its integrity and my authority, for which I hold myself responsible to God alone and my people."

This *apologia* with a distinct note of defiance, leaves the rectitude of these annexations very much where it was. As to the rectitude of the annexation of Nice and Savoy, we might repeat the words of M. Giacometti, when he says: "I ask all earnest men in Italy and everywhere else, whether any French Government, empire, royalty, or republic, finding itself, like that of Napoléon III, in a position to obtain such a rectification of frontiers in exchange for immense services rendered and to be rendered, could fail to demand it of Italy without being guilty of high treason to France?"

The Nice plebiscite took place on April 15th, and that in Savoy on the 22nd of the same month. The plebiscites in Tuscany and the Æmilia—that is the Romagna, Modena, and Parma—had taken place in March, with the usual prearranged result. General Cialdini occupied the Romagna in the middle of March, and immediately afterwards King Victor Emmanuel, no longer fearing the frown of the Emperor Napoléon, accepted the proffered sovereignty. At this time there was still a large French force in Lombardy under Marshal Vaillant.

When the treaty presented by Cavour on April 12th was eventually passed on May 29th, there were only 33 'noes' to

229 'ayes.' Rattazzi and a few others abstained from voting. Before the voting in Nice and Savoy, Victor Emmanuel issued the following proclamation to the two provinces:—"In spite of the pain of separating from you, I was obliged to consider that the territorial changes occasioned in Italy by the war justified the demand of my august ally, the Emperor Napoléon, for your reunion to France. Also I was obliged to take into account the immense services which France has rendered Italy. Moreover, I could not but admit that the rapidity and facility of communications are every day increasing the number and importance of the relations of Savoy and Nice with France. Nor could I forget that great affinities of race, language, and customs render these relations still more close and natural. Nevertheless, such a change in the destinies of these provinces could not be imposed upon you; it must be the result of your free consent.

Sir James Hudson told Lord John Russell on the 1st of May that Benedetti had showed Cavour the Emperor's private instructions to withdraw the troops from Lombardy, but march them to Bologna and Florence if Cavour drew back on the annexation question. As Sir Theodore Martin very justly observes: "Whether the Italian kingdom was created by the addition of Lombardy and Venetia, or by the Duchies, Tuscany, and the Romagna insisting on joining Sardinia, the ground on which the French Emperor rested his demands was the same—the creation of a strong Italian kingdom on his frontier." On March 15th, at Florence, heralds proclaimed the majority for annexation to Piedmont. On the 21st, the Emperor Napoléon received at the Tuileries a deputation from the provincial and municipal councils of Savoy, and in his reply said:—"It is neither by conquest nor by insurrection that Savoy and Nice will be reunited to France, but by the free consent of the legitimate Sovereign, supported by popular adhesion. . . . My affection for Switzerland made me think it possible to detach certain portions of Savoy in favour of the Confederation, but in view of the repulsion manifested amongst you at the idea of dismembering a country which in coming

down the centuries has been able to create a glorious individuality for itself, and thus obtain a national history, it is natural to declare that I will not constrain the wishes of its population in favour of others." The Swiss Confederation had put forward a claim to Chablais and Faucigny on the theory of neutrality in 1815, and England had strongly upheld this theory. M. Thouvenel referred to the matter in his memorandum addressed to the Great Powers on March 13th in justification of the annexation of Nice and Savoy. He proposed a conference to settle the neutrality of Chablais and Faucigny, but it fell through owing to the startling events in South Italy, and the Swiss had to give up the attempt. Nevertheless, in the treaty of March 24th the neutrality was admitted, and the people given a year to choose between France and Sardinia. The Prince Consort was particularly hostile to the annexation of Nice and Savoy, "helped," he said, "by the worse than stupidity of the other Powers." The Queen and he, the Prince notes, had seen danger in the English four points, "helping the Emperor out of Villafranca and Zürich," and had in vain pointed this out to the Ministry.

"Russia," said the Prince Consort later, "gives her silent assent, Austria intimates her delight, that Sardinia is to have justice meted out to her according to her own code.... Prussia is, as usual, timorous and undecided." Prussia was, in fact, becoming nervous as to French intentions, and showed such marked disquietude that the Emperor Napoléon deemed it advisable to have an interview with the Prince Regent. This interview duly took place at Baden on June 12th, when there assembled to meet the Emperor of the French, the Prince Regent of Prussia, the King of Hanover, the King of Bavaria, the King of Saxony, the King of Wurtemberg, the Grand Duke of Baden, the Grand Duke of Hesse, and the Duke of Saxe-Coburg. To each and all the Emperor Napoléon expressed his firm intention to preserve peace. The Prince Regent gave an interesting account of his interview with the Emperor in a letter to the Prince Consort.

The Emperor had said his object was to give an earnest of his pacific intentions. Nice and Savoy was quite an exceptional case. When he promised assistance to Victor Emmanuel, this annexation was understood to follow any material addition to Piedmontese territory resulting from the war. The Prince Regent said this was most satisfactory, but he knew nothing about Nice and Savoy before the war, and the Emperor had now appeared as a General and Commander-in-Chief. Let the Emperor tell the other Sovereigns in Germany the same as he had told him (the Prince Regent). The Emperor was guarded, the Prince Regent said, on Italian affairs, but he promised to use influence with Victor Emmanuel, to persuade him to lend no help to Garibaldi against Naples.

The Emperor, as we shall see, was as good as his word. Yet the path was full of difficulties. If Germany was now reassured as to the Imperial intentions, England appeared to be still distrustful. In March there had been an onslaught on the Emperor in the English Parliament. Lord Palmerston had had some private correspondence with France, and Lord John Russell got very angry with his chief. The Ministry, it is true, tried to silence any discussion on Nice and Savoy in the House of Commons, but Lord John Russell on March 26th made a violent attack on the Emperor of the French. Lord John Manners and Mr. Kinglake supported the Foreign Secretary, and even the Queen approved the speech. Persigny was furious, and raised counter threats, and the French Press assumed an angry tone. The Emperor at once commissioned the Comte de Flahault to see Palmerston, and on March 28th the two had an important conversation in the Premier's carriage. Both alleged that their great object was to prevent war; and largely owing to the tact and forbearance of the French Emperor, things calmed down. Persigny persuaded Lord John to make a conciliatory statement in the House on April 2nd. But still the Emperor felt that England was distrustful, and so on July 25th he addressed a remarkable open letter to Persigny. "Affairs appear to me," the Emperor said, "to have got into such a tangle—thanks to the mistrust excited everywhere since

the war in Italy—that I write to you in the hope that a conversation in perfect frankness with Lord Palmerston will remedy the existing evil." The Emperor declared that since Villafranca, his one thought and one object had been peace and the best of terms with his neighbours, especially England. He had renounced Savoy and Nice, and it was the extra additions to Piedmont that made him fall back upon the idea of annexing provinces essentially French.

It was difficult to come to an understanding with England as to Venetia, because of Villafranca, but he was free as to Central Italy, and asked for nothing better than to be at one with England on this subject and others. He was anxious for peace in Italy, and to withdraw from Rome. "Let us," continued the Emperor, "deal frankly and loyally with one another, like honest men, as we are, and not like rogues, who are each bent on cheating the other." M. Thouvenel was not quite easy as to the effect this letter might have both in France and abroad, but the result in England was distinctly good for the time, and on the 5th of August, Lord John Russell wrote to Lord Cowley a pacific reply.

The *Moniteur* had done its best to calm foreign opinion by the following announcement on June 1st: "The Government considers it its duty to protest against the suppositions of all kinds, the malevolent accusations and rash interpretations, to which the annexation of Savoy and of Nice to France have given birth during the last few weeks. It is only after the termination of a successful war and of events which have considerably increased his territory, that the King of Sardinia, on the just demand of the Emperor, and consulting, moreover, the interest of provinces separated from the rest of his states by the highest mountains of Europe, has consented to sign the treaty which is about to unite them to France after the solemn vote of the populations. What can be more frank, more regular, more legitimate? And yet, under the influence of hostile passions or imprudent sympathies (*amitiés*), some persons allow themselves insinuations, others appreciations, which tend to attribute to the French Government the design of provoking

or suffering complications to arise in Europe, in order to seek occasion for new acquisitions of territory. The thoughts which animate it, however, are wholly different. The Government, we proclaim it openly, deplores these manœuvres destined to propagate daily the most inexact impressions of its real intentions. The Emperor is using all his efforts to re-establish the shaken confidence of Europe. His one desire is to live at peace with the sovereigns who are his allies, and to expend all his care in actively developing the resources of France."

But we are anticipating a little. Before this date startling events had occurred in Southern Italy, as we shall see later. Before turning to the story of the "Stirring of the South," which cut short the tedious discussions on the position of Chablais and Faucigny after the annexation of Savoy to France, we must pause a moment to see how recent events affected the position of the various governments concerned in Italian affairs towards each other. We must recapitulate a little to review the situation at the end of April, 1860—the calm before the storm.

First, as to the position of the King of Sardinia in regard to the Pope. On September 17th, 1859, Victor Emmanuel had despatched a cautious letter to the Pope by the hand of the Abbé Stellardi. This letter was but one in a series exchanged between Pope and King on the subject of the revolted Romagna.

"*Très Saint Père, J'expédie à votre Sainteté l'abbé Stellardi qui jouit de toute ma confiance. Il est chargé par moi de donner à votre Sainteté quelques éclaircissements à l'égard des faits qui ont précédé et suivi les changements qui ont eu lieu dans les Romagnes, éclaircissements qui lui feront connaître le part que j'y ai prise. Je sais que j'ai grand besoin de l'indulgence de votre Sainteté, mais j'ai confiance pour l'obtenir dans sa bonté accoutumée. Dans cette confiance je la prie de m'accorder sa bénédiction apostolique, en même temps que je me declare avec un profond respect, De votre Sainteté, Le très humble et obeissant fils et serviteur, Victor Emanuel.*"

M. Thouvenel sent a copy of this letter to the Duc de Gramont in Rome, on March 11th, 1860, after the Pope had requested Victor Emmanuel to support the Papal case at the Congress, and the King replied by the letter of February 6th, quoted in the preceding chapter.

On September 26th, 1859, Pius IX, in Consistory, spoke of his rebellious subjects as follows:—

"Moved by undisguised hatred to the Holy See, they have dared to meet together in Bologna on the 6th of this month, in an assembly called by them the national assembly of the people of Æmilia, and to promulgate a decree full of false accusations and false pretexts, in which mendaciously asserting the unanimity of the people, they declared, in opposition to the rights of the Church, that they would no longer remain under the Pontifical Government. And on the following day, they similarly declared, as is now the fashion, that they wished to unite themselves to the dominions of the King of Sardinia, and to become his subjects."

On March 20th, Victor Emmanuel wrote a further letter to Pius IX. Beginning, "Most Blessed Father," the King of Sardinia said that ten continuous years of foreign occupation in the Romagna, whilst giving offence and causing injury to the independence of Italy, had not been able to give order to society, repose to the population, or authority to the government. After giving his reasons for accepting the annexations, and promising that if the Pope would negociate, he (Victor Emmanuel) would make up any loss of revenue suffered by the sovereign Pontiff, the King concluded: "I ask with reverence for the Apostolic Benediction." Pius IX replied on April 2nd. The Pope, after speaking of the insults offered to religion and to her ministers, said that it was impossible to come to terms. Referring to the vote of the populations, the Pope continued: "I might tell you that the so-called universal suffrage was not spontaneous, but imposed upon the people: but upon this subject I abstain from asking the opinion of your Majesty, as I refrain from giving mine." Yet the kindly spirit of Pius IX, even when giving the most severe admon-

itions, reveals itself at the close of this letter: "I pray the Lord to give you those blessings of which in your difficult circumstances you have most need."

On his side, Victor Emmanuel put a special paragraph into his speech to Farini on the subject of the Romagna, when he accepted the sovereignty of the Æmilia. Referring to the people, "which already of their own accord have separated themselves from the Pontifical rule," he said: "I do not mean to lessen my devotion for the venerated Head of the Church, a devotion which has been and always will be warm in my heart. As a Catholic and Italian Prince, I am always ready to defend that independence necessary to his supreme ministry, to contribute to the splendour of his court, and to render homage to his legitimate sovereignty." All through the unhappy business, while political questions of necessity made the two men permanent enemies before the public, there was still the same indulgent liking for the King on the part of the Pope, and the same sincere homage to the Head of the Church on the part of the King. Pius IX felt himself obliged to visit the King of Sardinia with the severest ecclesiastical censures in the most public manner, it is true, and it is equally true that *Il re Galantuomo* bore them with filial meekness.

On March 26th, the Pope, in a brief, declared that "in the crafty and perverse machinations," resulting in detaching the Legations, "the sub-Alpine Government had taken the principal part; not only, I say it with horror, despising my admonitions, my complaints, and all ecclesiastical penalties, but stiff-necked in its dishonesty against all right, extorted a popular vote by dint of money, of threats, of terror, and of other artifices." Three days later the excommunication followed, to which we have already referred.

It must not be supposed that the annexations to Piedmont passed without protest. Austria had joined the Emperor Napoléon in objecting to the projected Regency in Central Italy, and when Victor Emmanuel accepted the annexations, the Austrian Government addressed a solemn protest to the Powers against the act, on the grounds of the treaty of Zürich and

those of 1815. The Russian Ambassador at Turin intimated the disapproval of his Government of the annexations to Piedmont, and Austria, still without any direct communication with the Government of King Victor Emmanuel, addressed her protest to him through the Prussian Minister. On the 29th of March, Austria entered a formal protest before the Federal Diet, and the same day the Papal Government solemnly protested against the annexations.

Parma and Modena had been annexed by decree of Victor Emmanuel on March 18th, and Tuscany, after the presentation of the vote by Ricasoli, on the 22nd. The Duke of Modena issued his protest to Europe on the 22nd from Vienna, the Grand Duke of Tuscany followed suit on the 24th from Dresden, and the Duchess of Parma on June 20th from St. Gall. The Duchess had previously appealed from Zürich to Queen Isabella, as chief of the Spanish Bourbons, to support before the Great Powers a protest against the annexation of Parma and Piacenza to Piedmont. The Russian Ambassador, following French advice, had reasoned with the Turin Cabinet before the annexations were accomplished, and both Prussia and Russia replied to England that the counter proposal of Austria should be referred to a future congress, after examination by a conference of the five Powers. M. Thouvenel replied that France would give an answer in concert with England.

It may be asked what became of the dispossessed Sovereigns. The Duchess of Parma died on February 1st, 1864, when her son, Robert II, was still only fifteen. The Duke of Parma has resided for many years at Schwarzau, in Lower Austria, but visited Rome for the coronation of Pius X. Of his twenty-one children, all are living except the eldest, the first wife of "King" Ferdinand of Bulgaria.* Francis V, Duke of Modena, died on November 20th, 1875, without children, leaving as his heir the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, now Heir-Presumptive of Austria-Hungary. The Duchess of Modena resides at Vienna. Ferdinand IV, Grand Duke of Tuscany, has long resided at the

* Duke Robert II died Nov. 17th, 1907.

Palace at Salzbourg. His later years have been saddened by the eccentricities of his two elder children, the Archduke Leopold, now known as Herr Wöffling, and the Archduchess Louise, wife of the present King of Saxony, now known as the Countess Montignoso, or Signora Toselli.*

Next, as to the relations between the Imperial Government and the Holy See.

On February 8th, 1860, the French Government had suggested to the Pope, that "the Court of Rome was not well inspired in endeavouring to establish a sort of indissoluble connection between two orders of interests, which cannot be confounded without danger." On the 12th, the Duc de Gramont was instructed to urge the Pope to separate the religious from the political question, and allow the Legations to be debated on a political footing. Cardinal Antonelli replied, on February 29th, to these despatches, urging that the discontent, disaffection, and rebellion in the Papal States, was not caused by maladministration on the part of the Government, but was produced purposely and artificially from without, that is to say, by Piedmont. It was impossible for the Pope to yield a principle, and the religious and political questions were inseparable. The matter was discussed between Gramont and Antonelli on March 2nd.

On February 17th, the *Moniteur* had published a despatch of Thouvenel to Gramont, pointing out that the revolution was due to the repugnance of the Pope to reforms, and that no further occupation of the Romagna by foreign troops would be possible. To this the Pope, not unnaturally, made answer that the revolution in the Romagna was entirely due to Sardinia, that no reforms would be granted until his subjects submitted, and that as the success of the revolution was due to foreign assistance, there was no reason why foreign troops should not be used to suppress it. The necessity for reforms in the Papal States had found a place, it should not be forgotten, in the Treaty of Zürich. Ever since the Pope had denounced the famous pamphlet as a "signal monument of hypocrisy," and

* The Grand Duke Ferdinand IV died at Salzbourg, Jan. 17th, 1908.

the Roman official gazette had stigmatised the same publication as "a reproduction of the errors and insults vomited against the Holy See," the French Government had been suspect at the Court of Rome. It was a sad change from the tone of frank trustfulness towards France customary at the Vatican ever since the re-establishment of the Empire.

Following up the circular of Antonelli to the Powers on June 15th, and the encyclical letter of the 18th, the Pope had delivered an allocation to the Cardinals on June 20th. Pius IX, after speaking in reprobation of the rebellious acts in Bologna, Ravenna, Perugia, &c., the object of which was to destroy the Catholic religion, said that the hope of an exit from all these evils was "certainly increased by the fact that the French armies at present existing in Italy will, in accordance with the declarations of our very dear son in Christ, the Emperor of the French, not only abstain from doing anything against our temporal power and that of the Holy See, but on the contrary will defend and preserve it."

Next, as to the attitude of Sardinia towards France. The reply of Victor Emmanuel to the appeal of the Emperor to observe the arrangements of Villafranca, was given in the Piedmontese press as follows: "*Se la Maestà vostra è vincolata da trattati, e non può nel congresso revocare i suoi impegni, io sono, O Sire, vincolato a mia volta dall' onore in cospetto dell' Europa, dal diritto e dal dovere della giustizia, degli interessi, in cospetto alla mia Casa, al mio popolo, all' Italia. La mia sorte è congiunta con quella del popolo Italiano, possiamo soccombere, tradire non mai. I Solferino e i S. Martino riscattorno tavolta i Novara e i Waterloo; ma le apostasie dei principe sono sempre irreparabili. Io sono commosso nel piu profondo dell' animo mio per la fede, per l'amore che questo nobile e sventurato populo ha in me risposto; e prima che venirgli meno spezzo la spada e getto la corona come fece il mio augusto genitore. Altri interesse personale non mi guida alla difesa delle annessione; la spada e il tempo hanno portato la mia Casa dal vertice delle Alpi alle sponde del Mincio; e quei due angioli tutelari della casa Sabauda la condurranno piu in là quando a Dio piaccia.*'"

A curious light is thrown on the honesty of Victor Emmanuel's policy towards the Emperor by a letter of February 11th, from the Duc de Gramont to M. Thouvenel, giving an account of an audience with Pius IX. The Pope addressed the Duc as follows: "*Eh bien, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, la situation s'est éclaircie, je sais que je n'ai plus rien à attendre de l'Empereur, il me laissera prendre les Légations et les Romagnes, et je ne puis, moi, l'empêcher. On me prendra tout ce qu'il permettra de prendre, et on me laissera ce qu'il me fera laisser. Il a la force, il est le maître.*" The Pope afterwards said and repeated his words: "*Car je n'ai renoncé à l'idée de reçevoir encore dans l'avenir des consolations de l'Empereur.*" The Ambassador then referred to a letter reported to have been written by Victor Emmanuel to His Holiness, and quoted the words as follows: "*Que ce n'était pas pour ses beaux yeux que l'Empereur avait fait la campagne d'Italie, ni par sympatie pour l'Italie, mais parce qu'il voulait prendre certaines provinces de ses États, et que par conséquent lui Victor Emanuel, était obligé de s'agrandir sous peine de se trouver plus petit après la campagne qu'avant.*" The Pope listened, and then said: "*Il me l'a écrit au mois d'août dernier.*" There could be no doubt of it, for the Duc de Gramont put his question a second time. In justice to Victor Emmanuel it must be remembered that he was still smarting under the check of Villafranca.

On the 29th of February, Cavour instructed Ricasoli to "take into consideration the counsels given to Tuscany by our generous ally, to whom Italy is indebted for her destiny." France, said Cavour, showed no preference as to the new sovereign. A fresh vote of the populations should be taken. In declining the French proposals at the beginning of March, Cavour said that he wished to give effect to the views of the Emperor, but there were "immense difficulties." Cavour was favourable to a vote, and would accept the vicariate. King Victor Emmanuel acknowledged in his speech to Parliament, that the freedom of Central Italy and of Lombardy and the repelling of the Austrian invasion were due to the "magnanimous ally." He had told the people of Parma and Modena

to "confide in the efficacious protection of the Emperor Napoléon, who led the legions of France to fight victoriously for the redemption of Italy." At Turin, feeling would appear to have been rather strong on the deference shown to the Emperor. A letter of the time says that, "Italians discovered that such was the ascendancy of the French Emperor over the *Galantuomo*, that every consideration of personal feeling and every instinct of patriotism in him gave way before a submissive fear of France."

On March 30th, the *Moniteur* published the treaty of cession between France and Sardinia. It should be borne in mind that the secret treaty preceding that of March 24th had been signed on the 12th, that is, just before M. Thouvenel's note to the Powers on March 13th.

By a secret part of the treaty of March 24th, France guaranteed Lombardy and Parma to Sardinia, but not Tuscany or the Romagna. This fact tended to force the hand of Cavour in acceding to the French demands for Nice and Savoy. Thouvenel informed Cavour in March, that the French Government would not follow Piedmont in a "perilous" course. If Victor Emmanuel accepted Tuscany, he would run the risk of losing support from France. M. Thouvenel said that the Emperor desired the simple cession of Savoy without a plébiscite, and that, with regard to Tuscany, the difficulty was to obtain the recognition of Europe, which had guaranteed the House of Lorraine.

Before the vote was taken in Central Italy, Buoncompagni resigned, for appearance sake, his governor-generalship, and, after the plébiscite, Victor Emmanuel appointed the Prince of Carignano, Lieutenant in Tuscany, and Baron Ricasoli, Governor-General. Ricasoli's attitude towards the Church may be inferred from an address of his to the National Guard at Florence, during the revolution. "We have in our midst," he said, "a decrepit foe in Rome's temporal sceptre. Mix not up the faith of your fathers with that nuisance..... As a Catholic, I feel it my duty to denounce the fraud of a worldly and profane court, as much adverse to true Christianity as to national happiness."

In February, the Tuscan troops in Florence and Bologna had been replaced by Piedmontese, and Victor Emmanuel gradually occupied the whole of Central Italy with his army, requesting the Emperor of the French to be good enough to leave some French troops in Lombardy. "France and Italy," said Victor Emmanuel, at the conclusion of his address to Nice and Savoy, "are two sister nations, whose destiny is to march at the head of civilisation."

Next, as to the English Government. Lord John Russell had written privately to Lord Cowley, on hearing from the Ambassador in September, 1859, of the scheme discussed between the Emperor Napoléon and Prince Metternich. This plan permitted the annexation of Parma and Piacenza to Piedmont, but handed over Modena to the Duchess of Parma, and restored Tuscany to Ferdinand IV. "I should use terms," said Lord John, "of abhorrence and indignation too strong for eyes and ears diplomatic. The disposal of the Tuscans and Modenese, as if they were so many firkins of butter, is somewhat too profligate." When the Emperor refused to allow the Regency of the Prince of Carignano, the Piedmontese Government asked England to support them against Austria. In this event, Victor Emmanuel would go on with his programme. The English ministry, however, would make no promises. After his inflammatory speech in the House of Commons, Lord John Russell wrote to Lord Cowley on March 26th: "I have just spoken a speech which may rebound in France. I hope the effect may be to rescue Chablais and Faucigny. We cannot see Swiss independence threatened without emotion." Persigny's "*Quel langage*" was speedily followed by a request from Lord Palmerston to the Comte de Flahault, to repeat Lord John's speech to the Emperor, as it expressed his (Palmerston's) opinion. The Comte de Flahault exclaimed: "*Mais c'est la guerre,*" and Palmerston coolly replied: "*Eh bien! si c'est la guerre, c'est la guerre. Que voulez-vous? Nous sommes preparés, et nous l'attendons de pied ferme.*" The unrestrained Premier might well have taken a lesson from a Liberal in the House of Commons, when, on March 3rd, in phrase at once more sober and more English

than his own, Mr. John Bright exclaimed: "Perish, Savoy! . . . . . rather than that we, the representatives of the people of England, should involve the Government of this country with the people and the Government of France."

In April, Rechberg authorised Apponyi, in London, to assure Lord John Russell that although Austria could not support the English protest concerning Savoy, she considered that the safety of Europe depended upon the faithful observance of treaties, and would even propose common action with England. Nothing, however, came of these pourparlers, the divergence of view between Downing Street under a Liberal ministry, and the Ballplatz, was too wide for any common action. For one thing, the English Cabinet would not agree to any support of the King of the Two Sicilies.

On the 22nd, the *Moniteur* published two despatches of M. Thouvenel, one to Persigny, in London, and the other to Tillos, the French Minister at Berne. To England it was stated that the annexation was necessary owing to the great additions to Piedmont. This was, as it were, a rejoinder to the rather strong expression of feeling in the English Parliament, to which we have already referred. To do justice to the Palmerston-Russell Ministry, it must be admitted that they acted with admirable reserve under circumstances of considerable provocation. Lord Normanby, indeed, expressed his thanks to the Government on February 7th, for having objected to the annexation of Nice and Savoy to France, whilst he moved an address, praying Her Majesty to avert the transfer, during the debate already alluded to, when Lord Derby spoke of the "unscrupulous violence" of France and the "base connivance" of Victor Emmanuel. On the same day, in the House of Commons, Lord John Russell, challenged by Lord Charles Hamilton, explained that as the Congress had been indefinitely adjourned, the Government thought the situation so serious that he submitted the proposals of January 14th to France and Austria. The Foreign Secretary announced that France had consented to the first three of his proposals, and was discussing the fourth with Austria. Austria had not approved fully of the

first point, namely, non-intervention by France and Austria while she did not intend to interfere. Russia had vouchsafed no reply, while Prussia waited for France and Austria. With regard to the fourth point, deprecating the despatch of Sardinian troops to Central Italy until the vote had been taken, Lord John Russell explained that if Central Italy was determined to join Sardinia, then the troops might be sent. This point was submitted to France alone. The second and third points, it will be remembered, were the withdrawal of French troops and non-interference with Austria in Venetia.

The subject came up again in the House of Lords on February 14th, when Lord Normanby enquired whether instructions had been given to the English *chargé d'affaires* at Florence, to attend a reception held on January 1st, by Buoncompagni, then acting as Governor-General of Tuscany without the consent of the people. Lord Normanby also asked for the dates of all communications between the Foreign Office and the British Ambassador in Paris, on Nice and Savoy, since January 1st. To this demand Lord Granville assented, but eventually the matter became so serious that Lord Cowley had to come and answer for himself in the House of Lords.

In the debate of February 14th, Lord Derby asked if all the papers on Nice and Savoy had been given to the House, and Lord Malmesbury expressed regret that the Government had not acted like its predecessor, by laying before Parliament a full statement of the conduct of affairs in regard to Italy. Lord Malmesbury said that he objected to the annexation of Savoy to France, and trusted the Government would adhere, as did the late Government, to the policy of non-intervention. Thus much, by way of recapitulation, to show the position of the English Ministry at this critical period. Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell so plainly sympathised with the annexations to Piedmont, that consistency as well as prudence counselled a reticent benevolence towards the annexations to the Empire of France. M. Thouvenel was fully aware of this; he knew his men, and the expostulations of England troubled

him no more than did the mild note of disapproval addressed to him by Prussia, at the request of England, on the 27th of March.

The Government of the Swiss Confederation certainly kept M. Thouvenel fully occupied in writing despatches in reply to Dr. Hern. The Swiss Government, in March, protested against the annexation of Chablais and Faucigny, until the Great Powers, to whom the Imperial Government had declared itself ready to submit the question, had given a decision.

The French Minister, in the note to Berne, published by the *Monitcur* on March 22nd, expressed his surprise that Switzerland should protest instead of relying on the justice of the Emperor Napoléon. The Féderal Government, he said, had no foundation for invoking treaties, yet France was willing for a compromise. No French garrisons were placed in Chablais and Faucigny provisionally, but the Swiss continued their protests.

In a formal protest made by the Federal Council, at this time, against the cession of Savoy, the King of Sardinia was required to observe treaty stipulations, and it was declared that the cession of Chablais, Faucigny, and the Genevois to France, was a violation of the treaties of 1815. M. Thouvenel explained his circular, but protests and petitions continued. On March 27th, the Swedish Government, in a note to Thouvenel, defended the Swiss position, and recommended the neutrality of Chablais and Faucigny. In April, M. Thouvenel, in a second note to Switzerland, said that the Emperor Louis Napoléon had "no thought of altering any of the legislative provisions on which depend the neutrality of Switzerland"; the treaty with Victor Emmanuel provides that the French Emperor shall come to an understanding with Switzerland and the Powers; this should completely reassure the Federal Council. But still they went on. The Council issued another note to the Powers against the voting in Savoy, complaining that it was not valid, owing to the presence of French agents directing the proceedings. Prince Gortschakoff replied to the Federal Council of Switzerland, that Russia gave her complete adherence to the Conference proposed by France. Austria pointedly declined to interfere.

M. Thouvenel informed the Powers that the French Government answered the Swiss note of April 5th as to the Conference, by stating that France and Austria had jointly suggested a Conference after the treaty of Zürich, and no Power had then objected. So France proposed the same course now, when the votings, &c., were over. France would consent to a Conference on the affairs of Switzerland, on the understanding that there would be no interference with the treaty of March 24th between France and Sardinia. M. Thouvenel issued notes on Savoy on April 7th and 16th. The Minister maintained that no upsetting of the treaty of Vienna was involved, and no altered situation in Switzerland, by the annexation of the neutralised districts. In May, the Federal Council issued a fresh note answering M. Thouvenel's assertion that it was in favour of Sardinia, and not of Switzerland, that the treaty of 1815 neutralised Northern Savoy. M. Thouvenel now agreed to a declaration in the coming Conference that Chablais and Faucigny should remain outside the French customs, and form a separate commercial zone. The subject then dropped.

To sum up briefly the results of the war of 1859 and its attendant circumstances. In April, 1860, the King of Sardinia, with Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Duchies added to Piedmont, found himself the accepted ruler of most of northern and central Italy. The Emperor of the French had added the beautiful provinces of Nice and Savoy to the Empire, and by the expulsion of the '*tedeschi*' had earned the gratitude of twelve millions of Italians. Victor Emmanuel was now the chosen Sovereign of nearly half the peninsula, and Napoléon III was acknowledged by all but republican revolutionaries, to be the powerful and magnanimous friend of the national cause. Cavour had long thought better of the foolish ravings and ungrateful impertinences of Monzambano and Turin, and in the calm of Leri he had come to take a more respectful and a saner view.

"The consequences of the peace of Villafranca," he wrote to Prince Napoléon, "have developed in the most admirable manner. The military and political campaign, which has followed that treaty, has been of greater advantage to Italy than the

military campaign which preceded it. It has given the Emperor Napoléon III greater claims on the gratitude of the Italians, than the battles of Magenta and Solferino." And Cavour did not lose his head a second time. From this time forward, even while he schemed behind the back of the Emperor, Cavour was not one whit behind his master in deference to the powerful ally.

The oft-repeated charge of ambition to set up a kingdom for one of his own family in Italy, had been finally shown to be illusory by the Emperor's frank and consistent policy.

The *Moniteur*, indeed, disposed of the tale on September 28th by the following announcement:—

"Several foreign papers assert that the solution of the affairs of Italy will be obstructed by the desire which the Emperor has to create in Italy a kingdom for a prince of his own house. These rumours need not be refuted. It suffices, in order to deprive them of every foundation, without mentioning the engagements made at Villafranca, to remind the public of the acts and words of the Emperor both before and after that epoch."

Contemporary opinion in this country of no extreme party kind on the position of the Emperor Napoléon at this period may not unfairly be gauged by the succeeding extracts from a leading London weekly, between July 2nd, 1859, and March 17th, 1860:—

"The Emperor Napoléon has acquired glory enough to satisfy any reasonable amount of ambition, and the Austrians have suffered a sufficient amount of defeat to show that their cause in Italy is hopeless, and yet not sufficient to degrade them in their own eyes."

"From first to last — in every aspect, social, moral, and political—the war has been abnormal and unnatural—a labyrinth of which no one possessed the clue but that dark and secret Emperor, who towers above all Europe in the plenitude of his power, and in the grandeur and inscrutability of his destiny and his purposes . . . One thing is clear: the Emperor of the French is the Lord Paramount of Europe. The Continental

Sovereigns exist upon his sufferance. He has no law but his will. And his will is the secret of his own bosom. He controls large revenues, and renders no account. He leads immense armies, and handles them like a soldier. Success follows him. Victory crowns him. The most hopeless enterprises succeed when he touches them. The wildest schemes appear prudent and practicable as soon as he has breathed his approval."

"Means must be found to rescue Napoléon III from his hasty promise at Villafranca, to aid in the restoration of the Tuscan, Parmesan, and Modenese Sovereigns; and unless the war is to be renewed — with the possibility of France and Austria finding themselves on the same side—that European Congress to which the King of Sardinia so wisely refers the question of Tuscany, must be summoned without delay."

"As yet the British people have given nothing but their sympathy to the Italians in their struggle for independence. France has given the lives of 50,000 men and millions of treasure to the cause."

"Austria having been eliminated by the fortune of war, France remained the sole arbiter of the destinies of the Pope. In assuming the initiative, and in promulgating before the meeting of the great European Congress a definite, well-considered, and feasible plan for the settlement of this ancient, obstinate, and increasing difficulty, the Emperor Napoléon has been guilty of no arrogance or presumption. He has simply assumed his proper place, and acted in accordance with his duty and responsibilities. The plan has the merit of directness and completeness . . . The Emperor Napoléon is strong enough in the support of France, and the necessary adhesion to his project of Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to carry his project against any opposition that may come either from the Pope himself, or from Austria combined with Spain and Naples . . . The French Emperor has done much to trouble Europe; but if he settle the Papal question—as there is every reason to believe that he will—on the basis laid down in this celebrated pamphlet, he will more than make amends for all the past inquietude he has caused, gain a more glorious victory than